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ABSTRACT 
On May 8, 1945 eleven to twelve million Germans experienced the fall 
of National Socialist Germany while in Allied captivity;1 four million German 
soldiers experienced it as captives of the United States. These Germans not 
only had to negotiate and respond to “victorious” Americans who judged 
them by standards different from those in the regime for which they fought, 
but also had to put into perspective their active investment in a political and 
social structure that had initiated and carried out global war and genocide. 
This study analyzes nine personal interviews conducted between 2001 and 
2004 to address how German soldiers and war prisoners remember their 
“private” experiences of the rupture of Germany‟s defeat and their 
transnational relations with U.S. personnel in captivity. By employing popular 
memory theory, it will investigate how German veterans, sixty years after the 
war, compose private memories and senses of self in the persistent shadows 
of their National Socialist past. 
                                               
1 This number includes a small percentage of persons of other nationalities who had to fight 
or volunteered to fight for the Germans in western and eastern war theaters. The number 
also includes civilians who had worked for National Socialist offices and organizations. 
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NOTE ON TRANSLATIONS 
 This dissertation uses excerpts from nine German-language 
interviews and cites several German-language secondary sources. I have 
translated into English all quotations from these sources. Translations from 
secondary sources are identified by “[my translation]” inside the quotation 
marks of translated quotations. German words and phrases are italicized and 
directly followed by their English translation in parentheses. Translations of 
interviews are not specifically identified because all interviews were originally 
in German and were translated into English. 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
2 The future publication of this work will include both the original German-language 
quotations and their English translations.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Growing up in the Rhineland region of the Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG) in the 1970s and 1980s, I heard stories about the aftermath 
of the Second World War, and about grandfathers and uncles who were war 
prisoners under British and U.S. control in North Africa, Italy, and Germany. I 
heard stories of the destruction of my great-grandparents‟ house in Speyer in 
1944, the arrival of U.S. soldiers in March 1945, the burnt-out U.S. tank my 
relatives pilfered for metal, and their great surprise that the U.S. soldiers did 
not shoot them in the back, as Hitler had warned. Another tale concerned a 
horse bone, found during 1947, postwar Germany‟s leanest year, and which 
provided animal fat to supplement the family‟s weekly seven-gram rations of 
butter. The abundance of stories about the end of the war makes two things 
clear: 1) my family has an ambivalent relationship to our German past, U.S. 
military personnel (and the United States in general), and the consequences 
of Germany‟s defeat, and 2) memory often conflicts with history.  
Early on in my life, I observed that my relatives‟ memories of 
Germany‟s past were anything but comprehensive. Most of their stories 
focused on the damage that real or imagined “enemies” had inflicted rather 
than on what Germans had done to their adversaries. This was a tendency 
my parents and their siblings (all born after 1948) refused to accept when the 
family was together. In the 1970s and 1980s, my parents refused to listen to 
their parents‟ war stories. Instead, they confronted my grandparents and 
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great-grandparents with Germany‟s atrocities—mainly the murder of Jews—
made increasingly explicit in media reports and history texts. Although my 
relatives‟ conflicts exposed rifts among different memories of Germany‟s 
past, these conflicts were not limited to our family:  memories clashed at 
home and in public, between generations and among peers, between the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic.  
As an American Studies Graduate student at the University of Kansas, 
I began to wonder if Germans from the war generation would ever honestly 
address their choices and actions. Would people who lived in the Third Reich 
tell the same defensive stories to a less cynical audience? I wanted to know 
how the U.S. military intervention affected the memories of Germans most 
actively involved in the war: German soldiers. In particular, how did German 
soldiers negotiate memories of the rupture caused by their defeat? How did 
they negotiate the fissure between memories of the Third Reich, the nation 
that started, planned, and justified the war legally and morally; and memories 
about the United States, the nation that defeated, held captive, judged, and 
punished Germans for acts that were legitimate according to National 
Socialist standards? How have the soldiers remembered and talked about 
this past? Since memories of those from “the war generation” did not seem to 
resonate with memories of Germans from later generations, how did the 
soldiers re-negotiate their memories with stories that circulated among the 
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German public in the decades after the war? What functions do their 
memories perform in the context of present-day German society and culture?   
In an effort to examine how German soldiers composed their pasts as 
memory and how they have sought to maintain a cohesive sense of self in 
the face of those conflicting memories, I interviewed—in German—thirty 
German veterans who fought in the war and experienced U.S. captivity either 
in the United States or in Europe between 1943 and 1947, and who lived in 
the Federal Republic of Germany. Based on nine of these interviews, which I 
conducted between 2001 and 2004,  this dissertation analyzes how former 
German soldiers and war prisoners compose their stories in present-day 
(unified) Germany about the rupture of Germany‟s defeat and their 
transnational relations with U.S. military personnel in captivity. 
1.1 German Soldiers and Prisoners of War: A Brief History 
The mass internment of German soldiers after 1945 was a specific 
consequence, perhaps an unanticipated one, but nevertheless a 
consequence, of Germany‟s illegal and aggressive war as well as its war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. Among the eleven to twelve million 
Germans who were in Allied captivity during Germany‟s defeat in May 1945, 
approximately eight million men and a few thousand women were from the 
Wehrmacht, the German army between 1933 and 1945, and several hundred 
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thousand were from the German Waffen SS.3 The German Wehrmacht had 
an estimated eighteen to nineteen million members and the Waffen SS had 
an estimated 600,000 members (301). Both groups were deployed in 
combat, on both the eastern and western fronts, and committed war crimes 
and crimes against humanity. The Waffen SS followed orders by the SS and 
the upper command of the German Wehrmacht. The Waffen SS was 
excessively brutal in warfare, especially against civilian populations.  
Both the SS and the German Wehrmacht upper command had 
strategically overruled rules of war to decriminalize military orders and 
actions that were commonly punishable under international law (Berghahn; 
Browning; Weinberg; Streit). Both Waffen SS and Wehrmacht units were 
permitted, encouraged, and ordered to commit war crimes for which they 
would not be punished in Germany. The Wehrmacht‟s function was to 
invade, occupy, and relocate or kill the original inhabitants of the occupied 
territories. Racially and politically “dangerous” people were to be executed. 
The soldiers plundered food, livestock and grain, and possessions to have 
them turned over to Germany, and they intentionally starved large parts of 
the populations in Soviet territories. The Wehrmacht participated in 
executions of Soviet Jews and maltreated and neglected prisoners of war. 
Between two and three million Soviet POWs alone perished at the hands of 
the German Wehrmacht (Berghahn).  
                                               
3 Exact numbers could not be found, but all Waffen SS men were supposed to be 
automatically interned for their affiliation with the SS.  
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Between 1942 and 1943, a Wehrmacht division deployed in North 
Africa to support the Italian troops against the British counteroffensive— Das 
Deutsche Afrika Korps (DAK) (German Africa Corps)—was defeated and fell 
into British and U.S. captivity. Of the 275,000 German Afrika Korps prisoners, 
about 140,000 stayed in British captivity in North Africa, and after an 
agreement between the United States and Great Britain in 1942, about 
135,000 were transported to the continental United States (Robel). As 
Gerhard Linderman suggests in A World Within War: America‟s Combat 
Experience in World War II, combat between the German Wehrmacht and 
western Allies in North Africa was more structured and humane than the 
combat in western Europe, including Normandy.  
Members of the Afrika Korps were put in captivity under comparatively 
amicable conditions. They were the first German prisoners to arrive, and they 
formed the most coherent group of German prisoners in the United States. 
Between 1944 and the spring of 1945, the Afrika Korps members in America 
were joined by about 250,000 German troops, primarily from the 
Wehrmacht‟s different divisions, who were captured in Europe after the 
Normandy invasion. The 380,000 German prisoners were housed 
comfortably. As Arnold Krammer argues in Nazi Prisoners of War in America, 
these prisoners received privileges far beyond what the laws protecting 
POWs required. They received these privileges from both the U.S. military 
captors and from the U.S. civilians for whom many of the prisoners worked in 
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wartime POW labor programs. The German POWs in the United States had 
been sheltered from the war, and in 1945 and 1946 returned to Germany 
well-fed and tanned, some with a college education and duffle bags full of 
cigarettes. However, not all of them were swiftly repatriated but were moved 
to camps in Europe for reasons unknown to them. 
The majority of the nearly 12 million Germans fell into captivity in May 
1945. More than 3.3 million of them fell into U.S. captivity and experienced 
very different material and political circumstances than those existing in 
prison camps in the United States. The Allies processed millions of people—
not only defeated soldiers, but also German civilians who had to be screened 
for their participation in the Nazi regime. Four million Germans who were 
captured in Europe in 1945 were categorized by the western Allies as 
Surrendered Enemy Personnel (SEP) or Defeated Enemy Forces (DEF), 
categories that excluded them from the protection of the Geneva Convention. 
One reason for this was that the Allies were unable to house and adequately 
feed and care for the massive number of POWs who fell into captivity. The 
U.S. military was especially overburdened with the Germans who, fearing 
reprisals for the atrocities they committed in the East, had preferred 
surrendering to the U.S. instead of to the Red Army (Bischof; Robel).  
Early on, the U.S. military interned prisoners in temporary enclosures 
that sometimes were no more than overcrowded fenced-in open fields. In the 
early weeks and months after the war, the U.S. military not only had to 
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accommodate German prisoners, but also displaced persons, refugees from 
the East, and liberated concentration camp survivors. The U.S. military was 
incapable of adequately feeding, housing or medically treating either its 
prisoners or the hundreds of thousands of displaced persons in dire need of 
food and shelter. Due to a Europe-wide food shortage, lack of housing and 
medical supplies, the enclosures‟ overpopulation and bad weather, many of 
the inhabitants died of typhoid and dysentery.  
In 1945, Europe was in ruins, and the millions of people who needed 
care were simply not able to get it. The majority of German Wehrmacht 
soldiers in U.S. captivity were disarmed, registered, and held mostly in these 
temporary enclosures for processing, after which they obtained their release 
papers and were allowed to travel home, where they reported to the local 
police station and received new identification cards. Persons who seemed to 
endanger security, war criminals or SS members, had to remain in captivity, 
some until mid-1947.  
Whether they were in the United States or in Europe, in 1945, German 
prisoners had to face the consequences of having supported the Nazi 
regime, the war, and the destruction they had caused. The Allies exposed 
Germany‟s war crimes and crimes against humanity, and temporarily 
charged the Germans with collective guilt for the atrocities committed in the 
name of the Third Reich (even though the actual Nuremberg Trials charged 
Germans not collectively but individually). The POWs in the United States 
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and the POWs in Europe had to face the changed political and social climate. 
Germany was defeated, the social, political and military organizations and 
structures disbanded, and German soldiers and civilians confronted with the 
legal and moral consequences of Germany‟s atrocities. In 1945, Germans 
were judged by the ethical and legal standards of the occupying forces.  
However, these material, ethical and legal confrontations and 
consequences were neither homogenous nor consistent, and they occurred 
in very different transnational contexts: in the context of wartime America, on 
the one hand, and in the context of postwar Germany, on the other. Many 
POWs had spent the end of the war in the United States—where they were 
sheltered from the war‟s destruction, the danger of being killed in combat or 
in aerial bombings and fed better and housed more comfortably than any of 
their peers at home. Most POWs who spent the end of the war in captivity in 
Europe had personally experienced Germany‟s military defeats on all 
battlefronts and the bombings between 1944 and 1945. Many of them had 
already arrived in captivity malnourished and battle-fatigued.  
In addition, in 1945, the Allied militaries screened, denazified, and 
punished National Socialists, war criminals, and men who had been 
members of any National Socialist organization the Allies declared illegal. 
Yet, soldiers and auxiliaries of the German Wehrmacht were released quickly 
and were seemingly exonerated for their involvement in the criminal war. The 
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majority of them were interned only very briefly for the purpose of 
disarmament, registration, and repatriation.  
Many of these soldiers were released as early as May 1945 and in the 
order in which they were needed in industry or for administration during the 
general discharge in August 1945. The United States military was the first 
occupational power to release its prisoners, sometimes by transferring them 
to French captivity as early as 1946, other times by repatriating them. 
Approximately 800,000 German POWs were transferred to the French 
forces, where many of them remained until 1947. Another reason for early 
repatriation was the United States‟ increasingly difficult relationship with the 
Soviet Union and its goal to rebuild Germany and establish the western 
Alliance.  
Many German prisoners who had not been found guilty of war crimes 
were nevertheless kept in captivity in France or Great Britain, where they 
were used for labor. Because prisoners were seemingly randomly selected 
for these postwar labor and reparation programs, many Germans saw these 
additional years in captivity as punishment for crimes they had not 
committed. Many Germans, some of whom had even been categorized anti-
Nazis in the United States and trained to work for the U.S. occupational 
forces, ended up in French captivity after their release from the United 
States, some even as late as 1948. By contrast, many high-ranking Nazis 
were released as early as 1945.  
15 
 
Immediately after the war, Volker R. Berghahn argues, returning 
soldiers shared “escapist” memories of the war, in public or within the family, 
with people who had no combat experience. He argues that the soldiers 
claimed that the generals, officers, and soldiers who had fought on the 
Eastern front “had all done no more than fight valiantly and honorably for 
their country to stem the tide of Soviet communism. If there had been war 
crimes,” Berghahn explains, the soldiers argued that “they had been the work 
of Heinrich Himmler‟s SS. Many claimed they had not even witnessed 
anything incriminating but had merely fought a „clean‟ war at the front” (xiii). 
These private memories that soldiers shared immediately after the war had 
the effect of sanitizing warfare, on the one hand, and covering up their 
personal traumas, on the other.  
Moreover, the generals‟ memorandum, in which former Wehrmacht 
generals presented their testimony for the defense, created an official 
narrative, or a version of the past, about the relationship between the 
Wehrmacht and the Nazi regime that offered memories useful also for the 
composure of soldiers because it claimed that the organization itself 
operated separately from the National Socialist leaders. 
In the early years after the German defeat and the Allied supreme 
command of Germany, the U.S. military government led the war crimes 
tribunal in Nuremberg (1946-1949) and helped define what constituted 
criminal acts and organizations in the Nazi regime and during the war. 
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Popular discourses in immediate postwar Germany included news about the 
trials and the verdicts. As Robert G. Moeller, Harold Marcuse, and many 
other cultural historians argue, the Allies‟ denazification process, which 
officially began in 1946, including the internment of war and Nazi criminals, 
the Nuremberg trials, and the occupation, were constitutive factors in the 
construction of war memory in the Federal Republic of Germany. During the 
follow-up proceedings of the Nuremberg Trials, specifically the so-called 
OKW-Prozess (the trial against the Wehrmacht high-command), the 
Wehrmacht was not found a criminal organization (Wette). According to the 
Joint Chiefs Staff Directive 1067 (also referred to as Eisenhower‟s 
denazification plans), the SS was a criminal organization. Because of this, 
members of the Waffen SS were usually not released together with all other 
POWs but were held longer and moved to internment camps for reasons of 
punishment. As Berghahn argues, the separation of the Waffen SS from the 
Wehrmacht also signaled to the Germans that the Wehrmacht was beyond 
reproach. The clear-cut separation between criminal and non-criminal 
organizations was not meant to be a moral acquittal of the atrocities by the 
German Wehrmacht, about which the Allies knew, but it was perceived as 
such among the general German population. The Nuremberg trials thereby 
allegedly excused former Wehrmacht members and made the SS solely 
responsible for the atrocities, which also shaped discourses through which 
many Wehrmacht soldiers composed their war memories.  
17 
 
In captivity, even before the official denazification process began, the 
U.S. captors interrogated the German POWs about their ranks and places of 
deployment. They were confronted with the concentration camps, sometimes 
personally, when they were placed in former concentration camps by their 
U.S. captors, sometimes in the form of film materials about Bergen Belsen. It 
was in captivity that outsiders who would judge them differently than their 
previous government confronted many of the men and women about their 
actions in the war and the Third Reich. Whereas the National Socialist 
Regime, as well the Wehrmacht command, had created a space within which 
the soldiers were able to commit atrocities without legal punishment, in 
captivity, they found that the “rights” did not apply.  
However, denazification in the U.S. zone ended relatively early, in 
1947. The United States needed western Germany as a partner in the newly 
emerging Cold War. Germans living in the U.S. occupied zone experienced a 
relatively quick return to cultural normalcy under these circumstances. For 
instance, the United States military was the first occupying force to release 
its war prisoners. The western Allies had released all their prisoners by the 
end of 1948, whereas the Soviet Union released most of them two years 
later, in 1950, yet still retained 26,000 “war criminals,” a group comprised 
both of German POWs and interned civilians (Biess 45).The early release of 
German POWs actually comprised part of the ground work for the western 
Alliance. The United States officially ended its military occupation of 
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Germany and granted the Federal Republic of Germany state sovereignty in 
1949, and the FRG, under the first post-war chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, 
began to reestablish the FRG‟s domestic and international stability in close 
cooperation with the western Allies (Herf; Moeller). 
Moreover, Nazi Germany‟s anti-bolshevism corresponded smoothly 
with the Cold War raison d’être of the western Alliance. As Berghahn argues, 
the western Allies in the wake of the Cold War relied heavily on the 
testimonies of generals who had fought against the Soviet Army, testimonies 
that historically and socially reestablished the reputation and power of 
thousands of former Wehrmacht generals and officers. The U. S. military 
anticipated a new ground war against the Soviet Union and used former 
Wehrmacht officers with experience at the Eastern Front, men whose 
criminal and moral status were far from “clean.” For the sake of rearmament 
in 1955, Berghahn argues, the United States and West Germany swept “the 
criminal aspects and behavior of the Wehrmacht under the carpet,” because, 
Berghahn explains: 
the Bundeswehr could not be built up without the expertise of former 
Wehrmacht officers, and so the new armed forces were vitally 
interested and heavily involved in spinning out the early postwar 
narratives of a Wehrmacht that had kept away from politics and Nazi 
race ideology—that had concentrated on fighting a decent war with 
traditional means. (xiii-xiv) 
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The United States Marshall Plan and Cold War alliance with Germany 
rehabilitated West Germany materially and morally (Grosser; Schröder). The 
Federal Republic of Germany was soon better off than the countries it had 
destroyed, which, in itself, seemed to be a way of forgiving past crimes, 
sanitizing the German war and “cleaning” the record of the German 
Wehrmacht for the purpose of a new war.  
The public memory of the German Wehrmacht that developed in the 
Federal Republic of Germany in the 1940s and 1950s was that the 
Wehrmacht and its soldiers fought a traditional, if not defensive war, and 
were exceptionally “honorable” and “chivalric.” Since the 1970s, historians 
have established indisputably that the Wehrmacht was inextricably involved 
in the war of extermination and the Holocaust, following closely the main 
goals of the National Socialist regime. Despite the availability of such 
historical evidence, many Germans have continued to cling to the long-lived 
myth of the “clean” Wehrmacht, the belief that the Wehrmacht, the 
organization and its individual soldiers, had been fully separated from the 
Nazi Regime and uninvolved in its atrocities.  
This public memory of the “clean” Wehrmacht has apparently 
permeated the West German population so much so that when in 1994 the 
Hamburg Institute for Social Research opened the exhibition Crimes of the 
German Wehrmacht: Dimensions of a War of Annihilation, 1941-1944, many 
Germans reacted with outrage and disbelief. The exhibit showed 
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photographs Wehrmacht soldiers had taken of their atrocities, putting in plain 
view the atrocities and the perpetrators as well as the dehumanizing gaze of 
the soldiers who took the pictures. Widespread resistance to the exhibit in 
1994 and some photo materials, unprofessionally labeled, resulted in the 
exhibit‟s temporary closure. The exhibit was revised and reopened with fewer 
photographs but more documentation on the Wehrmacht orders and 
subsequent atrocities; it was finally able to withstand the accusation of 
condemning categorically and insubstantially all Wehrmacht soldiers.  
The Wehrmacht exhibition and the debates revolving around it 
comprised a watershed in West German popular memory of the Second 
World War, but the shift of popular memories about the war had not been 
easy because this newly popularized memory of the Wehrmacht conflicted 
with the myths of the clean Wehrmacht and its long-standing tradition. 
Different interest groups publicly fought over the meaning of the past and 
sought to preserve or earn the central place in popular memory of the war. 
Historical scholarship that proved that Wehrmacht soldiers and the 
Wehrmacht as an organization were part of the war of extermination in the 
East, such as Christian Streit‟s Keine Kameraden, has repeatedly met with 
resistance from the West German public. Over the decades, the myth of the 
clean Wehrmacht has been challenged frequently not only by professional 
scholarship, but also by politicians and German public figures (Herf). In the 
late 1990s, knowledge of the crimes of the Wehrmacht was about to finally 
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establish itself as a popular and collectively shared memory of the past in the 
public. It resonated with a growing group of critics willing to assimilate the 
memories of the past that the exhibition made public. Their openness 
towards the exhibition coincided with the moment when Holocaust memory 
permeated popular culture as well. It was the time when the U.S. Holocaust 
Memorial Museum opened and Steven Spielberg released Schindler‟s List 
(1993) and Saving Private Ryan (1998), and when many new Holocaust 
memorials and commemorative events occurred in Berlin. At the same time, 
Germans became increasingly aware that the last surviving witnesses of the 
War and the Third Reich were about to die.  
1.2 Literature Review 
Most cultural historical scholarship on German war captivity memories 
focuses on political constructions of a “usable past,” a past that serves 
politicians to reestablish West Germany‟s international reputation and power 
after Nazism. As is the case in many postwar societies, soldiers‟ war stories 
often serve to re-construct national community and identity (Anderson; 
Mosse).The history of postwar Germany is no different. Robert G. Moeller 
argues in War Memories: Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic 
of Germany that West Germany re-constructed its national identity after 
National Socialism by strategically deploying German soldiers‟ personal 
memories of war captivity in the Soviet Union as public discourse. Moeller 
argues that the German POWs‟ experiences of Soviet internment “became 
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part of West German political consciousness in the 1950s” (3-5). Citizens of 
the FRG could feel membership in the “imagined community” of the FRG by 
adopting the public memory of Germany‟s victimization by the Soviet Union. 
Moeller opposes a large body of preceding literature claiming that Germans 
engaged in willful amnesia, a type of intentional forgetting of the past. 
Moeller‟s central argument is that Germans did not forget their pasts in the 
1950s, but they remembered selectively by constructing two competing 
narratives of victimization, one which accounted for Germany‟s victimization 
of European Jews and one which emphasized the Soviet Union‟s 
victimization of German soldiers and citizens.4 Public discourses about the 
war became more critical in the 1960s and 1970s, but Moeller argues that 
the narrative of German victimization reemerged in the 1980s and 1990s 
because the narrative in which the Germans suffered as much as the Jews 
had never been abandoned (291).5   
Moeller‟s study exclusively focuses on those memories that were 
assimilated and assimilable into the national memory in the FRG and served 
the construction of its postwar identity. Interested in public narratives—the 
dominant stories that circulated in the public arenas of the FRG in the 
1950s—Moeller excluded those memories that did not cohere with the public 
representations of the past. Consequently, the private memories of Germans 
                                               
4 Soviet soldiers did, in fact, keep Germans in captivity, many of them until 1956, and 
expelled millions of ethnic Germans from eastern European territories. 
5 See also Harold Marcuse, Legacies of Dachau: The Uses and Abuses of a Concentration 
Camp, 1933-2001.  
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whose experiences did not overlap with collective, public experiences were 
subordinated and marginalized. 
Frank Biess‟ study, Homecomings: Returning POWs and the Legacies 
of Defeat in Postwar Germany, analyzes the East and West German public 
discourses dealing with Germans returning from Soviet captivity between 
1945 and 1956. Neither side acknowledged the crimes of the German 
Wehrmacht. Biess shows that political parties—the CDU and the SPD in 
West Germany and the SED in East Germany—used narratives of returning 
prisoners to construct political identities after the war that would deflect 
responsibility for the atrocities. These narratives served to construct a 
democratic and pro-American FRG and a socialist, pro-Soviet GDR—a point 
Jeffrey Herf also establishes in Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two 
Germanys. Herf argues that West Germany‟s national memory earned 
transnational justification from the FRG‟s relationship with the United States 
in the Cold War. German war memory constructed public narratives after the 
war in a process through which politicians constituted the FRG‟s national 
identity in the 1950s.  
Biess, however, acknowledges the differences between public 
narratives constructed by these states and the responses of common 
Germans. Between 1945 and 1946, the devastation of Germany‟s defeat and 
the German casualties at the battlefronts and home fronts alike “prompted a 
surprising, though rather brief, willingness to address guilt and responsibility 
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for Nazi crimes and military defeat” (46-47). In the early months and years of 
the occupation, common Germans made complaints to the U.S. military, 
stating that among the men who were released from captivity early were a 
disproportionately large number of ardent Nazis, including Wehrmacht 
officers who had carelessly ordered common soldiers to fight deadly battles 
they could not win. Biess concludes from these complaints that many 
Germans were willing to find and persecute Nazis who seemingly preserved 
their wartime privileges of impunity. He also concludes that these debates 
about German POWs also served “as one way to differentiate between 
degrees of German guilt”: men in captivity were rendered more innocent than 
men who were repatriated early (47). German POWs who were in U.S. 
captivity in late 1945 and 1946, even under conditions comparably favorable 
to the civilian population, were publicly regarded as victims of an unfair Allied 
administration that failed to separate the Nazis from the less guilty 
Wehrmacht.  
In Legacies of Dachau: The Uses and Abuses and a Concentration 
Camp, Harold Marcuse argues that between 1945 and 1949, many Germans 
officially shared the notion that they were victims of the Nazis and the Allied 
forces. The Nazis, they believed, had used German soldiers for the war, and 
the Allied forces troubled these German soldiers with unnecessary 
denazifcation processes and abused them in captivity long after Germany‟s 
defeat. Illustrating that the history of German victimization was a central 
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aspect of war memory and national interest in the 1950s is the FRG-funded 
commission (the Maschke Commission6). 
This commission produced twenty-two volumes over the course of 
seventeen years, including seven volumes on captivity in the Soviet Union, 
two on captivity in Yugoslavia, one on captivity in Poland and 
Czechoslovakia, two on U.S. captivity, two on captivity in Britain, one on 
captivity in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg, and one on captivity in 
France (Maschke). 7 The volumes draw on interviews and diaries, letters and 
written testimonies by as many as 400,000 returned German POWs as well 
                                               
6 Robert G. Moeller explains that Maschke had been: 
chairholder at the University of Jena under the Nazis. An outspoken 
propagandist for German expansion in eastern Europe, he celebrated a 
„German right to the east‟ and practiced a variety of history that was riddled 
with racist conceptions of Germany‟s eastward expansion as part of the 
necessary „growth of the German national body,‟ a place to be filled with 
German “blood and the best of [Germany‟s] soul.‟ His academic career was 
interrupted by military service that allowed him to battle what he had 
identified as the „Asiatic powers‟ behind Soviet expansion, but German 
inability to contain those powers resulted in his capture by the Soviets and a 
lengthy stint as a prisoner of war that ended only with his release in 1953. 
Although dismissed from his university position on political grounds in 1945, 
in the 1950s he was named to a professorship in social and economic 
history at the University of Heidelberg. Maschke did not have the same high 
professional status as the editors of [an] expellee project, but he was well 
situated; entrusting the official chronicle of the POW experience to him was 
therefore a clear sign that a „scientific‟ account, free of any claims of 
partisan bias or self-pity, was the goal (177-178). 
 
7 The extraordinary interest in the “fate” and suffering of German POWs in postwar West 
Germany (but not on the victims of Nazi Germany) also had other reasons. Rüdiger 
Overmans argues in “Ein Silberstreif Am Forschungshorizont” that trace services sought to 
locate the whereabouts of about one million Germans who were missing at the end of the 
war and realized that they could only do so by reconstructing how each victorious power 
processed the German enemy combatants. The German Büro für Friedensfragen (The 
German Office for Peace Questions),which funded the Maschke Kommission, sought to 
collect information about German POWs for postwar peace negotiations allegedly because 
the lack of documentation about German POWs after the First World War put Germany at an 
economic disadvantage.  
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as on 45,0000 reports from the Red Cross, the German Cartias Verband, the 
YMCA, and the U.S. military.  
In spite of the work‟s rich resources, meticulous details, and mostly 
accurate historical references, the commission‟s focus on victimization 
represents a disturbingly limited viewpoint and lacks in critical perspective. 
Most noticeably, the volumes are exceptionally detailed in dealing with the 
German prisoners‟ suffering in Soviet captivity. The volumes appear to 
interpret the experiences of German POWs held in Europe after the war as 
an experience of national humiliation, clearly juxtaposing the personal “fate” 
of male soldiers and the “fate” of the German nation as an imagined and 
political community. The authors present war captivity in hyperbolic terms of 
passive but heroic suffering. Captivity appears as if it had been Schicksal 
(fate), rather than the result of the German war.  
The volume by Kurt Böhme, Die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen in 
amerikanischer Hand—Europa (The German Prisoners of War in American 
Hands—Europe), describes the experience of millions of POWs who fell into 
American hands around May 8, 1945, as a “tragedy,” and as a “mass 
calamity not previously known to world history [my translation]” (140-41). As 
such, Böhme‟s version of war captivity was the consequence of Germany‟s 
defeat, not the consequence of Germany‟s aggressive war. The work 
excludes the suffering the Germans caused European countries and pays no 
attention to their own implication in the devastation of Europe. He also 
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overstresses the suffering of the German POWs and minimizes the suffering 
of the civilian population. On the contrary, the volumes make soldiers, not 
civilians, appear to be the main victims of the war.  
In addition, both of the commission‟s volumes on U.S. captivity 
preserve and promote a sense of military honor and group cohesion and 
suggest that the Allies, disloyal German soldiers, and the Nazi regime 
undermined their comradeship. Both volumes do so by relying heavily on the 
prisoners‟ dramatic testimonies. Testimonies about captivity in the U.S. 
emphasize the prisoner‟s resourcefulness and hard work at preserving a 
civilized life-style while longing for their families and their Heimat (homeland) 
Testimonies about U.S. captivity in Europe after 1945 emphasize the U.S. 
military‟s poor treatment and, in many other cases, examples of un-collegial 
German comrades. The commission further stresses military cohesion and 
honor by separating Wehrmacht (and Waffen SS) members from “National 
Socialists” who sacrificed German soldiers for a lost war. The soldiers 
sacrificed themselves for a cause that failed, and the victors punished them 
for a defeat the Nazis had brought on the German people.  
Especially the soldiers who fell into captivity in Europe after the war 
are represented as doubly victimized; the total collapse of the Third Reich 
was doubly traumatic. 8 Böhme argues: 
                                               
8 The term “collapse” is a common U.S. military reference describing the falling apart of an 
enemy regime. Much of the German literature adopted language used by the U.S. military 
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Six years of war that, now behind barbed wire seemingly turned 
out to have been a senseless because wasted sacrifice 
sobered up the soldier over night…. Underneath his uniform, 
which concealed much, the naked human being became 
visible, the individual who was not quite able to understand the 
defeat of the fatherland, for whom questions about shelter, 
food, clothing and medical care, contact with the outside world 
and repatriation became the meaning of life [my translation]. 
(141)  
The main emphasis of the massive study was the undeserved suffering of 
the German POWs, comprised of the German defeat, the realization that the 
cause for which the German soldiers had fought was lost, and the 
government for which they went to war no longer existed and would not help 
them when they were in need.  
Moreover, the two main volumes on U.S. captivity use testimonies of 
German POWs to assess the quality of the U.S. military‟s treatment of its 
prisoners. In the United States, the commission argues, prisoners were 
treated “correctly,” as expected, failing to mention that the German military 
had broken the same regulations. In Europe, the U.S. military did not always 
fully adhere to the rules of the Convention, which led many of the prisoners 
Böhme cites to conclude that the German soldiers had become the victims of 
                                                                                                                                     
and appropriated it for their own writing of history, which is frequently overlooked in studies 
seeking to understand the ways in which Germans narrated the experience of their past.  
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“vengeful” and “victory-intoxicated” U.S. soldiers (139). The Allies‟ discovery 
of the concentration camps and their feeling of superiority as victors, Böhme 
suggests, made the U.S. captors neglect and willfully abuse German POWs. 
He repeatedly suggests, however, that their treatment was not characteristic 
of U.S. people and their culture. Böhme‟s representations of German-
American relations in U.S. captivity in Europe after 1945 suggest that the 
general brutality of the war disconnected people who were otherwise racial 
and cultural equals: 
The [POWs‟] emotional misery remained hidden. For the man 
from Texas or North Carolina, it was unfathomable, and it had 
to be because for him the world had not collapsed… Even 
though there were many commonalities between the victors 
and the defeated, with regards to ancestry and background, 
ways of thinking, and culture, under these extreme conditions, 
they did not for a long time prove to be a basis for a clarifying 
dialog. Too much evil had preceded it [my translation]. (140)  
Although he argues that U.S. forces treated POWs better than Soviet forces 
(whom the National Socialist regime represented as racially and culturally 
inferior), Böhme frequently refers to the U.S. military‟s transgressions as 
“crimes against humanity.” Böhme claims that inappropriate “behaviors 
among the captors [were] humanly understandable. But not excusable 
because they broke the rules of the humanitarian law [my translation]” (140). 
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The German soldiers‟ own active involvement in causing misery to others 
remains somewhere in the shadows of Böhme‟s allusion to the general 
brutality of war. The German soldiers‟ suffering, in contrast, is supposed to 
restore their military and masculine honor. The early literature on German 
POWs represented by the volumes of the Maschke commission separated 
captivity from the atrocities the Germans had committed, as if captivity 
occurred in an historical and moral vacuum, at the same time as it sought to 
sanitize Germany‟s national past. The rehabilitation of the German soldiers‟ 
reputation was thus intertwined with the rehabilitation of postwar German 
civic society. 
1.3 Popular Memory Theory 
Popular memory theory (developed by the Popular Memory Group 
based in Birmingham, England) explains emotional and political functions of 
public and private memory narratives. In Commemorating War: The Politics 
of Memory, Timothy G. Ashplant, Graham Dawson, and Michael Roper 
explain that popular memory theory acknowledges that public and private 
memories are analytically distinct but dialectically constitutive of one another; 
they interact and affect each other. The theory conceptualizes 
“representations” of the past as “public” when they “„achieve centrality‟ within 
the public domain, where their institutional propagation by the national and 
local state, the culture industries or the public media ensure their scope to 
make public meaning for vast audiences” (13). Postwar Germany‟s memory 
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of victimization, for instance, was a public memory insofar as it was promoted 
by the state. By contrast, private memories “[circulate] among particular 
social groups „in the course of everyday life‟” (13). However, they cannot 
be readily unscrambled from the effects of dominant historical 
discourses. It is often these that supply the very terms by which 
a private history is thought through. By the same token, the 
power of dominant memories depends not simply on their 
public visibility, but also on their capacity to connect with and 
articulate particular popular conceptions, whilst actively 
silencing and marginalizing others. (13) 
For instance, the public memory of German national victimization resonated 
with a large part of the German population at the same time as a large part of 
the German population shared stories of suffering and victimization among 
themselves. However, stories that were not assimilable into the public 
narrative of German victimization remained marginal or silenced. 9  
Popular memory theory posits that different memories coexist and that 
people and groups actively seek “to give public articulation to, and hence 
gain recognition for,” their memories (16). Ashplant et al. term this 
phenomenon the politics of war memory and commemoration and define it as 
                                               
9 For instance, one possible interview subject decided not to participate and did so because 
he felt that he had “nothing good to say about the Germans” and “liked the Russians [sic.]” 
because they treated him “very well.” Even sixty years after the war, this man felt that his 
story should, but did not, resonate with the public representation of the war in the 1950s, and 
that his memory was and should remain outside of a domain dominated by hegemonic 
narratives. 
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the relations of power that structure the ways in which wars can 
be remembered, across forms that range from public 
commemoration orchestrated by nation-states through to the 
personal testimonies of war survivors; and from the cultural 
memories of war represented in film, plays and novels, through 
to juridical investigations of wartime atrocities in courts of 
human rights. By the politics of war memory and 
commemoration, we signal the contestation of meaning that 
occurs within and between these various forms and practices, 
and the (unequal) struggle to install particular memories at the 
centre…, at the expense of others which are marginalized and 
forgotten.( xi)  
The politics of memory model is especially useful for analyzing private 
German war memories because it facilitates seeing personal memories of 
POWs and public commemorations of war (in which POWs play a central 
role) not as identical but as outcomes of ongoing horizontal and vertical 
struggles; as variables, not essences; as forms of dialectic negotiation, not 
as steps in a linear progression of “working through” the past. Individuals are 
historical and cultural agents who have the need and power to shape, 
subvert, or conform to culture, and they do not all remember and narrate their 
pasts in the same fashion or for the same purpose. Based on a British 
cultural studies framework, popular memory theory therefore understands 
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culture as an arena of constant conflict among forces of domination, consent, 
and resistance.  
Popular memory theory differs fundamentally from the main two 
paradigms that have defined both memory studies and scholarship on 
Germans‟ relationships to and memories about their National Socialist past. 
The older paradigm, exemplified by the work of Theodor Adorno and 
Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich, studies public expressions of 
Germany‟s memory of the past as constructed “from below.” The 
Mitscherlichs, in particular, argue that common Germans‟ “collective” 
experiences and memories manifested themselves in the public sphere, 
where private and public memories appeared to be analytically the same. 
The newer paradigm, represented by the works of Jeffrey Herf and Robert 
Moeller, among others, approaches public expressions of Germany‟s 
memory of the past as constructed by the state.10  This model subordinates 
private memories that do not correspond with hegemonic memory discourses 
circulating in the public sphere. It accounts only for hegemonic narratives of 
the past, excluding marginal, subordinated, or oppositional memories that 
                                               
10 The shift from the first, a Freudian and psychoanalytic model, to the second, a cultural 
historical model interested in discourse analysis, is exemplified by the shift from the concept 
of Vergangenheitsbewältigung (mastering the past) to the concept of memory studies. The 
work of Jan Assmann should also be mentioned here because his work had defined the 
newly emerged field of memory studies in Germany in the 1980s and 1990s. Assmann‟s 
memory theory, however, is more useful to studies on collective memories that define a 
culture and cultural traditions that remain relatively constant over a long period of time.  
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people share predominantly in private, not public, arenas. These models not 
only rely on but also fabricate the assumption that culture is cohesive.  
Instead, popular memory theory combines these paradigms (which 
Ashplant et al. refer to as the “state-centred” model and the “social-agency 
model”, in order to “identify the transactions and negotiations that occur 
between the various agencies involved in producing war memories: those of 
the state, civil society, „private‟ social groups and individuals” (7, xii). 
However, each paradigm by itself diminishes “individual subjectivity” of 
private memories. 11 
 The state-centered model treats memory as “politics” and fails to 
account for “the richness and complexity of personal memory” (11). This 
model suggests that social and cultural cohesion are both the purpose and 
the structure of memory, because the power of conformity makes people 
adhere to a common culture and shared identity.12  Granted, the state seeks 
to preserve domestic and international power and recognition, subordinating 
needs and memories of “ordinary” people to larger goals. However, as 
popular memory theory posits, ordinary people, whose private memories may 
differ from memories circulating in public and global arenas, also seek power 
and recognition through their own memories and by resisting and opposing 
                                               
11 Ashplant et al. believe that the separation of these two paradigms, the seemingly mutual 
exclusiveness of these bodies of work, “are a product of disciplinary divisions within the 
emerging field of memory studies; between, for example, those historians influenced chiefly 
by political science, international relations or sociology; and those influenced by 
anthropology, cultural criticism or psychoanalysis” (7). 
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popular narratives. Thus, Ashplant et al. argue that the state-centered 
approach “may over-play the unity of social elites and tends to take for 
granted their capacity to touch off popular identifications” (10). In conclusion, 
the state-centered model downplays agency and subjectivity of individuals in 
shaping public and private memories, and it marginalizes existing memories 
that do not fit public forms of commemoration.  
Moreover, Ashplant et al. explain, the “social-agency” model presents 
memory as transhistorical and as an “expression of mourning, being a 
human response to the death and suffering that war engenders on a vast 
scale” (7). Based on Freud‟s concept of melancholia and mourning, this 
approach, like the work of the Mitscherlichs, downplays the influence of the 
state and the political specificity of cultural or national discourses, and the 
impact that changing popular currents in memorial culture have on 
individuals and their memories. This model suggests there is a “universal 
psyche” that responds to trauma in a predictable way, a stance that deprives 
memory of its political inflections, making it ahistorical and closed off to 
individually different needs and methods of dealing with emotional damage 
(11). Ashplant et al., however, see a problem with the social agency model 
insofar as it frequently suggests that memory is an expression of universally 
shared psychic processes. The model tends to impose “„normal grieving‟ 
which ignores the range of individual psychic responses to death” as well as 
“situations in which there is a “psychic imperative not to „work through‟ from 
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melancholia to mourning” (41). Freud considered melancholia the 
unproductive form of dealing with loss and trauma, and mourning the 
productive way of letting go of the past. The social agency model is 
problematic because it suggests that people seemingly either succeed or fail 
in coming to terms with the past. It suggests that letting go of the past—as if 
to overcome it and cut it out of one‟s life—is desirable. However, I argue that 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung entails dealing with the past constructively and 
not by repetitive denial. It also means that Germans have an obligation to 
remember and not to lose touch with the trauma they, their ancestors, and 
their country have caused in order to affirm accountability and avoid 
becoming perpetrators again. 
Moreover, Ashplant et al. point out new insights gained by war 
veterans who have experienced and inflicted trauma. Many war veterans with 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder “are encouraged to work at creating their 
own private remembrance—for example, lighting candles for dead mates or 
using drama-therapy to enact their burial” for the purpose “of making memory 
biddable rather than involuntary” (41). However, as it turns out, they explain, 
“many ex-servicemen are reluctant to „let go‟ of their memories this way. The 
very fact that this memory remains private and unassimilated is important to 
them; it shows that they were keeping faith with the dead” (41-42). More 
recent scholarship on veterans with war trauma, including the work by Svenja 
Goltermann on emotional trauma among German veterans, strongly 
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suggests that soldiers have no homogeneous, collective experience of acts 
they committed and witnessed. Soldiers‟ emotional responses to war are 
biographically and individually unique, which requires scholars interested in 
“how” Germans remember to study biographically unique memories of the 
war rather than public discourses.  
Much processing of past identifications and emotional, active 
investments in National Socialism has taken place privately and revolved 
around biographically unique memories (similar to processes used when 
treating PTSD). Confessing what one has done also means that people give 
up control over the information and when and how they choose to recall it, 
which may be detrimental to private healing processes. However, healing 
and transformation need to be made public because the social world needs 
to see evidence of change. Vergangeheitsbewältigung, therefore, should be 
an emotional, cognitive, and narrative process. The only facet of 
Vergangeheitsbewältigung to which I had access as a researcher, however, 
was the former POWs‟ articulated memories: carefully composed stories that 
serve a sense of self with which the subjects can live.  
1.4 Composure 
How do German veterans and former prisoners compose private 
memories of the past? Popular memory theory conceptualizes the process of 
making memories, both private and public, as “composure.” Brian Dawson, 
one of the original members of the Popular Memory Group, argues in Soldier 
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Heroes that people compose their memories in an effort “not only for a 
formally satisfying narrative or a coherent version of events, but also for a 
version of the self that can be lived with in relative psychic comfort” (Dawson 
23). In “Anzac Memories: Putting Popular Memory Theory into Practice in 
Australia,” Alistair Thomson explains the main aspects of composure:  
In one sense, we „compose‟ or construct memories using the 
public language and meanings of our culture. In another sense, 
we „compose‟ our memories which help us to feel relatively 
comfortable with our lives, which gives us a feeling of 
composure. We remake or repress memories of experiences 
which are still painful and „unsafe‟ because they do not easily 
accord with our present identity, or because their inherent 
traumas or tensions have never been resolved. We seek 
composure, an alignment of our past, present, and future lives. 
One key theoretical connection, and the link between the two 
senses of composure, is that the apparently private process of 
composing safe memories is in fact very public. Our memories 
are risky and painful if they do not conform with the public 
norms or versions of the past. We compose our memories so 
that they will fit with what is publicly acceptable, or, if we have 
been excluded from general public acceptance, we seek out 
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particular publics which affirm our identities and the way we 
want to remember our lives (301).  
Most importantly, composure explains how storytelling is an intersubjective 
performance in which narrators tell the most suitable version of their 
memories, anticipating that the audience will recognize it as meaningful and 
valid. This intersubjective performance makes the audience a constitutive 
factor in the story told. Telling the story is also a social act through which 
people manage (or seek to manage) their disturbing acts or experiences and 
seek sympathy or recognition from an audience, which can further soothe 
bad feelings. Composure is part of everyday life and our intersubjective 
relations with other people.  
 Composure also explains that we compose memories about our lives 
to project a cohesive sense of self to others and ourselves. We compose our 
private memories carefully, selecting elements and excluding others, 
emphasizing pleasant aspects and downplaying, reinterpreting, denying, or 
repressing painful aspects. We imagine ourselves within our own stories in 
relation to events we choose to recall. We may describe ourselves as 
observers or actors, as victims, bystanders, or perpetrators. We may 
downplay our own agency in aggressive acts and overplay our agency in 
acts of heroism. In Soldier Heroes, Dawson explains that any narrative can 
become a “site for imaginary scenarios with desired and feared outcomes, 
narrated „as if‟ they had „really‟ happened in just this way. These fantasy 
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investments represent a range of possible selves, some powerful and 
effective in the social world, others threatened and at risk” (Dawson 22). This 
applies to private and public narratives because all narratives offer scenarios 
in which we can imagine ourselves—and others. We use existing narratives 
to make choices before we act; we may use them to anticipate explanations 
for our actions; we may use them to justify our actions; and we may use them 
to compose memories and a cohesive sense of self. However, people neither 
integrate external (mostly hegemonic) narratives to the same degree nor 
draw from only one set of narratives to compose their own. 
 
Storytellers negotiate between their emotional needs and the public‟s 
interpretation of them by gauging cultural and ethical expectations defined in 
public discourses and enacted through social forms of merit and punishment. 
Therefore, the interview subjects‟ private memories and sense of composure 
are shaped by intra-psychic needs (and problems) and social discourses (or 
narratives) and structures. People remake painful or shameful memories of 
past actions, experiences or identifications in order to align them with their 
present sense of self. German soldiers have participated in violent actions 
and identified to different degrees with National Socialist ideology. German 
soldiers participated in murders of Germany‟s “racial enemies:” Jews, Roma, 
and Sinti. They killed Soviet soldiers and civilians and participated in the 
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occupation and violent control of territories to bring about the “Thousand-
Year Reich.” Did they do so based on orders or out of conviction?  
The Germans‟ line of defense in the Nuremberg Trials, as well as the 
defense by men such as Adolf Eichmann, was that they should not be held 
accountable for war crimes and crimes against humanity because all they 
had done was follow orders. However, many scholars, such as Omer Bartov, 
have argued that many—if not all—German soldiers firmly believed in and 
identified with National Socialist ideology or racial superiority and the 
Germans‟ justification to murder civilians for the sake of eastern territories. 
Bartov argues in Hitler‟s Army that the longer they stayed in the war, the 
more ideologically motivated they became. Therefore, Bartov argues that 
many Wehrmacht soldiers not only acted in accordance with military 
commands, but also identified emotionally with hegemonic narratives of the 
National Socialist state. Ideology was a constitutive part of their actions and 
identifications, their cognitive rationalizations and emotional experiences.  
Therefore, composure is not only constituted after the event. The 
ways in which subjects composed their memories of the war might have 
been in place when they fought in the war. National Socialist ideology and 
propaganda presented the Wehrmacht as “honorable” and “chivalric.” These 
contemporary representations may have scripted the ways in which soldiers 
experienced their actions, not only how they remembered and narrated them 
after 1945. They might remember themselves as chivalric because they 
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identified and experienced themselves as chivalric. However, as stated 
above, the degree to which they internalized these hegemonic narratives and 
emotionally identified with them depended on the individual. 
 In 1945, identifications with and actions justified by National Socialist 
narratives were no longer justifiable—legally or morally. The main premise of 
this dissertation is that the conflicts that emerged in this particular moment of 
rupture are precisely those tensions the subjects most seek to overcome by 
composing their memories: the tensions between their emotional 
identifications and the “new” political relations and discourses. These 
tensions, around which their composed memories revolve, give insight into 
how and why German soldiers used National Socialist narratives as moral 
justifications or sources of identification. Emotional inflections of their 
memories concern how they felt in response to being defeated, captured, 
treated (fed, housed, talked to), and confronted physically with Germany‟s 
atrocities. Feelings of shock, shame, or disappointment in relation to their 
captors illuminate the ways German soldiers felt about themselves and what 
they did and witnessed. Emotional aspects of private captivity memories—, 
which the interview subjects only occasionally, and seemingly accidentally, 
shared—can provide insight into their wartime mentalities. In captivity (i.e. in 
U.S. reeducation programs, screening procedures, and interrogations), the 
soldiers had to adjust to a new social order. Contradictions in the interview 
subjects‟ memories demonstrate that personal memories and hegemonic 
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narratives never align. Individuals seek to preserve private and emotional 
memories that simultaneously connect and disconnect them from social 
history. How? 
1.5 Memory Conflicts and Tensions 
The work of German memory scholar and oral historian Harald Welzer 
serves to explain the specific tensions and conflicts between emotional and 
rational forms of composure. In “Was Wir Für Böse Menschen Sind!,” (“What 
Terrible People We Are!”), Welzer argues that people remember and transmit 
memories on two different levels: cognitive and emotional. People “interpret 
the world… not only cognitively, but our interpretation is always accompanied 
by emotions that turn the event into an experience [my translation]” (9). War 
captivity was an experience in the sense that Welzer describes. People live 
in an ideological context within hegemonic narratives, the purpose of which is 
to make citizens supportive subjects of the state. These narratives affect 
people, but the degree to which they believe in and empathize with these 
narratives depends on the individual. More poignantly, Welzer argues that,  
memory of one‟s own past operates on different levels, which is 
particularly apparent where historically concluded processes 
such as National Socialism are concerned. On the one, more 
cognitive level, we remember the past from the side of history 
where we look at the past in the light of what we learned about 
it afterwards. Experiences that are located on a more 
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emotionally colored level of experience preserve their “Zeitkern” 
[“temporal essence”]; that means that they are being looked at 
in the light of “des Erlebens” [emotional experience]—and that 
is being remembered [by Welzer‟s interview subjects] … as if “it 
happened yesterday” [my translation]. (9) 
Welzer explains the coexistence of emotional and cognitive levels of memory 
with examples of seemingly contradictory narratives by members of the war 
generation. Both men Welzer cites presented critical perspectives of the 
Third Reich (with which they evidenced their intellectual processing of a 
criminal past) but occasionally lapsed into uncritical, even enthusiastic 
references to the “same” past, i.e. their feelings of heroism in the Navy or a 
sense of accomplishment for earning military honors (7-9). Welzer‟s theory 
suggests people may cognitively adopt interpretations of a past—the lesson 
of a book that argues that Nazis are criminals—that are different from the 
way they experienced that past emotionally. Welzer argues that the temporal 
essence of their emotional experience of that past may remain unchanged 
and can be re-experienced (and transmitted to others) the same way it was 
experienced in the first place.  
I have observed these same contradictions in interviews I conducted 
with subjects whose cognitive and emotional memories seemed to clash. As 
my analysis will show, many interviewees claimed not to have identified with 
National Socialism but explained they experienced Hitler‟s rise to power as 
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uplifting. This shows they rationalized currently “appropriate” statements 
about the past, through which they sought to protect their reputation. By 
contrast, many interviewees preserved emotional memories from as early as 
the 1930s, such as their excitement when Hitler came to power. Several 
subjects claimed they had very close Jewish friends who were able to leave 
the country “early” and asserted they never agreed with “the National 
Socialist‟s anti-Semitism” but later discussed their outrage at being housed, 
as prisoners of war, in former concentration camps still “dirtied” by their 
previous inmates. These memory conflicts reveal the contradictory nature of 
memory and tension between cognitive and emotional levels of memory. The 
subjects had not abandoned earlier emotional “memory habits;” 13 instead, 
they sought to align their emotions with more publicly acceptable memories. 
These memory conflicts offered me insight into their wartime mentalities and 
the ways in which they identified with and acted in response to the public 
(hegemonic) discourses in the Third Reich.14 
                                               
13 See Steven T. Ostovich, “Epilogue: Dangerous Memories” and Andrew S. Bergerson‟s 
Ordinary Germans in Extraordinary Times: The Nazi Revolution in Hildesheim on his 
application of Ostovich‟s concept of “memory habit.”  
 
14 Bergerson came to similar theoretical conclusions about the quality of interviews he 
conducted with Germans about the Holocaust. He argues: “When encouraged to present the 
story of their lives in narrative, my interview partners arguably re-enacted those same habits 
by which they cultivated their identities in the first place.... The habitual correlation between 
self-cultivation in the past and self-representation in the present enabled me to reconstruct 
[the interview subjects‟] roles in the early stages of the Holocaust. From this perspective, 
ordinary Germans still deny their knowledge of Nazi crimes against humanity in the present 
because they denied their knowledge of it in the past” (238). 
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Most of my interview subjects have learned how to use language to 
appear respectable. Many have constructed rational explanations for their 
choices and actions when they joined the Hitler Youth, decided to stop 
speaking with a Jewish classmate, or went into combat. German soldiers 
might have foreseen Germany‟s defeat, becoming subjects of a different 
power structure after National Socialism and rationalizing their alibis. 
Likewise, hegemonic discourses after May 8, 1945, were perhaps easy for 
them to repeat but not embraced emotionally as the truth. My hypothesis 
hinges on Welzer‟s views about contradictions between emotional and 
rational embodiments of memory. Welzer‟s work helps interpret 
contradictions in my interviewees‟ narratives and analyze their significance in 
relation to their emotional entanglement, on the one hand, and their cognitive 
explanations, on the other.15 
  
                                               
15 Welzer‟s theory is compatible with popular memory theory, the latter of which puts more 
emphasis on the political dimensions of memory narratives than Welzer. Ashplant et al. 
argue that “eyewitness‟s‟‟ memory of the war … is constructed from both personal 
experience and in relation to pre-existing cultural templates … consisting of cultural 
narratives, myths and tropes, through which later conflicts are understood” (34). While the 
authors refer to a tendency to interpret one event in terms of another—for instance, 
interpreting the Second World War in terms of the First World War—their reference to 
eyewitness memories suggests that the concept of cultural templates applies to interpreting 
one‟s own war actions and experiences and deriving a positive sense of self in terms of a 
cultural narrative that already existed (34-35). 
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2. INTERVIEWS 
2.1 The Interview Subjects 
From the thirty interviews I conducted, I have carefully selected nine 
interviews with subjects whose narratives were both representative of the 
tendencies of interpretations within my sample and were detailed and rich 
enough to reveal their memories‟ heterogeneous forms and functions. 
Represented in this dissertation is a selection of nine interviewees. These 
include, in the order in which they appear in the dissertation: Herr Paul, Herr 
Bauer, and Herr Leitner in chapter 3; and Herr Koch, Herr Müller and Herr 
Schuhler, in chapter 4. All six of them had been deployed in North Africa as 
members of the Afrika Korps that was defeated in 1943. All six of them were 
interned in the United States. Herr Vogel, Herr Becker, and Herr Bachmann, 
whose interviews are discussed in chapter 5, were interned in U.S. military 
operated camps in Europe, not for the duration of the war, as the group of 
prisoners in the United States was, but for punishment for their National 
Socialist affiliations. Herr Vogel was among the upper ranks of the German 
Wehrmacht that had fought both in western and eastern European theaters. 
Herr Becker and Herr Bachmann had been deployed as soldiers in the 
Waffen SS, the armored infantry division of the German Schutzstaffel (SS). 
All interview subjects will be introduced in more detail in the sections 
discussing their interviews. The following section discusses my research 
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methods, the subjects‟ commonalities, and the interview relationship within 
which my subjects composed their memories of U.S. captivity. 
2.2 Method 
I anticipated difficulties finding subjects, especially since I live in the 
United States most of the year and spend only a few weeks in Germany 
during the summers. I initially planned to obtain names of possible subjects 
from the rosters of the Red Cross or the Modern Military Records of the 
National Archives in Washington and the Bundesarchiv-Militärarchive (BA-
MA), the federal military archives, in Freiburg and Koblenz, Germany, which 
hold the main collection of military documents in the Federal Republic of 
Germany. Locating subjects through the rosters of the German or United 
States military archives was ineffective because the rosters did not list their 
current addresses and phone numbers. Contacting family and friends in 
Germany to locate subjects by word-of-mouth, however, was effective. 
Family, friends, acquaintances, and neighbors of my family in Germany, as 
well as a colleague at the University of Kansas, referred me to various 
subjects—with contact information in hand.  
I cleared the project with the Human Subjects Committee-Lawrence 
(HSC-L), which ensures that all interview participants are protected by 
international research protocol. Prior to the interviews, I provided consent 
forms assuring the anonymity of participants and persons mentioned during 
the interview. I have used pseudonyms for persons who participated in the 
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interviews as well as private persons the interviewees‟ mentioned in their 
interviews, mainly to protect the subjects‟ relatives and friends who might not 
want to be recognized. Most of the subjects wanted to remain anonymous. 
Interviews lasted one-and-a-half to two hours on average, but some 
interviews lasted as long as five hours. I interviewed some of the subjects 
twice, which added up to thirty-seven interviews and more than sixty 
interview hours. I taped the interviews with a dictating machine and took 
notes for follow-up questions.  
Because I wanted access to the participants‟ subjective interpretations 
of the past and learn how they composed their private memories, I conducted 
open-ended, open-narrative interviews with little interference. I had hoped to 
create an environment where they could speak openly about issues they 
might not be willing to discuss with their children or in public, where they 
would risk being scrutinized. Encouraging subjects to share details they 
initiated allowed me to gather evidence about their subjective remembering. 
It simultaneously allowed the subjects to use the interviews to direct the 
course of dialogue. Many men began speaking before I had set up the tape 
recorder, and many continued to speak for about half-an-hour or an hour 
without an invitation or opportunity for me to ask questions. This led me to 
conclude that those subjects who chose to participate felt a strong need for 
composure.  
Subjects who had been referred to me by acquaintances, friends, or 
50 
 
relatives eagerly invited me to their homes. The private family sphere 
provided an inter-personal context for the interviews. Many of the men I met 
through word-of-mouth and interviewed in their homes, such as Herr Koch, 
Herr Bachmann, Herr Becker, and Herr Paul, related to me on an emotional 
and intergenerational level and quite frequently sought to pass on memories 
their children and grandchildren did not want to hear. Other times, they asked 
questions they could not discuss within their own families. I sensed very 
frequently that they had hoped that I would be the guardian of their pasts. 
Many subjects connected quite intensely with me as an interviewer. Herr 
Paul, for instance, invited me to spend the night in the family guestroom. Herr 
and Frau Bachmann invited me to stay for dinner and come back soon for 
coffee and cake. 
Several of the subjects wanted to spend much time with me talking 
about their pasts and contemplating their families in historical perspective. In 
this way, the familiar context of the homes in which they had raised children 
and watched grandchildren lent itself to associative connections between the 
subject of the interview and the familiar context in which it was conducted. 
Many times, the subjects referred to a place in the home where a brother had 
done his homework before the war, or to a photograph of a relative who had 
died or a son who does not come home anymore. Whereas the subjects I 
met through word-of-mouth (2001 and 2002) were eager to meet me 
personally, they were strangely reluctant to refer me to other potential 
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subjects, thus not creating the much-anticipated snowball effect.  
I assume that not cross-referencing helped the interview subjects 
preserve the integrity of the stories they told me. As Ashplant et al. explain, 
private memories are unsafe or dangerous when they do not cohere with 
public (hegemonic/collective) representations of the past. Not cross-
referencing was possibly a matter of protecting their private memories from 
public scrutiny. It helped them keep their private memories private as long as 
I was in the research process. Moreover, not cross-referencing helped them 
preserve the ownership and integrity of private memory. Many of their friends 
and acquaintances had incriminating or conflicting information that could 
undermine the validity of their stories. (For instance, Herr Becker explained 
to me during the interview that he was forced to join the Waffen SS, whereas 
his friend confessed that Becker had eagerly volunteered.) Keeping their 
memories personal was also a matter of male privilege and private “honor.” 
Many men rigidly excluded their wives from the history they discussed in their 
presence. The subjects allowed, even required, their wives to corroborate 
their stories but were reluctant to let their wives tell their own. Last but not 
least, I was under the impression that many subjects wanted to feel free to 
vacillate between speaking as individuals and as members of a German 
generational and experiential community. Depending on the narrative 
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context, each position served different kinds and degrees of composure.16  
One subject, whose interview is not included in this dissertation, urged 
me to contact the VDAK, which is not only one of the largest organizations 
for veterans of the Second World War, but which also represents a large 
number of men who had been POWs in the United States. This participant 
assumed that many of his “comrades” in the organization would be eager to 
speak about their captivity in the United States. He was correct. I wrote 
letters to several individual representatives of local VDAK groups in western 
Germany. One VDAK spokesman submitted and published my personal 
letter in the VDAK‟s newsletter, Die Oase (The Oasis), which led to an 
abundance of responses from VDAK members who were excited to be 
interviewed.  
From the pool of these VDAK volunteers, I selected only men who had 
experienced, not only heard about, captivity in the United States. Among the 
subjects from the VDAK were Herr Leitner, Herr Müller, Herr Bauer and Herr 
Schuhler. I interviewed them by telephone (2002 and 2004) because I was 
not able to travel to Germany. Telephone interviews differ from personal 
interviews because they do not communicate facial expressions, allow 
                                               
16 As I will demonstrate in the interview with Herr Becker, for instance, the interview subjects 
often identified themselves as individuals when they referred to collective criminal actions to 
set themselves apart from them, but as members of a community when they referred to 
collective actions that had positive implications.  
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physical proximity, or require travel. Telephone interviews were still 
qualitatively the same as the personal interviews insofar as the subjects‟ 
stories showed no significant disparities.  
Unlike the men I had found by word-of-mouth, many men mentioned 
me to “comrades” in the VDAK, but the interviewees themselves were just as 
reluctant to let me know about others who had a similar story to tell. The 
intermediary was a military organization that had firmly established its own 
version of the past, a version to which all members had full access and with 
which they knew they had to align themselves if they wanted recognition from 
their “comrades.” Their use of the term “comrades” shows that they created a 
sense of cohesion as soldiers in a military organization. From what I could 
gather from several issues of Die Oase, comradeship, among German 
soldiers and prisoners and between the German and U.S. militaries, came to 
resonate strongly as a shared narrative in the memories of soldiers from the 
Afrika Korps.  
The subjects who responded to my ad in Die Oase frequently 
referenced their memories with articles published in the magazine or 
otherwise resonated with the discourses of the VDAK. Although the different 
intermediary agencies—family and acquaintances on the one hand and the 
VDAK on the other—created referential frameworks for the interviews, they 
did not seem to bear on the emotional core of their memories.  
 
54 
 
2.3 The Subjects: Commonalities and Particularities 
The most pertinent commonality the interview subjects shared was 
their willingness if not strong desire to participate in the project. Several 
potential subjects turned me down for fear of difficulties with family or peers. 
Others explicitly stated that they preferred not to talk about the past anymore. 
The subjects who did participate, however, all shared the desire to transmit 
their memories. The absence of voices from people who did not want to 
revisit the past, appear side by side with other war generation Germans, or 
felt that their stories did not “fit” comprises the biggest limitation of this 
project.   
Another commonality, an intended one, was that all participants had 
lived in the Federal Republic of Germany, the western part of reunified 
Germany. In former West Germany, public memories were shaped by pro-
U.S. transnational relations and were qualitatively different from East 
German public war memories. I chose to interview only subjects from the 
FRG for these reasons. Although all my subjects had lived in the FRG, some 
had lived in North Rhine-Westphalia and the Rhineland Palatine, which were 
in the French occupation zone between 1945 and 1949. Others had lived in 
Hesse, Baden Württemberg, and Bavaria, which were in the U.S. occupation 
zone. Yet, all of them were in the equally “Americanized” part of West 
Germany.  
At the time I began searching for subjects in 2000, only the youngest 
55 
 
group of Germans was still alive, those who were in their late teens or early 
twenties when they fought in the war and were in U.S. captivity. Most of the 
subjects I located were born between 1920 and 1928, only Herr Vogel was 
older. He was born in 1913. Thus, with the exception of Vogel, the men 
represented in the dissertation were among the youngest group of Germans 
who actively participated in the Third Reich and the only group of active 
participants still alive at the time I conducted the interviews.  
The subject‟s age played a role in the ways they experienced and 
participated in the Third Reich, and in the ways they remembered the past. 
The subjects were children or young teenagers when Hitler came to power in 
1933. This means that they remembered German society and culture before 
Hitler either vaguely or not at all. They were in school during the formative 
years of the Third Reich, and in their late teens or early twenties when they 
enlisted in the German military and auxiliary forces. They were also in their 
late teens or early twenties when they became prisoners of war.  
From today‟s perspective, the people who populated Germany in the 
Third Reich often appear as a coherent, unified and collectively motivated 
group. However, various sociological scholars suggest that groups of people 
experience and remember historical events differently based on their age, 
which is a relevant factor in the memories my subjects composed. In 
Legacies of Dachau, Harold Marcuse emphasizes the impact of nationally 
and socially significant political events on young adults: 
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sociological studies have observed that pivotal experiences 
between the ages of 16 and 26, in certain circumstances from 
14 to 30, are critical in shaping lifetime political attitudes. 
Certain momentous political events such as wars and economic 
crises may overshadow important events in individual 
biographies and affect most people born during a range of 
years (291).  
Marcuse‟s “cohort model” has its limitations, especially in a project that seeks 
to understand biographically diverse private memories. Although Marcuse‟s 
model does not account for subjective interpretations of larger historical 
events or the “eccentricities of individual biography” (291), it contextualizes 
the lives of people of a certain age in the linear progression of history. 
Understanding the correlation between age and the different phases and 
events in German history helps put into perspective the correlation between 
the deeds of parents, grandparents and great-grandparents. More 
importantly, the cohort model foregrounds the succession of actions that 
different cohorts of Germans themselves set into motion.  
Based on this sociological model, Marcuse carefully categorizes war 
generation Germans into five different cohorts. According to Marcuse‟s 
model, my subjects belong to two different groups of “experiential cohorts.” 
The first are the “1943ers” who experienced the “hopelessness of the 
situation after 1943 and the defeat of Stalingrad” (292). The 1943ers, born 
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between 1916 and 1925, “staffed the offices, schools and institutions—
including the army and the concentration camps—of the Nazi Reich during 
Nazism‟s stable phase after 1935. This cohort was also the most decimated 
in World War II” (292). Marcuse adds that they “contributed to the generation 
of perpetrators” and that they “were young enough to have had only limited 
complicity in constructing the regime” (292). The second cohort represented 
among my subjects is the group of Germans born between 1926 and 1936. 
Marcuse refers to them as the “1948ers,” “since the Marshall Plan aid and 
the currency reform of 1948 gave them their first positive political orientation, 
as opposed to the total disorientation of 1945” (292-3).17 Marcuse‟s model 
helps researchers understand why different cohorts might have different 
relationships to the past in the war, and it is also valuable to appreciate 
different degrees of moral responsibility. 
Most of my subjects were the children of the Nazi founding fathers and 
career Nazi cohorts. They inherited and actively participated in the Nazi 
regime. While they may not have contributed to establishing the Nazi regime, 
they were old enough to have participated in, defined and defended the 
                                               
17 Marcuse refers to the cohort of people born between 1890 and 1902 as the “„1918ers‟ or 
the cohort of Nazism‟s founding fathers” because they “created the pivotal event … the Nazi 
accession to unprecedented political and cultural power after 1930” (291). Marcuse refers to 
people who were born between 1903 and 1915 as the “1933ers” or “the careerist Nazi 
cohort” because the pivotal event in their lives was Hitler‟s rise to power in 1933, which, to 
them, “was a vindication of Germany‟s national pride. They immediately took the opportunity 
to make careers building and consolidating this state.” “Recent German authors” refer to 
them as the „Tätergeneration‟ the generation of perpetrators” (291-2).  
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regime. Notwithstanding their moral responsibility for having actively 
participated in a criminal regime, my subjects inherited the Third Reich from 
their parents and turned out to be the one group among the Germans most 
damaged and devastated in the German war itself. If “pivotal experiences 
between the ages of 16 and 26 … are critical in shaping lifetime political 
attitudes,” then we can assume that the experience of defeat and war 
captivity has shaped my subjects‟ political views about and memories of the 
past more than subsequent events in their lives.  
The interviews demonstrate that the experiences my subjects had at 
that age were indeed quite formative of the ways in which they would 
understand and relate to the past, but not on a collective level, as Marcuse‟s 
model suggests. These two cohorts were fully socialized in the Third Reich 
and had no personal experiences with times before National Socialism. Many 
of them experienced National Socialism and the aggressive war as ordinary; 
the changes that came in the form of denazification and the changed 
ideological and hegemonic context under allied occupation was, by contrast, 
extraordinary. The degree to which they experienced the end of the war as a 
caesura reflects the degree to which they perceived the Third Reich as 
normal.  
2.4 Interview Relationship 
The oral historian Allessandro Portelli argues that the subjective 
involvement of researchers shapes the interviews they conduct and that the 
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interviews themselves are shaped by the circumstances of the interview. 
“The content of oral sources,” he argues, “depends largely on what the 
interviewer puts into it in terms of questions, dialogue, and personal 
relationship” (70-71). Objectivity can only be achieved when the researcher is 
aware of her input, her own connection to the topic and the interviewee, and 
when she makes her investment transparent to her audience. I assume that 
my initial expectations early on in the interview process affected the 
interviews in very particular ways. I entered the relationship with my subjects 
confused about how to relate to them. On one hand, I assumed that, as a 
third generation German, I was more open to listening to the war generation 
than were the postwar generations in the left-wing circles in which I was 
raised. 18 Many of the subjects gave me the impression that no one had given 
them a fair hearing; I felt justified in listening. On the other hand, I was deeply 
skeptical about them because they were part of a society that supported 
National Socialism. The generation appeared to me as silenced and 
powerless and simultaneously contaminated by the possibility of having 
actively participated in Nazi Germany, perhaps by having condoned the 
                                               
18 In “Fathers and Sons Retrospectively,” Michael Schneider analyzes the deeply 
acrimonious relationship between the war generation and the left- wing postwar cohort, the 
so-called „68ers. The „68ers rejected their fathers and in many cases after the fathers had 
already passed away. They exposed and scrutinized their parents but failed to engage in a 
dialogue with them. I had similar experiences in my own family where I perceived my 
parents‟ unwillingness to listen to anything related to the war anymore as a form of silencing 
and repression of my grandparents‟ memories.  
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persecution and murder of the Jews, or even participated in them. The point 
was: I thought I would not find out anything unless I asked and actively and 
non-judgmentally invited members of the war generation to engage in a 
dialogue. I had hoped that if I listened to them, they would volunteer more 
information to me than they did to my parents‟ generation. I felt that as a 
third-generation German, I had a score to settle with both my parents, 
because they did not listen to my grandparents; and with my grandparents, 
because they once actively supported the National Socialist regime or fought 
in a criminal war.  
As a West German, I had both a national and a regional relationship 
with my subjects. All subjects were citizens of the Federal Republic of 
Germany; we were part of the same society and memory culture of German 
past. We were exposed to the same hegemonic narratives. However, we 
were positioned very differently in relationship to both that past and the 
present context within which we interacted. Our relationship was thereby also 
inter-generational; I am the grand- and great-grandchild of war generation 
Germans, but, in relationship to my subjects, I was occasionally the same 
age as their children, and at times the same age as their grandchildren. They 
were, however, my grandparents‟ age, which made me feel separated from 
them by one generation. At the same time, I felt connected to them because I 
had frequently wanted to overcome my parents‟ rejection of my 
grandparents. As my research progressed, I learned that the war 
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generation‟s memories of the past were indeed quite troubling in many 
cases, which led me to assume that my parents‟ generation simply 
disconnected themselves from the past by refusing to accept the memories 
their parents sought to transmit.  
As a third generation German whose own family‟s conversations 
about the past were pronouncedly defensive, I was quick to assume the role 
of the stand-in grandchild. This simultaneously hindered and helped me 
gather information. In “Mein Opa War Kein Nazi” (“My Gandpa Was No 
Nazi”), Harald Welzer, who also specializes in memories between 
generations of Germans and the ways in which memories are transferred 
among them, argues that it is primarily the emotional component of memory 
that is passed from the war generation to the generation of their 
grandchildren. He suggests that grandchildren are particularly prone to 
absorb the emotional memories discussed earlier. 
I entered the interviews with expectations that remained unfulfilled. I 
was naïve about the persistence of Nazism in many of these subjects‟ lives, 
but my naiveté and openness were also conducive to encouraging the 
subjects to speak—which they were already eager to do. I had expected the 
subjects to address issues of trauma and to be conscious of their past 
crimes. Only a few of them spoke of trauma, and if so, mainly their own: 
German casualties caused by their adversaries‟ counterattacks, Allied aerial 
bombings, and their judgment of the Germans‟ war crimes and crimes 
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against humanity. Most of my subjects preferred to speak about the fate of 
people they considered their own, but some men, for instance Herr Koch and 
Herr Bauer, spoke about feeling personally accountable for Germany‟s 
atrocities. Subjects who fought at the eastern front spoke more about 
incidents in which they felt victimized by the Red Army or Czechoslovakian 
troops, the British, French and U.S. militaries. Only Herr Koch, Herr Bauer 
and Herr Bachmann used the interviews to speak about Germans victimizing 
others. At the same time, most subjects sought to distance themselves from 
National Socialist ideology and the regime. The subjects did so in very 
different ways, while, at the same time, they may have preserved aspects of 
National Socialist ideology. As my analysis of the interviews will show, most 
subjects strategically sought to defend themselves from the stigma of 
Nazism. Most of them denied sharing the hatred propagated by National 
Socialist propaganda even when many of their emotional memories seemed 
to tell a different story.  
Moreover, in a sociological study on generational inflections of 
collective memories, Howard Schuman and Jacqueline Scott (1989) not only 
suggest that generations remember events of national significance 
differently, stemming from the age at which they experienced or learned 
about them; but they also find that “generational effects are the result of the 
intersection of personal and national history“ (Scott 380). Their study 
concludes that personal experience of national historical events in 
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adolescence and young adulthood leaves a prominent impression on a 
person‟s life memories. They argue that “it is the intersection of personal and 
national history that provides the most vital and remembered connection to 
the times we have experienced” (380).  
Their observations are particularly crucial to this project as they 
explain that emotional attachments to certain historical events are 
pronouncedly stronger when people experience them in their youth. Personal 
experiences of historical events during the most formative years shape the 
way people interpret the world around them. Schuman and Scott explain that: 
youthful experience of an actual event or change often focuses 
memories on the direct personal meaning of the experience, 
whereas the attribution of some larger political meaning to the 
event is more likely to be made by those who did not 
experience it at all, or at least did not experience it during their 
adolescence or young adulthood (378).  
They add that groups of people who personally experienced the war are 
usually “quite personal and particular—less about „World War II‟ as a 
collectively conceptualized event than about one‟s personal loss of hearing 
while on military assignment in North Africa, or the shortage of candy bars on 
the home front” (379). Their “collective memory” of the Second World War is 
autobiographical and mainly about what they lived through rather than what 
has become the social, historical or national significance of that war.  
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This might explain why groups who did not personally experience the Second 
World War tend to form and share a collective memory of it by contrasting 
(and comparing) it to the events they have experienced. In other words, 
“collective” memory of an event shifts its ground over time so that it becomes 
less rooted in direct personal experiences and more rooted in socially 
constructed discourses.  
Therefore, Schumann and Scott‟s theory about collective memories is 
compatible with popular memory theory, which focuses on the transmission 
of memories between the generations in what they call “post-memory.” 
Ashplant et al. argue that what defines the “social relationships between the 
witness and the second generation” is that they are “metaphorically in the 
same realm of memory, yet never in an identical place” (46). People have to 
negotiate between their own experience and the framework in which they 
articulate and share their memories. Ashplant et al. explain that transmitting 
memories among the generations—in private or public arenas—is always a 
very difficult cultural negotiation process “that further demonstrates the 
complexity of subjective relations to war memory” (43). Different age groups 
have very particular relationship to the same past. The “witness” generation, 
as they call it, tends to defend the “inviolable truth of witnessing from the 
„almost memory‟ of others.” (46) Ashplant et al. suggest that the witnesses 
“seek to ensure that their version of the war is not forgotten, whilst 
successors struggle between the conflict between acting as „trustees‟ of 
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survivor memory, and reasserting this legacy and their own relation to it” 
(43). Witnesses often feel “skepticism towards other people‟s 
representations” (46), whereas successive generations “may wrestle with the 
way in which eyewitness experience blocks out or marginalizes other ways of 
remembering…  [and] may impose a critical perspective on the survivors” 
(45). This intergenerational difficulty of negotiating the different quality of 
memories is another variable in the subjects‟ memory conflicts, where 
emotional memories seek to preserve their “authenticity” in the face of 
external (transnational or transgenerational) discourses. From the emotional 
urgency with which many interview subjects approached me during the 
interviews, I conclude that speaking with a third-generation German might 
have been an additional facet of their desired composure 
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3. “THE AMERICANS WERE OUR FRIENDS“: TRANSNATIONAL 
COMRADESHIPS 
3.1 Introduction 
An article by Lyn Ermann published in the Washington Post early in 
2004 represents the key facets of German POW history used in the United 
States popular representations of the Second World War. Ermann‟s article 
deals with a U.S. military program that allegedly reeducated German 
prisoners of war in the principles of freedom and democracy. Ermann claims 
that the program‟s purpose “was no different from the one being pursued 
today by the United States in Iraq: to transform a dictatorship into a 
democracy.” She argues that this democratization program: 
changed those who went there by immersing them in the fruits 
of democracy. Germans were given physical freedom: 
afternoon swims, talks with professors cross-legged on the 
grass. American and German, captor and captive, teacher and 
student, blueblood and farmer, officer and enlisted man, treated 
one another as equals.  
Attesting to the program‟s inherent egalitarianism and by extension, 
America‟s egalitarianism and its ability to enthuse former German nationalist 
prisoners about U.S. popular culture, Ermann cites the voices of three former 
POWs who had participated in the program. When their POW camp‟s army 
band met after the war, for instance, it had “switched from marching songs to 
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American standards.” One of the men not only married a Jewish woman after 
the war, but also became “head of Austria‟s largest bank, and, later, served 
as honorary president of the Austrian Red Cross.”  He describes himself as 
“very American” in that he is “now known for his generosity and his habit of 
speaking hard truths.” Ermann‟s article resonates with the main themes 
represented in U.S. public representations about the War that permeate the 
majority of laymen studies on the topic produced in the United States. She 
presents the U.S. treatment of German POWs, generally, and the 
reeducation program, specifically, as models of a uniquely U.S. 
egalitarianism, generosity, and honesty.  
Ermann‟s article is representative of the themes prevalent in the 
greater part of books on German POWs in U.S. captivity, which comes from 
local and lay historians in the United States, not Germany, and deals 
primarily with the local histories of POW camps in different states and the 
U.S. military‟s reeducation program. Judith M. Gansberg's Stalag U.S.A.: The 
Remarkable Story of German POWs in America (1977) was the first book 
published on the topic of the U.S. reeducation program. Her interpretation of 
the reeducation program continues to permeate the literature in the field, as 
well as Arnold Krammer‟s Nazi Prisoners of War in America.19 Scholarship 
on German POWs in the United States tends to argue that the good 
treatment German POWs received in the camps in the United States was a 
                                               
19 A book that is more critical of the program is Ron T. Robin's The Barbed-Wire College: 
Reeducating German POWS in the United States During World War II (1995).  
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clear sign of the United States‟ democratic character, that the United States 
was inherently well-intentioned and egalitarian.20  
The United States government planned to transform Germany into a 
pro-American democracy after the war. In 1944, U.S. Office of the Provost 
Marshal General (OPMG) inaugurated an “intellectual diversion program” for 
prisoners of war in the United States, a program also referred to as the 
Special Projects Division (SPD). The SPD, which operated secretly until May 
1945, sought to influence the prisoners‟ attitude about the United States by 
what the America War Department termed “intellectual diversion (Krammer 
193).” The U.S. military decided to offer materials reflecting favorably on the 
county‟s government, culture and people. Through these media sources, 
“‟the curiosity of the prisoners concerning the United States and its 
institutions would provide the means for reeducation‟” (Krammer 195). The 
PMGO‟s rationale behind the “diversion” program was to make facts” 
available” to them, “rather than being forced upon them … through such 
                                               
20 Among the local histories are, to name just a few, Robert D. Billinger‟s Hitler‟s Soldiers in 
the Sunshine State: German POWs in Florida (2000); David Fiedler‟s The Enemy Among 
US: POWs in Missouri during World War II (2003), Jeffrey E. Geiger's Prisoners of War at 
Camp Cook, California (1996), Allen V. Koop's Stark Decency: German Prisoners of War in 
a New England Village (1988), Lowell A. May‟s Camp Concordia: German POWs in the 
Midwest (1995); Allan Kent Powell‟s Splinters of a Nation: German Prisoners of War in Utah 
(1989), Glen Thompson‟s book on POWs in Nebraska, Prisoners on the Plains: German 
POWs in America (1993). Arnold Krammer‟s Nazi Prisoners of War in America (1979) is still 
the most comprehensive study of the history of German POW camps in the continental 
United States.  
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media as literature, motion pictures, newspapers, music, art, and educational 
courses.” The PMGO argued that:  
Two types of facts were needed, those which would convince 
them of the impracticality and viciousness of the Nazi position. 
If a large variety of facts could be presented convincingly, 
perhaps the German prisoners of war might understand and 
believe that historical and ethical truth as generally conceived 
by western civilization, might come to respect the American 
people and their ideological values, and upon repatriation to 
Germany might form the nucleus of a new German ideology 
which will reject militarism and totalitarian controls and will 
advocate a democratic system and government (qtd. in 
Krammer 197).  
As this excerpt illustrates, the PMGO equated democracy with American-
style democracy and democratization mainly with an acceptance of the U.S. 
intervention in the war and German‟s cultural development. Ron Robin 
argues in The Barbed Wire College: Reeducating German POWs in the 
United States During World War II that the SPD adopted a liberal arts 
program that was to destroy “the mass deception of National Socialism,” and 
sought to replace it with “an alternative, and thoroughly American cultural 
agenda” (5).  
70 
 
The SPD was headed by Colonel Edward Davison and Maxwell 
McKnight and various intellectuals, such as Walter Schönstedt and Howard 
Mumford Jones. Jones was the most prominent member of the group of 
university professors who participated in the conceptualization and 
actualization of the Special Projects Division. He served as Director of 
Education and instructor of American civilization at the so-called Idea Factory 
at Fort Kearney, but among present-day American Studies scholars, Jones 
are also known as one of the architects of what is today known as American 
Studies.21  The History of American Civilization program focused on recurring 
themes in history and literature representing distinctive features of American 
culture. American Civilization sought to search for, document and study an 
essential American character in “great” American literature. Thus, the 
objective of early American Studies was not only to study but also to 
propagate Americanisms in the United States by defining an essentially 
American literary and historical canon and, with that, an essential American 
mythology. Robin argues that Jones saw Fascism‟s success “not in the 
ruthless deployment of repressive political tools, but in the „efficient creation 
by the dictators of a glamorous mythology‟” (Robin 43). He felt that “the only 
way to conquer an alien mythology is to have a better mythology of your 
                                               
21 Jones was one of the various Professors who in the 1930s and 1940s shaped the new 
interdisciplinary (History of American Civilization graduate) program at Harvard University 
that would emerge as American Studies. Albeit not characterized by an identifiable school, 
the early Americanists of the 1930 shared in principle their approach to and understanding of 
their subject in very similar ways in which their successors of the Myth and Symbol school 
perceived them. 
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own‟” (Robin 43). Robin argues that Jones sought to regenerate the 
humanities and ward off the effects of what he perceived as detrimental 
effects of the social sciences. Jones felt that a liberal arts‟ effort would serve 
to create American democratic myths capable of resurrecting an engaging 
vision of America‟s past.22   
The SPD‟s work between 1944 and 1945 consisted mainly of 
censoring materials that supported Nazi propaganda and depicted the United 
States poorly. Through censorship, they sought to replace negative 
representations of democracy and the United States with favorable ones. 
Between 1944 and 1945, the SPD helped incorporate American history, 
literature and civilization courses into the curricula of the prisoners‟ camp 
universities. Prisoners could take college-level courses from their educated 
peers and receive credit from German universities. Various Universities in 
the United States, such as the University of Kansas, supported these 
German camp universities and provided textbooks. Another intellectual part 
of this diversion program was the publication of a German language POW 
                                               
22 Jones was not only a precursor of the discipline of American Studies, but he symbolizes 
the intersections between the discipline and Americanization of Germany. The reeducation 
programs in the United States represent the beginning of a longer process of intellectual and 
cultural change of western Germany. In the 1950s, American Studies programs emerged in 
western Germany as a continuation of this reeducation process and various former POWs 
played a part in the establishment of these programs, such as the American Studies 
program at the Johannes Gutenberg University in Mainz. As the Federal Republic of 
Germany manifested its anti-Soviet memory of the war, it also established its American 
Studies programs and America Hauser. In that context, the reeducation project signifies a 
part of a larger Americanization project that sought to define an essentialist American 
national narrative at the moment when the United States established itself as a world power.  
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newspaper, Der Ruf (The Call), by and for prisoners of war. The newspaper 
offered literary reviews of and political essays on topics censored from the 
German media. Writers consisted of German POWs who positioned 
themselves intellectually and politically against the Nazi regime and the 
war.23  
Moreover, the SPD sent specially trained Assistant Executive Officers 
(AEOs) to infiltrate the camp population and monitor as well as indoctrinate 
“by example” (Gansberg 89). Krammer explains that there about 150 AEOs, 
one for each of the main prisoner of war camps. Most AEOs spoke German, 
many were German Jewish immigrants, and some of them had fled Germany 
only a few years earlier. Using their language skills, AEOs‟ determined the 
political attitude among the prisoners, separated Nazi POWs from anti-Nazi 
POWs, and sought to prevent kangaroo courts and other forms of Nazi 
intimidation. Separating Nazis from anti-Nazis, Gansberg argues, effectively 
prevented internal camp conflicts and increased the number of prisoners who 
embraced a pro-American stance in lieu of the other inmates who promoted 
National Socialism with hostility.  
The second phase, also referred to as the “crash course” phase of the 
program, began May 8, 1945. In early 1945, the Supreme Headquarters 
                                               
23 Hans Werner Richter and Andreas Andersch, two removed German authors, wrote for Der 
Ruf and continued their political and literary work in western Germany. Andersch founded 
the so-called Gruppe 47 that consisted of various German authors, such as Günter Grass 
They continued to write and publish Der Ruf in postwar Germany, but the U.S. occupation 
forces prohibited it in 1947.  
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Allied Expeditory Forces (SHAEF) had requested that the War Department 
train anti-Nazi prisoners for police duty in occupied Germany (Arthur L. Smith 
84). Fort Getty reeducated German POWS in administration, and Fort 
Wetherill, specifically called the “United States Army School,” became a 
distinct police school that trained German POWs to become future Allied Law 
enforcement officers in occupied Germany.24  In fall 1944, the SPD had 
begun to set up specially designed reeducation POW facilities in New York, 
Rhode Island, and Virginia, which processed nearly 39,000 German anti-Nazi 
POWs in pro-American democracy (Robin 5). The largest re-education effort 
was launched in Fort Eustis in 1946, close to Hampton Roads, Virginia, 
where 23,000 POWS took the six-day crash courses in democracy and 
police work in the American occupied sector. The SPD tried to reeducate as 
many POWs as possible so that they would “contribute most to the building 
of a more democratic, peaceful, and cooperative Germany” (86). By April 5, 
1946, 23,142 POWs of a total of 39,000 men who had gone through the 
SPD‟s programs had completed the reeducation program at Fort Eustis alone 
(Smith 98).  
According to early postwar research on the effects of reeducation, 
Hermann Jung explains in Die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen in 
                                               
24 Readers interested in the reeducation programs may consult Maschke commission 
volumes, Judith Gansberg‟s Stalag USA, Arnold Krammer‟s Nazi Prisoners of War in 
America, Ron Robin‟s The Barbed Wire College, and Alfred L. Smith‟s The War for the 
German Mind.  
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amerikanischer Hand, USA, only 3% of those who had previously been 
categorized as Nazis now opposed Nazism and favored the idea of a 
democratic system in Germany. Jung concludes from U.S. military reports 
that the program had only a minimal effect on the 355,000 German POWs 
who did not directly participate in the special schools, but he argues that the 
program has “surely” served the prisoners in dealing with National Socialism 
internally (238). The end of the SPD‟s reeducation effort overlapped with the 
War Department atrocity education about the Germans‟ collective guilt. The 
U.S. military began reeducating German prisoners of war no longer by 
voluntary participation but forced confrontations with the German atrocities. 
Three of my subjects were among the 39,000 Germans who were 
selected for and participated in the intense reeducation programs: Herr Paul, 
Herr Leitner and Herr Koch. (Koch‟s interview will be discussed in chapter 4.)  
In this chapter, I analyze interviews with three former German Afrika 
Korps soldiers who were in captivity in the United States between 1943 and 
1946 and who were labeled “anti-Nazis”: Herr Paul, Herr Bauer, and Herr 
Leitner. Their “anti-Nazi” behavior qualified them to participate in the above-
described reeducation program and to work for the U.S. military in postwar 
Germany. Between 1943 and 1945, when other German soldiers were still 
feverishly hoping that Germany would win the war and defending their sense 
of national pride and honor, Herr Paul, Herr Bauer and Herr Leitner had 
seemingly relaxed their identifications with Germany and sought out a 
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“transnational comradeship” with the U.S. military for the sake of social 
recognition and material privileges.25  
3.2 Herr Paul: “Not Even Goering Eats This Well in Germany.” 
Born in 1921, Herr Paul learned to be an auto mechanic at the Opel 
factory in 1938, and was in the infantry of the German Afrika Korps deployed 
in combat in North Africa, 15th Panzer Division, 115 Panzergrenadier 
Regiment. After his capture by the U.S. military in 1943, Paul and his fellow 
POWs were first kept in a large British camp in Oran, and then transported 
on a “liberty” ship to Glasgow, Scotland, where they were interrogated 
individually by British intelligence officers before being transported to New 
York under Canadian guard on the Louis Pasteur. In New York, Paul and his 
peers were deloused, redressed, and transported comfortably by train to 
Camp Concordia, Kansas, where Paul stayed for one year in Compound B. 
Paul volunteered for the labor program and was hired out to a canning 
factory and to peach and sugar beet farms in Kansas. Conditions in the camp 
changed noticeably the day after Germany‟s unconditional surrender, but 
Paul thought the U.S. soldiers‟ treatment of the prisoners remained the 
same. He was among those subjects who did not perceive the end of the war 
as a caesura and had probably not depended on the notion of “German 
                                               
25 Herr Schmidt, whose interview is not discussed in the dissertation, felt that the “economic 
miracle” had already begun in captivity in the United States. Herr Koch and his peers could 
not comprehend the abundance of brand new clothes, bed sheets, towels they received 
when they arrived in the camp. They were greeted with “get rid of your old stuff, here you get 
it “all new.” 
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superiority” for his sense of self. Paul was repatriated through a release 
camp in France in 1946 to the U.S. military occupation zone in Hesse. There, 
Paul took employment with the district‟s U.S. administrative office translating 
denazification reports.  
I met Herr Paul in 2001 at his home in a small suburb of Frankfurt am 
Main in Hesse. He spontaneously started the interview by telling me about 
his brother‟s return from Soviet captivity. Paul had already returned from the 
United States and was living with his parents when his brother arrived at their 
sister‟s house in 1946 or 1947, where Paul first saw him in a bathtub. He 
said, “His eyes were hanging out like this [he gestures], the whole body was 
only a skeleton, like the Jews from Buchenwald, exactly like they were shown 
to us, that‟s what he looked like.” He added,  
That was a horrific sight. I will never forget it. He brought this tin 
cup for his food with a handle he made from wire. And I, I had 
come back from America. The exact opposite, you see? And 
that‟s why I wanted to tell you, uh. Well, one likes, prefers to 
talk about this than about the horrible things, you see? Because 
it was a pleasant time in America, you know? .... And that‟s why 
I have always had a positive attitude about America, you see? 
There are people in [German] politics … people who stupidly 
blat [like sheep]: “uh, those Amis,” and who say a lot of shit [he 
said this word in English], you know? And that always agitates 
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me, you know? [Because] 95% of what I experienced over 
there in those three years was positive, you know? They 
treated us humanely. They really catered to us. We had clean 
and neat clothes. As far as hygiene was concerned, there was 
nothing to complain about at all (my emphasis). 
Paul‟s private transnational memory of captivity in the United States depends 
to a large degree on contrasts between his war and captivity experiences 
and those of his brother. Paul compares the sight of his brother‟s dystrophied 
body to images of the bodies of concentration camp survivors that U.S. 
military personnel showed German captives in 1945. At one point during the 
interview, Paul showed me a photograph of himself in U.S. captivity. He was 
young, healthy, tanned and shirtless, with a big smile on his face: a stark 
contrast to the description of his brother. Whereas U.S. captors treated him 
“humanely” and thus made Paul feel human, Soviet captors treated his 
brother inhumanely and deprived him of his humanity. Paul assumed his 
brother was repatriated from the Soviet Union with dystrophy because the 
Soviets did not want to care for him. The U.S. military, on the other hand, 
took excellent care of Paul. He returned home physically and mentally fit, 
whereas his brother was both physically and mentally close to death.  
This contrast made Paul forever grateful to “the Americans.” His 
narrative is thus amicable and uncritical of the United States. He told me that 
he becomes agitated whenever people criticize the United States and he 
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dismisses anti-American sentiments as “shit.” Using the term “shit” in English 
emphasizes Paul‟s identification with the United States and his ability to 
cultivate his own Americanization in English. His memory is based on 
transnational autobiographical history of his and his brother‟s respective 
times in U.S. and Soviet captivity; it shows Paul has embraced a 
transnational—that is, German-American—identity. His memory is private 
and analytically different from public discourses about the German prisoners 
of war through which he interpreted his experiences.  
Paul‟s visual association of the sight of his brother with the sight of 
concentration camp photographs he was shown illuminates the transnational 
and private dimensions of his memory. His description of his brother‟s body 
is a facet of his unique biography; his use of the term “humanely” in 
describing the U.S. military‟s treatment and contrasting it to the Soviet‟s 
“inhumane” treatment of his brother is an adaptation of hegemonic 
discourses in Germany between 1933 and 1945, and 1949 and 1955. Nazi 
ideology presented “Russians” as barbarian aggressors and the German war 
against the Soviet Union as militarily preventive and racially justified. Nazi 
ideology also conceptualized citizenship racially and politically. Based on this 
ideology and National Socialist laws and practices, only German citizens 
were granted human rights in the German Reich.26   
                                               
26 For more information, see George Mosse, Fallen Soldiers, and Marion Kaplan, Between 
Dignity and Despair: Jewish Life in Nazi Germany. 
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Between 1945 and 1955, public discourse in the western part of 
Germany, which later became the Federal Republic of Germany, hinged on 
the suffering of German soldiers (and Germans in general) under Soviet 
totalitarian barbarism. Paul‟s narrative also hinges on this suffering; he 
interpreted his brother‟s condition as a consequence of Soviet cruelty, which 
he likened to Nazi atrocities targeting European Jews. Paul made this 
connection based primarily on the sight of bodies. They looked the same to 
him, yet he also interpreted the meaning of these bodies by refusing to 
accept Germany‟s contribution to the condition of his brother. For instance, 
Paul did not consider what condition his brother might have been in when he 
became a prisoner, perhaps even as late as 1945. Paul himself became a 
prisoner in North Africa in 1943, in a campaign that was relatively benign 
compared to the warfare between the German Wehrmacht and the Red Army 
after 1942. He did not account for acts of violence and destruction the 
Wehrmacht, Waffen SS and SS committed against Soviet soldiers and 
civilians, which may have caused his brother‟s captors to be ruthless; nor did 
he account for the lack of food supplies.  
Paul therefore still interpreted the horrific sight of his brother as the 
lens through which he viewed his own U.S. captivity narrative, composed 
through discourses that were prevalent at the time: National Socialist 
ideology, U.S. ideology and postwar atrocity education, and national 
discourses that shaped the cultural identity of the Federal Republic of 
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Germany. Paul‟s narrative also shows that public discourses in Germany 
could not displace his need for deriving composure from his experience in 
U.S. captivity or for identifications he gained during his Americanization. His 
narrative composure stems from having interpreted his embodied experience 
primarily in relation to discourses prevalent at the time: telling how well he 
fared in the United States seemed to provide him with a large degree of 
composure, whereas telling about his brother‟s return caused him 
discomposure. He did not feel comfortable talking about his brother, but he 
felt obligated to talk for the sake of commemorating him; for his own sake, he 
wanted to justify his Americanization.  
Paul‟s narrative is uniquely his own, but it also illuminates 
commonalities among the interviews I conducted with former Afrika Korps 
members held captive in the continental United States. Paul felt treated 
“humanely,” a term many former German war prisoners used to describe 
their treatment by the U.S. For Paul, this “humane” treatment entailed 
physical comfort in the camps in the United States and stood in stark contrast 
to the treatment his brother or the men, women and children had suffered in 
concentration camps. In North Africa, Paul slept in tents or under his truck in 
the open air in the desert for two years; he ate mainly crackers and sardines. 
In captivity, however, Paul was able to sleep in a bed with clean sheets and 
received large, varied meals. He never experienced any violations. He and 
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his peers were never assaulted or shot at, which was the main reason Paul 
was thankful.  
As an Afrika Korps member, Paul felt he had earned fair treatment 
because he fought a “fair” war and “never shot anyone in the back.” Paul also 
felt that the “good reputation” of the Afrika Korps had “preceded” them, that 
they had fought “without any evils in attendance, you know?” He felt that the 
U.S., British and Canadian soldiers all treated them “with respect,” which he 
said was “fantastic.”  He attributed the respect from western allies to what he 
and many other Wehrmacht soldiers, specifically from the Afrika Korps, 
perceived as military expertise and fairness. He said, “We won every battle. 
Each and every one. Really true! When we attacked, the soldiers from 
England just ran-and the French and whoever was there. This is not false 
self-praise. That‟s really how it was. When it was dark, at night, the war was 
over.” As soon as the U.S. military was involved in the war in North Africa, 
however, Paul noticed that fewer and fewer of his people returned from 
combat. Three times, he claimed, he was taken prisoner by a few U.S. 
soldiers and let go again because no U.S. military backup arrived. Even then, 
he said, he hoped he could stay in captivity because he wanted the war to be 
over for him. When the entire Afrika Korps surrendered and Paul was on the 
prisoner transport from the front to the prison camp, he noticed the 
abundance of U.S. military jeeps and weapons. It was then and there that 
Paul knew Germany would lose the war. When he arrived in the United 
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States and saw the size of the buildings and the land and the country‟s 
material wealth, he was further convinced that Germany would lose the war 
and that he would embrace this new place as a new opportunity.  
The material wealth, luxurious accommodations, and apparent 
comradeship with which the U.S. military met the Afrika Korps soldiers 
served as Paul‟s composure. It provided him with a positive memory he 
preferred over the horrific images of the concentration camps, the sight of his 
brother, and the Third Reich in general. Paul arrived in Camp Concordia, 
among the first group of German soldiers greeted with a large and varied 
breakfast with coffee, rolls, butter and five types of jam. He had his first fried 
chicken in captivity. Life in captivity was “absolute prosperity if not 
excessiveness.” He added, “I always said that „Not even Goering eats this 
well in Germany.‟ I could say that because I was far away from Germany. 
The Third Reich was a terrible time, you can believe me.” The memory of 
U.S. captivity offered Paul a refuge from memories he preferred to repress, 
an imaginary scenario that he inhabited as an imaginary (honorary) 
American.  
3.3 Herr Bauer: “But We Were Friends!” 
Herr Bauer was born in 1922 in a small town in the Rhineland 
Palatine. He was a private in the German Wehrmacht, a Richtschütze 
(gunner) in the Panzer Regiment of the 21st Division that was deployed in 
North Africa when he fell into captivity in 1943. Bauer was transported to the 
83 
 
United States and interned in Camp Concordia, Kansas until 1945 in a 
compound for common soldiers. Bauer read my letter in the Afrika Korps 
newsletter, Die Oase, and we established our first contact through the 
Verband Deutsches Afrika Korps (VDAK,) (Africa Corps Veterans 
Organization), an agency that has thrived for more than sixty years. Among 
its members, the VDAK promotes and circulates narratives of masculine, 
military comradeship, not only among German soldiers in the Second World 
War, but between the postwar German Bundeswehr (German army) and the 
British and U.S. armies. Bauer used the VDAK‟s central narratives when he 
referred to his past military division in the Afrika Korps and when he sought 
to explain the transnational relations during and after the war that many 
German, British and U.S. military veterans organizations seek to nourish. 
Like many other VDAK members I interviewed, Bauer sought to make sense 
of his captivity by employing prevalent stories circulating within the VDAK.  
I conducted two interviews with him by telephone in 2003. Both times, 
he was accompanied by his wife, who frequently told him to speak up. The 
first time we spoke, he was enthusiastic and happy to talk about “good times” 
in captivity. He was exceptionally enthusiastic to report positive memories 
about his time in U.S. captivity, which gave me the impression that he 
wanted to use the interview as an opportunity to share actively pleasant 
memories of the past and exclude unpleasant memories of the past, an 
impression that was confirmed by the second interview.  
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The second time we talked, his story about captivity was the same, 
but his mood was noticeably different. He wanted to tell me about the Jewish 
families who lived in his village when he was a child. Instead of referring to 
the VDAK newsletter, he cited newspaper articles and archival materials he 
had collected on his own. Bauer had accounted for all of the nine Jewish 
citizens in his village. Each of them was killed in Auschwitz. Bauer repeatedly 
questioned himself for having “noticed nothing „wrong‟” about the 
marginalization and disappearance of his Jewish neighbors. This led me to 
believe that Bauer felt personal guilt about the German atrocities, and that 
his story about U.S. internment focuses so much on positive memories 
because he had to bring his feeling of pride and elation as an Afrika Korps 
member in U.S. internment into cohesion with his feeling of ethical guilt.  
Bauer utilized his idealized captivity memories for the purpose of 
exoneration. Examples of friendliness and occasional admiration he and his 
peers experienced served not to continue his past beliefs but to negotiate the 
conflict between his past and present selves.  
Herr Bauer constructed a sense of composure around what he 
represented as a “natural” transnational friendship among the German and 
U.S. military personnel that developed in Camp Concordia, Kansas.27 He 
presented these friendships as spontaneous and unaffected by the war or 
                                               
27  Lowell A. May‟s Camp Concordia: German POWs in the Midwest, confirms both Paul and 
Bauer‟s descriptions of the camp and the prisoners‟ relations with the captors. Paul and 
Bauer also remembered the names of the U.S. personnel correctly.  
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national ideology. He and his comrades from the Afrika Korps felt respected 
and admired by the U.S. military and civilian personnel in the camp. Bauer‟s 
narrative revolved around instances that allowed him to relive feelings of 
comradeship and appreciation. 
Like many other members of the VDAK, Bauer suggested that 
Werhmacht soldiers deployed in the Afrika Korps were better soldiers and 
had higher morals than other soldiers deployed in other divisions. Bauer 
identified with the Afrika Korps Wehrmacht divisions largely by using the 
identity the veterans organization constructed for itself and the reputation it 
had earned internationally. By sheer association with the Afrika Korps, as 
military division, and with the VDAK, as veterans‟ organization, Bauer sought 
to create a U.S. captivity narrative in which his captivity in the United States 
exonerated him and absolved him of the crimes Germany committed.  
As a member of the VDAK, Bauer frequently inserted interpretations 
promoted in the VDAK‟s newsletter, Die Oase. His private memory of being a 
member of the Afrika Korps in U.S. captivity was congruent with the 
collective memories that circulate in the VDAK. He explained that: 
the Afrika Korps was well-liked. Because one thing is clear, with 
us was nobody who had fought in Europe and, uh, who fought 
after 1943. With us in Concordia there were only the Africans 
[Africa Corps soldiers]. No other group came in. And it is still 
the case today: they were war opponents, but, nevertheless, 
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fair war opponents.  
Bauer distinguished soldiers who had fought in Europe from the Afrika Korps 
by the time and location of their service. Bauer also distinguished between 
the Afrika Korps members, whom he described as “fair” war opponents, and 
“anti-Nazis” involved in the re-education programs in the United States, 
whom he described as “unfair” war opponents.  
Bauer was incorrect in assuming that soldiers in the Afrika Korps had 
not fought anywhere else, but he presented this particular group of Afrika 
Korps soldiers in Concordia as uncontaminated by soldiers from other war 
theaters where the German Wehrmacht did not obey the rules of the Geneva 
Convention: “When we arrived in North Africa, as young soldiers, we were 
instructed in the rules of the Geneva Convention before we went into the first 
battle.... They told us that prisoners were to be treated fairly and that we 
should not take away any of the things they are carrying.” Indeed, military 
historians have identified the North African war as a fair and compassionate 
war among all the adversaries, especially compared to the war the Germans 
fought in other areas of the world, even the war the Americans fought in the 
Pacific. Bauer‟s distinction between the Afrika Korps and other parts of the 
Wehrmacht—the North Africa war and the war in Europe—served as the 
foundation for his representations of friendship between the Afrika Korps 
members and the U.S. military and civilian personnel.  
Bauer described the relationship between the POWs and the U.S. 
87 
 
military as compassionate and amicable. Their captors did not make them 
feel inferior or defeated, and U.S. officers socialized with Germans of the 
same rank. For instance, within only four weeks of their arrival, Bauer said, 
the German camp company commander and the U.S. camp commander, 
both colonels in their respective armies, went horseback riding outside the 
camp. In addition, several of the U.S. officers working at the POW camp in 
Concordia along with imprisoned German officers jointly became what he 
calls “paternal guides” to some of the teenaged common soldiers among the 
German POWs. One of the U.S. camp commanders, a “Captain Strong,” was 
so helpful and approachable, Bauer claimed, that he and many other 
prisoners called him “Papa Strong.”  
A U.S. “Captain Teufel,” who was originally from Berlin, held lectures 
on democracy and was widely known as the one person in the camp who 
tried to make “real democrats out of Nazis.”  Bauer related to him as a nice, 
non-coercive superior who invited German POWs to exercise their freedom 
of speech. Bauer claimed that Teufel encouraged the prisoners to tell him 
“the truth” about their feelings about the Third Reich or National Socialism. 
Bauer‟s affection also stemmed from the intellectual openness with which 
Teufel responded to some of the POWs‟ belief in National Socialism and 
Hitler‟s political decisions. Bauer described “American joviality” towards the 
POWs as if it had been a natural reaction to what he described as the “non-
Fascist,” “fair” and “pacifist” character of the German Afrika Korps. Bauer 
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perceived the exchange between the POWs and the U.S. camp 
representatives as a true example of egalitarianism, a validation that they 
were proper and respectable.  
Bauer‟s idealization of his U.S. captors as father figures is also 
apparent in the following example. Despite admitting that he “shouldn‟t even 
say this, the POWs celebrated Hitler‟s birthday in our camp.... April 20th was 
Hitler‟s birthday and we celebrated Hitler‟s birthday and the Americans were 
standing there and smiled.” “In a sense,” he adds, “the whole thing was 
comical ... they hung a flag out and so forth. That‟s the way it was. And no 
one did anything about it; we all thought it was a hoax. We were all glad the 
war was over.”   
In Bauer‟s explanation, the U.S. military did not react because they 
“must have” understood the lack of seriousness behind this potentially 
inflammatory celebration. In seeking to demonstrate that the American camp 
commander tolerated and approved of their Nazi gatherings, Bauer‟s story 
ambiguously suggests that U.S. military would have intervened had they 
believed that the POWs celebrated a Nazi ritual in earnest. If the American 
military‟s tolerance of Nazi rituals was proof that the prisoners had not been 
dangerous Nazis, it could just as likely have meant that they followed the 
rules of the Geneva Convention, were indifferent, or were perhaps even 
sympathetic to the Germans and their cultural beliefs.  
Based on his reading of U.S. military documents, Arnold Krammer 
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argues in Nazi Prisoners in America that the Convention allowed German 
prisoners to do the Hitler salute, keep the Nazi flag and portraits of Hitler, and 
celebrate his and other National Socialist leaders‟ birthdays. American 
military personnel stood by or permitted Nazi rituals, and sometimes even 
provided the Nazi flags and participated in the events. Most scholars argue 
that the American military allowed Germans to celebrate Nazism out of 
respect for foreign military prisoners on one hand, and their fear of reprisals 
against American soldiers in German captivity on the other (Krammer; 
Gansberg). As I will discuss in more detail in the following section on the 
interview with Herr Koch, the American military did indeed share cultural 
beliefs about race in general and about Jews specifically.  
In light of these different possible interpretations, Bauer‟s story comes 
to reveal itself more clearly as a strategic cultivation of positive memories of 
American captivity in which the American captors ostensibly represent a 
decisive moral authority. Bauer‟s narrative presents his fellow prisoners as 
anti-Nazis within the transnational relations between the German prisoners 
and the American captors. After all, he had already explained that the Afrika 
Korps had been “fair” and did not necessitate American interference or 
correction. Bauer‟s narrative revolves around non-judgmental and paternal 
U.S. military men whose compassionate and fatherly supervision implied that 
he and his fellow Afrika Korps members were not Nazis. The American 
military did not react to their participation in Germany‟s war with resentment 
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or revenge, but rather with compassion and parent-like forgiveness. In his 
narrative, he derives a sense of composure from imagining himself and his 
comrades under the benign guardianship of men in the American military.  
From within his memory of American captivity, Bauer cultivates a 
sense of comfort and composure that stands in stark contrast to his 
otherwise negative memories of the Third Reich and his feeling of guilt for 
the murder of Jews. He utilizes narratives from the VDAK that create a sense 
of comradely cohesion within the Afrika Korps and between the Afrika Korps 
and the British and American militaries. He uses the trope about Rommel‟s 
alleged anti-Nazism and the international recognition of the North African war 
as a comparatively “fair” war to decontaminate his part in the German past. 
For Bauer, this narrative of German-American friendship provides private 
comfort and a sense of composure, a moral refuge not apparently from 
external accusations but from deeply personal feelings of ethical guilt.  
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3.4 Herr Leitner “A Word of Honor” 
Herr Leitner was born in 1920 in Kassel, where he grew up in a 
working class Social Democratic household. A soldier in the German 
Wehrmacht, deployed in the German Afrika Korps, Leitner was taken 
prisoner on May 10, 1943 near Mateur, Tunisia. He was subsequently 
transported on the Pasteur to the United States, and moved to Camp 
Breckenridge, Kentucky, in June 1943, where he stayed until summer 1944. 
Leitner was part of the POW labor program, took many jobs that required him 
to move, and was transferred to Camp Atterbury, Indiana. Between 1945 and 
February 1946, Leitner was relocated to Camp Marion, Ohio, where he 
worked as inventory manager at Camp Perry, a satellite camp of Camp 
Marion. In Ohio, Leitner participated in a four-week education program that 
trained him to work for the U.S. military in the western part of postwar 
Germany. Leitner was released from U.S. captivity at Camp Shanks, New 
York, in February 1946 with discharge papers for Kassel.  
However, Leitner‟s ship did not go to port in Bremerhaven, as he and 
his peers expected. Instead, the ship went to port in Le Havre, France and 
took them to a U.S. camp in Bolbec, where, according to Leitner, U.S. 
officers gave him “their word of honor” that he could work for U.S. occupation 
authorities in Kassel and that he would be taken there immediately. Instead, 
Leitner found himself in Cherbourg, a French labor camp, where Moroccan 
soldiers took the Germans‟ possessions and beat them. Leitner referred to 
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this camp as a “starvation camp” where seven inmates received one loaf of 
bread, about two ounces of butter, and one ladle of soup each day. Leitner 
escaped once but was apprehended by German youth who immediately 
turned him over to the French police for a monetary reward. Leitner‟s fifth 
escape attempt was successful, he said, only because he reported to the 
U.S. military police, who quickly arranged for Leitner‟s repatriation and 
employment. He worked for the U.S. military authorities in Kassel until 1958.  
When Leitner spoke with me in a telephone interview in 2004, he was 
83 years old. He had a walking disability that required him to use a 
wheelchair. Leitner said he had an excellent relationship with his children, 
and lived with his son and his family, who supported him and helped him 
communicate with me through email and by telephone. Unlike other subjects, 
Leitner‟s family did not appear torn over his past in National Socialist 
Germany; neither did he emphasize the end of the war as a caesura. 
Leitner‟s discomfort derived from feelings of betrayal about his transnational 
past in U.S. and French captivity. He felt betrayed by the U.S. officers who 
had promised to repatriate him promptly but instead turned him over to the 
French. Leitner said he was under the impression, until only recently, that the 
U.S. military “sold” German prisoners to France as slave laborers. All his life, 
Leitner said, he was upset about the transfer to the French camp.  
Leitner‟s narrative about captivity in the United States and France 
represents him as a thoughtful and diplomatic man who was able to manage 
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difficult international negotiations. His narrative does not negotiate intra-
German or generational conflicts, but rather cultural and national boundaries. 
He did not identify as a German national subject or seek cohesion within the 
state, but rather sought personal cohesion within other public spheres.  
For instance, Leitner‟s story about captivity in the United States 
between 1943 and 1946 revolved much more around relationships with 
Americans than with German prisoners. In October 1943, Leitner learned that 
his mother and fiancée were killed in the Allied firebombing of Kassel. 
Compared to many German POWs whose relatives were killed in the 
bombings, Leitner never presented the attack on Kassel as a personal or 
national victimization. Instead, he said, he started feeling “very alone.”  He 
felt that he had “little connection” to his home and instead of making a new 
life in Germany, he wanted “to stay in America.”  Staying in the United States 
when the war ended, however, was not an option for POWs, even though 
many of them wished to immigrate to the United States, mainly for economic 
stability (Reiss).  
Leitner talked at length about the process that led him to consider 
immigrating to the United States. In Camp Marion, Ohio, where he arrived in 
February 1945, Leitner assisted a Reverend with his church service. Leitner‟s 
involvement with the church, he explained, was a commitment to his 
deceased mother and fiancée, his family‟s religious tradition, and his faith in 
God. Leitner participated regularly in camp church services, a practice many 
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other POWs avoided in favor of participation in Nazi rituals such as the 
Morgenfeiern (morning celebrations or morning assemblies). Morgenfeiern 
had nationalist and ideological import, replacing religious traditions and 
indoctrinating participants through propaganda. Leitner thus ostensibly 
distanced himself both from National Socialism and from many of his peers 
who continued with the Morgenfeiern, even in captivity.  
Moreover, instead of seeking advice from his peers about the loss of 
his family, Leitner said that he sought advice from a Reverend, who 
encouraged Leitner to immigrate, and from a Corporal, a German Jewish 
émigré who encouraged Leitner to join the U.S. military as he had when he 
immigrated to the United States with his family. As a result, Leitner reported 
to the U.S. military with his plans to enlist, a decision that rendered him a 
traitor to the German military and the National Socialist regime. To determine 
Leitner‟s trustworthiness, U.S. military representatives asked Leitner if he 
was willing to fight against the German military. Although Leitner stated he 
was ready to fight against the Japanese, he could not fight against Germans. 
Leitner explained: “I experienced something that helped me make that 
decision. In Camp Mateur, in Africa, one of my German comrades was 
guarded by his own brother who fought for the U.S. military.”  He did not want 
to face a situation where he could have the “misfortune of shooting [his] own 
relative.” He was willing to fight for the United States to earn the privilege to 
immigrate but could not “fight [his] relatives in good conscience.”  Ultimately, 
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the U.S. military spokesperson in charge of Leitner‟s application informed 
him that he “lacked in democratic understanding” and therefore would not be 
admitted to the U.S. military.   
Leitner persisted in using the material advantages that U.S. 
internment offered. Leitner abandoned the thought of joining the U.S. military 
during wartime but began to anticipate the U.S. victory and the prospect of 
immigrating to the United States after the war, and made another attempt at 
taking advantage of his transnational situation. Leitner took an English class 
to improve his reading abilities, which he would later need to work at a Heinz 
factory and as manager of the Marion satellite camp.  
Taking English classes improved Leitner‟s opportunities in yet another 
way. The U.S. military frequently interpreted POWs‟ interest in English 
classes as a sign of positive inclination towards the United States and 
democratization. Even self-interested study of English was interpreted by the 
U.S. military as a sign of democratization. As Mathias Reiss (and several of 
my subjects) have argued, taking English classes was more of an 
opportunistic strategy than a sign of their democratization. When the war 
ended, Leitner volunteered to work for the U.S. military and was selected to 
participate in a reeducation program at Camp Perry, Ohio in 1945. Camp 
Perry was generally reserved for prisoners who had proven to have positive 
opinions about the United States and would live in the U.S. zone of 
occupation. Leitner volunteered because he assumed that working for the 
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U.S. occupation government would help him develop a good résumé to 
present to the U.S. consulate if he still wanted to immigrate.  
Like many POWs interned in the United States, Leitner gained 
educational advantages in captivity. German POWs could take college-level 
courses in these camps and earn college credit transferable to universities in 
Germany. Many POWs who took English courses used their skills in western 
Germany under U.S. military occupation to communicate or do business with 
U.S. military personnel. Taking English courses and participating in the 
training program for work in the U.S. military occupation zone in Hesse 
allowed Leitner to loosen ties to Germany at a time when he had no desire to 
return. 
During the four-week program in Camp Perry, Leitner read Der Ruf 
(The Call) with great interest. Der Ruf was a newspaper written by prisoners 
of war who opposed the Nazi regime. Many German POWs rejected and 
even burned copies of Der Ruf. Leitner rejected neither the paper nor its 
stance on the war. Leitner took courses about Hitler and the nature of 
National Socialism, about United States history and the nature and goals of 
democracy. He said that he performed well as a student. A representative of 
the reeducation program offered to transfer him to an anti-Nazi camp while 
he was awaiting repatriation. However, describing this “anti-Nazi” camp as a 
site “for men who did not want to have anything to do with the Wehrmacht 
from the first,” Leitner declined. He did not identify with those calling 
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themselves (or those whom the U.S. military labeled) “anti-Nazis.” Leitner did 
not describe anti-Nazis as opponents of Hitler, the National Socialist 
ideology, or the regime, but as opponents of the German military. Leitner 
ultimately refused the offer to move to an anti-Nazi camp. Even though he 
was opposed to Hitler, he refused to oppose or harm his German comrades. 
Leitner‟s composure rests on his persistent comradeship with German 
soldiers, a relationship he needed to emphasize when he explained his 
cooperation with the U.S. military. He explained: “the oath I had sworn to the 
German people and the German Wehrmacht was binding.” Nevertheless, he 
would have left the German military to fight for the U.S. military. The people 
to whom he claimed total loyalty would have seen him as a traitor, not a 
comrade. Leitner confessed that, “For me, a deserter is a deserter and an 
oath is an oath. I have not taken an oath on Hitler, but I have taken an oath 
as a soldier, to my God.” His sense of comradeship and loyalty thus seems 
contradictory. Leitner saw the men in anti-Nazi camps as deserters, but did 
not see himself that way. The difference was not in leaving one military and 
joining another, but in actively undermining or opposing German soldiers. 
This means Leitner‟s loyalty was passive. He would have joined the U.S. 
military and paid the price of warfare and possible death, but that would have 
been a sacrifice for himself, not for Germany‟s victims. Leitner‟s motivations 
were neither political nor ethical, but rather strategic; and his composure was 
still tied to a military code of honor to other soldiers in Hitler‟s army. 
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Leitner‟s interview reveals that he felt responsible neither for 
Germany‟s atrocities nor for his plan to join the U.S. military to help stop the 
atrocities. Leitner sought to negotiate his position between Germany and the 
United States. Like many other interview subjects, Leitner perceived the U.S. 
military as inconsistent when the negotiations concerning his desire to join 
the U.S. military did not receive his anticipated recognition. Like many other 
subjects, Leitner questioned the U.S. military‟s understanding and practice of 
democracy. The U.S. military‟s diagnosis of Leitner as not democratic 
enough did not appear consistent with other instances when U.S. military 
authorities offered to move him to an anti-Nazi camp, made him camp 
commander, and later chose him to participate in a democratization program. 
Therefore, Leitner positioned himself in his narrative ambiguously between 
Germans and Americans, between the German and the U.S. militaries, 
between his peers and the U.S. military guards. He presented himself as an 
agent in intercultural and international exchanges: as a diplomat.  
Like a diplomat, Leitner sought to nourish public relations between two 
parties who had difficulty negotiating differences. He utilized tact to gain 
strategic, material advantages. Even though his diplomacy did not yield the 
results he hoped for—he was denied immigration and “betrayed” by U.S. 
officers—Leitner‟s narrative about his past serves to represent his ability to 
negotiate seemingly dissimilar social and political positions. During the war, 
Leitner was a German soldier who had sworn loyalty to his people, but who 
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did not wish to return to Germany and would have joined the ranks of 
Germany‟s enemies. In that regard, Leitner‟s captivity narrative coheres with 
the sense of identity he created for himself over the course of his life. 
After his retirement in 1983, Leitner joined an organization for aging 
people that soon affiliated with an international organization for seniors in 
France. He traveled to Canada, the United States, and Israel several times. 
As the German representative of the organization, he was proud that he and 
his delegation were the first Germans to be received by the mayor of Paris in 
the 1980s. Leitner stated that he looked back on his accomplishments and 
awards as the German representative of the organization with pride. The 
theme of his captivity narrative reappears in his representation of a lecture he 
delivered for a French audience in the late 1980s: 
I went to the podium, looked around the room, slowly. I looked 
left and I looked right and didn‟t say a single word; and then I 
said—and that was the bomb—I said: “I see many women of 
my generation in the audience who have been marked by the 
suffering of the last years of the war. Please allow me to bow to 
their suffering,” and they gave me a standing ovation. I couldn‟t 
even give them enough autographs. 
Leitner‟s diplomatic abilities were finally rewarded at this speech. He found a 
way to approach the tension between German and French audience 
members by “bombing” their expectations and inserting women into a 
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narrative about a war that has been “owned” mostly by men.  
Leitner negotiated transnational tensions, the main origin of his 
discomposure, by exposing it as a narrative of masculine nationalism where 
acts of national and transnational comradeship were repeatedly betrayed. 
However, he used a reference to women strategically to dislocate a tension 
that was very personal to his experience of war and captivity. Leitner‟s 
narrative represents him as a person whose main conflict was finding a place 
among cultures: Germany, the United States, and France, whose relations 
and decisions about the Germans were unpredictable. His conflict stemmed 
from tension among nations, not among regimes, generations, or narratives 
within Germany. Leitner‟s strategy of composure was to tell a story that 
would earn him recognition for his ability to “bomb” or invalidate ineffective 
public relations.  
3.5 Conclusion 
Paul, Bauer and Leitner composed positive memories of U.S. captivity 
that they used to position themselves historically and ethically in a culturally 
negotiated history of the German past. Paul, Bauer and Leitner did so by 
offering stories about their relaxed emotional ties to the Third Reich. In 
conjunction to this, Paul, Herr Bauer, and Herr Leitner represented different 
degrees of a transnational comradeship between American and German 
soldiers in the United States that Lynne Ermann described so positively in 
her article. 
101 
 
Herr Bauer stated “those were good times in America.” Herr Leitner, 
stated that he “liked it in USA” and had hoped to start a new life in the United 
States after his fiancée and his mother had been killed in the Kassel 
bombing. Herr Paul was enthusiastic about his time in America and 
described it as “wonderful” and exceptional, [as] a time [he] will never forget.” 
Herr Paul wholeheartedly cultivated discourses identical to the ones 
promoted by the reeducation program. Whereas Paul had seemingly 
embraced the wartime U.S. ideology of “democracy,” he was more effectively 
persuaded by the “excessive” abundance and variety of food. Herr Bauer 
embraced both wartime U.S. ideology and narrative shared in the arena of 
the VDAK that resonated richly with stories about transnational military 
comradeships. Leitner, whose frustrated attempt to immigrate had 
disconnected him emotionally from a more permanent friendship with the 
United States composed a counter-narrative to the transnational military 
comradeship.  
Paul, Bauer and Leitner did not emotionally struggle with the cultural 
and social changes in May 1945 when the U.S. military changed its treatment 
of the POWs in the United States slightly by requiring more of them to 
participate in the labor program, screening them more rigidly for their Nazi 
affiliations, and subjecting them to Nazi atrocity education. Even though the 
U.S. military lowered the quality of the food, neither Paul, nor Bauer, nor 
Leinter experienced these changes as a caesura.  
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Another subject, Herr Koch, whose interview I discuss in chapter 4, 
took part the reeducation program. What distinguishes him from Herr Paul 
and Herr Leitner, however, was that he clearly cultivated his ardent Nazism 
while he was interned in the United States. Koch was among a very small 
number of soldiers who were picked for the program in spite of their hostility 
towards the United States and their dedication to defend “the Third Reich” 
both physically and symbolically. The following section discusses interviews 
with POWs who had preserved their nationalism and have composed 
memories that revolve around national comradeships in a transnational 
context. 
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4. NAZIS OR ANTI-NAZIS? TRANSNATIONAL CONVERSIONS 
4.1 Introduction 
On May 8, 1945, Germany surrendered unconditionally. Prisoners 
who were still in the U.S. did not personally experience Germany‟s 
devastation, but they saw images published the U.S. news media. They did 
not experience serious food shortages in Europe, but they noticed that the 
U.S. military served them smaller amounts and less palatable foods. They 
had fewer privileges. Before 1945, officers were exempt from the labor 
program, but they were urged to work after Germany‟s defeat. The three 
subjects whose interviews I discuss in this chapter had all identified strongly 
with Nazi Germany at the time they were in captivity. All three of them have 
sought to account for their feeling of shock in 1945 when they were 
confronted with the consequences of Germany‟s defeat.  
One crucial way in which the changed relations between the United 
States and Germany became apparent to the prisoners was the U.S. 
military‟s shift from a voluntary reeducation program to a sudden 
confrontation with Germanys‟ atrocities (Robin 120). German radio 
propaganda had ended and the Allies‟ media published the horrific images of 
the Nazi concentration camps, which they required the prisoners in the U.S. 
to see. The U.S. military confronted prisoners with film materials from the 
liberated concentration camps without notice but under close observation. 
What intensified the shock value of these film screenings was the fact that 
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they were shown in camp movie theaters that had previously been used for 
entertainment and diversion in the non-coercive and covert phase of the 
SPD‟s reeducation effort. Beginning in May 1945, the Army Signal Corps 
released concentration camp documentaries. The British and American 
military produced newsreels of Bergen Belsen, and the SHAEF‟s 
Psychological Warfare Division and the American Council for the Prosecution 
of Axis Criminality in 1945 produced the one hour long Nazi Concentration 
Camps (Robin 122). The Nazi atrocity films were an undeniable testimony to 
Germany‟s genocide. The screening of these films was mandatory and the 
AEOs, who were previously supposed to engage with the prisoners in a non-
coercive manner, were now required to report the prisoners‟ responses to the 
films to the War Department.  
The screening of atrocity films in the same theaters in which POWs 
previously viewed motion pictures for entertainment signified a power shift 
between the captors and their captives. Because of this specific cultural 
context, the screening of atrocity films in the camps in the United States 
resonated differently than the screening to POWs in Europe. Previously, they 
prisoners had the opportunity to view pre-selected, as Robin suggests, pro-
American movies that assured the inmates‟ consumption of favorable images 
of the United States. On average, Krammer argues, each POWs viewed 
thirty motion pictures on a voluntary basis.  
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With the end of the war and the mandatory screenings of atrocity 
films, the act of viewing movies changed from leisure to moral confrontations. 
It was no longer a choice for leisure but a requirement meant to instill 
collective guilt for German atrocities. In her essay, “Compulsory Viewing: 
Concentration Camp Film and German Re-education,” Susan L. Carruthers 
argues that: 
images of Nazi atrocity were fastened upon as resources for 
identity-construction from the very moment the cameras 
entered the camps. For the victorious Anglo-American Allies 
footage from the camps assumed a privileged role in the work 
of re-educating a defeated populace: bringing Germans to 
„proper‟ awareness of their complicity in Nazi crimes by 
exposing them to graphic illustrative testimony. (733-34) 
As much as the SPD previously sought to construct an essential American 
character that was benign and egalitarian and enjoyed a good life style in the 
eyes of the German POWs, the Army Signal Corps‟ atrocity films now 
constructed an essential American character that was the masculine victor 
and moral authority that would judge and punish criminals. These films also 
developed German postwar identities as defeated, emasculated, and 
immoral. These atrocity films, which replaced and made inaccessible the 
previous films, signified a shift from America as military friend to America as 
victor, and they linked the idealized version of a prosperous America in 
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Hollywood films to the representations of stigmatized, defeated, and 
destroyed Germany.  
 Herr Koch, Herr Müller, and Herr Schuhler composed memories of 
their captivity in the United States that accounted for their experience of 
rupture. Certainly, all three of them had experienced 1945 differently and 
from a biographically unique perspective. However, their memories all seek 
to negotiate what I understand as their loss of an imagined German national 
cohesion.  
4.2 Herr Koch: “The Complete Viciousness of Nazism” 
Herr Koch was born in 1923 in a small town in the Rhineland Palatine. 
Even though his father was a democrat and opposed to Hitler, Koch was 
actively involved in the Nazi movement at an early age. He volunteered for 
the Hitler Youth as early as 1934, when membership was voluntary, and 
made it to Rottenscharfürher, junior squad leader.28 Koch enlisted in the 
Wehrmacht in 1941 as a Non-Commissioned officer and was deployed in 
North Africa twice, the second time by choice because he wanted to avoid 
the eastern campaigns. He had seen many severely wounded and 
traumatized German soldiers returning from the East in 1943, and he did 
everything in his power to be declared fit to fight in tropical climates and 
                                               
28 Membership in the Hitler Youth was not compulsory for youth 17 and over until 1939. By 
1941, it was compulsory for youth over 11 years of age.  
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qualify for deployment in North Africa. He was taken prisoner in North Africa 
in May 1943 and subsequently interned in Camp Trinidad, Colorado where 
he stayed until 1945. He was then moved to Camp Phillips, Fort Riley, and 
eventually to Camp Eustis, Virginia, where he was one of the 39,000 German 
POWs who participated in the U. S. special democratization program. He 
was repatriated though France and Bavaria and returned in 1945 to his 
home, which was in the French zone of occupation until 1949 when the 
occupation of Germany officially ended. 
In 2001, when I interviewed Koch personally at his home in a small 
village in the Rhineland Palatine, he composed his narrative by contrasting 
his present identity as a liberal and well-educated retired Protestant Minister 
to his past identity as a National Socialist and anti-Semite. He explained his 
actions and motivations from the perspective of a changed man, representing 
his present-day understanding as the result of a long process of intellectual 
and emotional confrontation with the German past. Koch credited Jewish 
German Assistant Executive Officers (AEOs), the U.S. military‟s reeducation 
program, and other atrocity education programs in the U.S. for this change, 
even though he had not been able to accept responsibility for the German 
atrocities and his own actions until much later. His interview reveals that 
former Nazis were able to change not only the stories they told, but also the 
fantasy investments they made in the National Socialist narratives of German 
superiority and the alleged inhumanity of Jews.  
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Koch began his narrative with his first official interaction with the U.S. 
military. While aboard a ship bound for the United States, a U.S. military 
representative informed them that they would be treated by the rules of the 
Geneva Convention, “like the soldiers of the captors.” Koch and his peers 
“thought that was hilarious.” He added, “We didn‟t know about the Geneva 
Convention because we were not supposed to be captured. We were 
supposed to die before being captured, according to Adolf Hitler.” Koch 
interpreted the U.S. military‟s stance towards its prisoners as a sign of 
naiveté about warfare. Koch told me about this and many other incidents to 
illustrate how arrogant he had been in 1943. He described his arrogance as 
very common among prisoners captured in North Africa because the war had 
not yet been lost and the Afrika Korps had not been not as decimated as 
other parts of the German Wehrmacht fighting in Europe.  
Koch also went to great lengths to recount the process of Nazification 
in captivity. Koch was from a deeply religious Protestant family, had regularly 
visited church, and planned to become a Minister early in his adolescence. 
Between 1943 and 1944 in the U.S., he attended camp church services, but 
became gradually infected by what he called “the mental disease of National 
Socialism.” Koch turned his back on church services and began frequenting 
National Socialist gatherings instead. “By the end of 1945, I can see that in 
my letters home, I wrote about Morgenfeiern [“morning celebrations”], about 
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[Alfred] Rosenberg. And I went to these events in complete uniform with the 
band on my arm. That was part of my life then.”   
Indeed, Koch identified these events clearly as National Socialist 
propaganda. The Morgenfeiern were a National Socialist invention. Their 
function was to replace religious education on Sundays with National 
Socialist ideology. Ritualized dialogues about Alfred Rosenberg were part of 
this National Socialist propaganda. Rosenberg had developed the racial 
theories around which Nazis constructed the ideal of the Aryan race and 
sought to justify the genocide of Jews. Rosenberg was one of the most 
influential Nazi leaders and was tried and sentenced to death in the 1946 
Nuremberg trials. Even in captivity, “common” Germans practiced and 
actively involved themselves with racial and National Socialist rituals that 
celebrated not just German nationalism, but racial superiority and hatred 
towards others. Identifying the ideological and racist purposes of these 
meetings sets Koch apart from other subjects who sought to present the 
Morgenfeiern as harmless, boyish little pranks.  
However, Koch used these examples to show how he “became more 
Nazi” after a new wave of POWs arrived from the European war theaters in 
1944. Koch did not join these meetings out of boredom, but rather because 
he wanted to be active. He was particularly drawn to the men from the SS. 
Although nobody in his family “had ever considered becoming a member of 
the SS,” Koch said that he was so impressed with their dedication towards 
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National Socialism that he decided to collaborate with them. Koch not only 
gathered with them on a regular basis and reaffirmed himself and others of 
the superiority of Germany and National Socialism, he also actively 
participated in the harassment of other inmates whose behavior they 
considered disrespectful toward the German regime.  
Germans who processed the inmates‟ letters read in one that a soldier 
had asked his mother to burn his SS uniform; when the men who intercepted 
the man‟s mail informed the SS, Koch‟s people beat him up. At one point, 
several of his fellow POWs beat another inmate unconscious, and Koch, who 
had worked at the camp hospital, covered up the beating by claiming the 
inmate had fallen out of his bed. The assaulted man sought protection from 
the U.S. military camp commander, and Koch was among those POWs in his 
group who regretted that they had not “beaten him to death” before he could 
get the support from the U.S. military and be removed from the camp. 
In Nazi Prisoners in America, Arnold Krammer argues that the internal 
social structure of the camps, which was organized by order of military rank, 
frequently served those inmates who were more aggressively involved in 
defending the Nazi regime. Krammer argues that the U.S. military‟s failure to 
understand the diversity of opinion, experience, and military affiliations of the 
prisoners “confused the War Department and allowed the drastic increase of 
Nazi influence inside the prisoner of war camps to occur” (Krammer 149). In 
our interview, Koch similarly claimed that the American military must not 
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have fully appreciated the “complete viciousness of Nazism” at the time and 
was naïve for assuming that the prisoners would behave in a civilized 
manner.  
Not feeling defeated but empowered in U.S. captivity, Koch and his 
peers also actively tried to harm the U.S. military by passive disobedience: 
destroying food rations, for example, and using flour to mark their soccer 
fields. As an accomplice of the SS men in the camp, Koch also helped plan a 
camp riot. The U.S. camp commander had put several SS men in charge of 
the camp fire department, which also meant, as Koch explained to me, that 
these SS men knew where the ammunition was stored. Their plan was to 
steal the ammunition, distribute it among fellow supporters and take the 
camp hostage. “Fortunately for us,” he said, the riot “never materialized 
because the war ended” before they could act on their plans.  
After many years, Koch, said, he finally understood his behavior in 
captivity as inappropriate. Koch was ashamed of his behavior in captivity, but 
he said that the freedom to organize without punishment in the camps 
facilitated his Nazification as much as the arrival and influence of the SS 
men. Koch excused the American military‟s failure to intervene because of 
their honest ignorance about Nazism‟s “viciousness,” which he tried to 
represent with his reference to the U.S. soldier informing them about their 
rights.  
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Koch was also aware that these aspects of his past would not 
resonate among an American audience. He knew that the U.S. military‟s 
tolerance of Nazism in the camps, and the amicable relations they 
developed, is a shameful aspect in the history of the United States. In the 
early 1990s, Koch visited Colorado again and was invited by a local 
newspaper to write about his time in Camp Trinidad, Colorado. Koch 
included anecdotes about the U.S. military‟s friendliness, his gratitude for the 
U.S. captors, and his story about the planned riot. The story about the U.S. 
military‟s use of SS men for the camp fire department was exactly what the 
newspaper edited out. Koch knew that this story did not fit public memory of 
the Second World War in the United States. Indeed, popular memory in the 
U.S. represents the American military as an inherently anti-fascist institution.  
What was shameful to Koch, however, was not the damage he and his 
peers had done to one another, but the damage they had done to Jews. 
Koch stated that anti-Semitism and the lack of self-reflection were 
uncustomary in his own family before and during the Third Reich, but that he 
was anti-Semitic even before he became “more Nazi” in the camp. In our 
interview in 2002, Koch stated that from his personal experience of the Third 
Reich, anti-Semitism was pervasive among the majority of Germans, and 
that Daniel Jonah Goldhagen‟s Hitler‟s Willing Executioners was “correct to a 
certain extent.” Koch agreed with Goldhagen‟s main argument that common 
Germans were motivated by anti-Semitism and willing to act on it. Koch 
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explained that he had participated in Hitler Youth rallies singing race-baiting 
songs, and harassing Jews in the U.S. military. He recalled specific incidents 
in the camp kitchen: the Assistant Executive Officer in Koch‟s company in the 
POW camp was a Herr Paul Blum, a German Jewish exile who was then 
employed by the American military. When Herr Blum came to the kitchen to 
sit down and eat, where POWs “had everything in abundance.” Koch 
emphasized that “the majority” of the present POWs “sang race-baiting Nazi 
songs until Blum left the room. We sang „Krumme Juden zieh’n dahin, 
daher,/ sie zieh’n durchs Rote Meer,/die Wellen schlagen zu,/ Die Welt hat 
Ruh.” (Crooked Jews, they scurry hither and thither / they cross the Red Sea 
/ the waves lunge out / the world is at peace.”) The song was very popular in 
Germany, sung by soldiers and schoolchildren alike to the melody of “Die 
Wolken ziehn dahin.” POWs exposed the same behavior in front of a Jewish 
Lieutenant Colonel Hirsch, a German émigré from Frankfurt, Main. Koch and 
his comrades hissed death threats at him, such as, “shoot the Jew; kill him 
dead.”  
Many German prisoners, including Koch, refused to consider Jewish 
men in the camp as rightful members of the U.S. military community or as 
human equals. Because the U.S. military and the Jewish AEOs treated 
POWs with much dignity and respect, Koch felt that German prisoners were 
unjustified in behaving aggressively. He recalled: “We had nothing to 
complain about. When we were together, we talked about a lot of shit, but 
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not much about the Americans. We had nothing to complain about. Nothing, 
you see?” However, what is for Koch a story about the dignity of Jewish 
AEOs., represents the U.S. military‟s failure to protect Jewish personnel 
from the German‟s verbal and physical threats. The German-speaking 
Jewish AEOs were not only in charge of the POWs, but also often superior 
in rank, a class category that prisoners commonly respected. Koch argued: 
“the American military treated us with velvet gloves” in spite of the “the 
German‟s pure brutality towards Jews.”  In Stalag USA, Judith Gansberg 
mentions anti-Semitism in the U.S. military and among participants in the 
Special Projects Division (SPD) in charge of the AEOs. She argues that the 
SPD: 
worried about the German reaction to dealing with members of 
[the Jewish] faith. They soon discovered that Jewish AEOs 
were having more trouble with fellow-officers in the camps than 
with the POWs. At one camp the Jewish AEO finally had to be 
replaced by a Gentile because the anti-Semitic CO, along with 
other officers, was hindering his work by encouraging the 
Germans and American enlisted personnel to ignore the AEO‟s 
directions (Gansberg). 
Moreover, Joseph W. Bendersky‟s systematic study of anti-Semitism in the 
U.S. Army between the First World War and today, “The Jewish Threat”: 
Anti-Semitic Politics in the U.S. Army shows that anti-Semitism was 
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pervasive, especially among the ranks of U.S. officers. According to 
Bendersky, the U.S. Army participated in stalling and preventing missions for 
the rescue of Jewish people from Europe. Many U.S. officers believed that 
the war was a “Jewish war,” or that “it was time the Germans got rid of [the 
Jews].”  He argues that the majority of U.S. officers believed in WASP 
superiority. Many assumed that Jewish immigrants were communist 
instigators. Even though, as Ronald Takaki argues in Double Victory: A 
Multicultural History of America in World War II, Jews were represented in 
disproportionately large numbers in the U.S. military, Bendersky shows that 
many U.S. military officers believed that Jews wanted to evade military 
service, especially infantry service . Anti-Semitic jokes and hateful remarks in 
front of Jews were common and so were incidents in which Jewish soldiers 
were “singled out for repudiation and ridicule,” Bendersky argues (299). 
Bendersky also suggests that many of the American officers actually admired 
Hitler‟s policies and the organization of the German army.29   
Bendersky‟s book proves that anti-Semitism and hostility towards 
Jews pervaded all ranks of the U.S. military, and Koch‟s interview shows that 
anti-Semitism and hostility towards Jews pervaded all ranks of the German 
                                               
29 American military history has long failed to study systemic anti-Semitism in the American 
Army and thereby contributed to the continuous misrepresentation of Jewish, American and 
German American transnational history. Regarding the history of German POWs in U.S. 
internment, that omission resulted in a sanitized representation of the American military and 
in most cases of the German POWs—at the expense of Jews. 
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civilian and military population. In April or May 1945, Koch and other POWs 
heard about extermination camps on “the news and on the radio.” He said 
that:  
When the news came from the concentration camps in Bergen 
Belsen, the first one, and about the murdered people ... then, at that 
time, I said, „Where would we all have ended up at if we had let those 
criminals loose on the German people? We had to kill them!‟ [Pause] 
Oh, just thinking of the people who were [killed]. [Pause] And I thought 
that was just and reasonable!  
When the U.S. military confronted the POWs with the atrocity films to 
educate them about their “collective guilt,” Koch did not recognize Jews as 
human beings or himself as a perpetrator. Koch thought at the time that 
mass murder was an acceptable solution to what he perceived to be the 
Jewish threat. He perceived Jews as criminals who deserved a painful death 
and merited no empathy. 
Even three months after hearing the news and seeing the films of the 
extermination camps, Koch told me, he was among those who said, “full of 
resentment,” that “the Germans would have never done anything like that.” 
Even though Koch had openly perpetrated anti-Semitism at home and in the 
camp, and felt that the murder of the Jews was justified and reasonable, he 
was still in disbelief about the material evidence and apparent barbarism of 
these crimes. Koch wanted to believe and adamantly insisted in 1945: “these 
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people died in a British firebomb.” Koch‟s first reaction was to deny 
Germany‟s atrocities by projecting them onto the Allies.  
During the interview in 2001, Koch used this story to show his past 
inability to understand what he saw—even though he had talked about and 
seemingly believed in the “need” to “murder” Jews. Addressing his past 
contradictions, Koch assumed that he simply never really contemplated what 
it meant to murder a person. Koch said that he was now distraught over his 
hatred towards people “who had done nothing to deserve it.” Koch was the 
only interview subject who admitted to his active role in mobbing and 
threatening Jews. He understood later that he had assimilated Nazi ideology 
as a form of self-identification that deeply shocked him when he was 
confronted with the physical evidence of the horror it had produced, though 
he did not understand why.  
Koch composed his memory of the past with recollections of his past 
anti-Semitism, through which he identified himself and his peers as 
perpetrators. After the war, however, Koch slowly began to change his 
perspective and became increasingly impressed with Blum and Hirsch. “The 
Germans reacted with brutality to this man‟s refinement,” Koch elaborated. 
Decades later, he sent Hirsch a letter of apology for his and his comrades‟ 
behavior. Hirsch wrote back, stating that he “had never made the mistake of 
ascribing the stupidity of a few onto the majority.” Koch thought that Hirsch 
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was wrong, that the majority of Germans was, indeed, anti-Semitic, and that 
he had been one of them.30 
 He also came to wonder why the U.S. military had never punished the 
Germans for their hostility. He assumed that Blum and Hirsch had decided 
not to report them.  
Koch represented the German POWs‟ anti-Semitic acts as a clear 
symptom of National Socialism and as the core of National Socialist ideology. 
Koch was careful not to compose an argument for moral equivalence, like 
                                               
30 Only very little research has been done on the German Jews who served in the U.S. 
military or on the experiences of German Jews who oversaw, interrogated, or otherwise had 
contact with German POWs. I have interviewed German Jews I have contacted through a 
Jewish newsletter in New York. Today‟s emphasis on America‟s role in saving Jewish 
victims of the Holocaust has contributed to widespread misunderstandings about the 
American Army as well as its treatment of Jews on the one hand and Germans on the other 
hand. The local histories of German POW camps in the United States tend to paint a very 
different picture. Penny Clark‟s book on German POWS in the American Midwest, for 
instance, cited several Americans who exonerated the German POWs from accusations of 
racism and hostility. One woman was quoted saying the German atrocities were horrible, but 
that “these boys” had done nothing. Anti-Semitism was pervasive in the United States both 
in the civilian and military populations, and the majority of U.S. produced books on the topic 
focus on the American military‟s rehabilitation of German prisoners of war and thereby 
obscure wartime American anti-Semitism.  
 
30 I have also interviewed German Jewish émigrés who worked for the U.S. military and who 
oversaw or worked beside German POWs. They suggest two kinds of experiences with the 
German POWs and the U.S. military that I will cover in a separate project later on. Several of 
the Jewish émigrés missed a Germany before Hitler, a Germany for which they, too, would 
have fought a war. At the time they left Germany for the United States, they felt disappointed 
and hurt for not being allowed to join the German military, for having been excluded from the 
Volksgemeinschaft, the community of the German people. Herr Kurt Hochmann, for 
instance, identified himself primarily as a German and secondarily as a Jew. Hochmann was 
sent back to Germany with the U.S. military where he worked as an interpreter. He 
experienced the Germans‟ frequent refusal to obey the U.S. camp commander as an 
expression of their nationalism for Germany. When Hochmann was in Germany, he 
witnessed how a high-ranking German POW who, according to the decisions at Nuremberg, 
should have been tried for war crimes, was removed from the camp and, he presumed, sent 
to the U.S. under a false identity. Rabbi L was deeply disappointed about the U.S. military‟s 
favorable treatment of many of its POWs. Rabbi L., who had fled Germany for the United 
States, joined the military. When he was getting ready to fight in the Pacific, he was sent to a 
military camp in Texas where, to his utmost surprise, he received his combat training from 
German POWs. He experienced the situation as “mind boggling.”   
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several of my other subjects had. At the same time, he did not idealize the 
United States or the U.S. military. Koch explained by way of examples that 
his learning process involved his better appreciation of pluralism, especially 
among cultures in the United States. For instance, Koch explained that he 
noticed that “the Americans treated the Japanese like apes” at the same time 
as he and his Nazi peers were terrorizing the camp. Koch stated that “the 
real America” was not the U.S. military, but more authentically represented in 
Jazz music. Indeed, Koch‟s living room showed a large collection of Jazz 
albums, Native American art, and literature about Jewish culture in western 
Europe. Koch‟s rehabilitation involved appreciation of cultural pluralism, the 
one aspect I noticed most of my subjects refused to accept. Most of them 
complained about immigrants and the unemployed German youth. Koch, 
however, composed his past as a journey of intellectual rehabilitation. By 
welcoming pluralism and confessing to his past mistakes, Koch composed a 
self he could live with.  
4.3 Herr Müller: The Trouble Maker’s “Unfaltering Loyalty” 
Herr Müller was born in 1921 in a mid-sized town close to Munich in 
Bavaria. He was a Private First Class in a field hospital of the German Afrika 
Korps in North Africa when he was captured by the French in 1943. He was 
first held captive by the French in Morocco until 1944 and then was 
transferred to the United States in summer 1944, where he remained until 
1945. Together with 600 other POWs from the Afrika Korps, he was 
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transported to Camp Florence, Arizona, and later to camps in Idaho, Oregon, 
Montana and Tennessee. Herr Müller felt fortunate that the U.S. military 
repatriated him early, after he had fallen ill and had to have surgery. He 
returned home in 1945, much earlier than most soldiers did. 
When Müller spoke with me on the phone in 2004, he began his 
narrative with anecdotes about the luxuriousness of the camps in the United 
States. He emphasized that POWs in the United States “lived like the king of 
France.”  In Arizona, he and his peers felt as if they had arrived in a “super 
hotel.” He quickly began to explain the limitations of what sounded like a 
story about the best vacation of his life, because the U.S. military had 
categorized him as a “trouble-maker,” one of those men whom the U.S. 
military had separated from the general camp population. Müller, like Koch, 
contrasted the good treatment he had received in the United States with his 
own antagonistic and nationalist demeanor.  
Müller‟s narrative revolved primarily around conflicts and moments of 
recognition related to his wartime nationalism. He and his peers, Müller 
stated, “could have been better off in Arizona, but we also had that pride in 
our nation. We were filled with pride, and we did not want to turn into 
degraded, will-less creatures.” He explained this strong sense of nationalism 
in a letter he sent me following our interview: “the fatherland was to us the 
greatest notion anyone could carry inside his heart; it gave us strength and a 
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symbol of unfaltering loyalty to our homeland [my translation].31  In 1944, 
Müller sought to prevent the humiliation of a captured soldier under the 
control of his national enemy by demonstrating strength-of-character and 
rigid determination to defend the German “Reich.” After he arrived in Camp 
Florence, Arizona in 1944, Müller volunteered to work in the camp library. 
American camp representatives asked him to sign an agreement not to 
commit sabotage, but he refused. He believed that POWs were protected 
under the rules of the Geneva Convention and should therefore not be 
expected to comply with any additional agreements. Reflecting on his 
captivity in 2003, Müller thought the U.S. military had simply wanted to 
reduce the number of watch personnel and hoped that POWs would agree to 
the terms of a formal contract. He felt that he and his peers should have 
agreed with the offer, but in 1944 Müller and his unit declined. Müller claimed 
that soldiers from his unit were inclined to be resistant and proud because 
the Afrika Korps were very “correct” in following the rules of the Geneva 
Convention. 
Müller and his peers felt as though the U.S. military had attempted to 
punish them for refusing to sign the agreement by ordering the POWs to pick 
cotton off camp instead of doing work inside the camp. Müller and his unit 
                                               
31 The German original to this quotation is: “Der Begriff Vaterland war für uns das Höchste 
was man in seinem Innern tragen konnte und war uns Kraft und Sinnbild unerschütterlicher 
Treue zu unserer Heimat.“ 
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refused to pick cotton because, as he explained to me, “they did not want to 
let [the U.S. personnel] give them orders.” He and his peers thought that the 
U.S. military “would use the cotton for the bombs they might drop on 
Germany,” and argued that using prisoners of war for labor related to 
armament or warfare was illegal. Nevertheless, the U.S. military moved them 
to a satellite camp near Camp Florence, Arizona, and took them out to the 
cotton fields. Müller and his comrades “had the audacity to fill 1.5 inch long 
tobacco pouches with cotton and turn these in at the end of their shift.” The 
consequences of this form of resistance were fourteen days on a diet of only 
bread and water. They still refused to comply with work orders, at which point 
the U.S. military returned them to the main camp. Müller recalled: “five-
hundred POWs commenced with a strike.” Once again, they received no 
more than bread and water. This time they held out for fifty days. Christmas 
came around and they received a whole turkey, but afterwards they were put 
back on their bread-and-water diet until New Years. 
Subsequently, a group of sixteen prisoners, including Müller, was 
singled out and ordered to a separate camp for Aufwiegler: troublemakers. 
Müller insisted that he “had not done anything.”  The majority of the 
remaining four-hundred and sixty prisoners tried to protect the sixteen 
“trouble-makers” from the U.S. soldiers but capitulated when the U.S. men 
threatened to shoot. Müller and the other fifteen troublemakers were held in a 
field camp, where they decided to wage a hunger strike. After six days they 
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“could not get up anymore.” Müller and his peers decided on this strike 
because they “were not conscious of any guilt”; the Aufwiegler had acted no 
differently than their four-hundred-and-sixty fellow prisoners. After all, he 
argued, the captors “did not know what kinds of stories we put out in the 
camps, the kinds of slogans that circulated in there.”  Since he could not 
understand why he was singled out, Müller assumed that the U.S. captors 
must have known about his “nationalist slogans.” Müller assumed that the 
U.S. mail censors had read his letters to his family and friends at home in 
Germany in which, he confessed, “I was probably a little political.”  
 In this interview, it is clear that Müller‟s sense of composure derives 
from constructing a cohesive connection between acts of nationalism 
followed by seemingly conflicting consequences. He downplays his 
nationalism in the context of punishment he received, but emphasizes it in an 
incident that earned him recognition from a U.S. camp chaplain. Müller 
recalled having written down a nationalist poem and hanging it up in the 
camp library where he worked before the U.S. military took notice of him as a 
troublemaker. Müller quoted what he referred to me as “a poem about the 
fatherland,” and he recited it on the phone: “Ans Vaterland, ans teure 
schliess Dich an, // Das halte fest mit deinem ganzen Herzen, // hier sind die 
starken Wurzeln deiner Kraft,” (“Join your beloved fatherland // Hold it fast 
wholeheartedly // Here are the strong roots of your strength [my translation].”  
This line is a passage from Schiller‟s Willhelm Tell that was not only inscribed 
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in the rim of some of the German Reichsmark coins—Germany‟s currency 
between the 1920s and 1948—but it was also one of the most prominent 
phrases used in National Socialist propaganda(Ruppelt). Although Müller 
used this incident to represent his nationalism, National Socialist elements 
remain unmentioned. Müller told me about the event with the poem to 
emphasize that the U.S. military chaplain “appreciated [him] very much and 
expressed high regard for [him] very explicitly;” the chaplain even patted him 
on his shoulder and said, “My good boy!”  Müller„s story thus revolves around 
his personal identification with Germany and German nationalism on one 
hand, and the ways in which U.S. military personnel responded to his 
nationalist actions on the other.  
In our interview, Müller attempted to use his narrative to 
decontaminate German nationalism from shame and disgrace. When Müller 
spoke about the chaplain‟s admiration of his Schiller citation, he added, “now 
that is not something one could condemn, is it?”  He continued to explain the 
origins of his nationalism. He was “raised to be nationalistic” in school where 
he “recited National Socialist propaganda” about the “stab in the back” after 
the First World War, learned about France‟s alleged antagonisms towards 
Germany and the Treaty of Versailles, which, he was told, unjustly punished 
Germans after the First World War. As a teenager, he believed National 
Socialist ideology and witnessed Hitler being represented as the savior of 
Germany. He said that: 
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dissatisfaction developed in Germany in response to these 
reprisals…. And when Hitler came, he straightened out the 
[situation with] the seven million unemployed [people] and 
instituted the Arbeitsdienst [labor duty] and the economy got off 
the ground again. That was the departure from the defeat of the 
First World War that was a dishonor to Germany in every 
aspect [my translation]. 
Müller continued to believe in the “Endsieg” (“the ultimate victory”) after he 
was captured and held in the United States, because, as he explained, “we 
were not very well informed about the economic and military conditions back 
home.” “In captivity, we did not know anything about what was really 
happening, and that‟s when I wrote „we hope for the ultimate victory and so 
forth‟.” Müller‟s nationalism and his trust in Germany‟s victory hinged on 
success stories from the Nationalist Socialist news media, such as the report 
of the Oberkommando der Deutschen Wehrmacht (OKW) (Supreme 
Command of the German Army). Receiving news of Germany‟s destruction 
and impending defeat through the Wehrmacht report, to which some 
prisoners listened in secret, would have destabilized his nationalism. Instead, 
he received more propaganda, which nourished his “unfaltering loyalty” to his 
“fatherland.”  
German prisoners were allowed to read U.S. as well as German 
language papers, both of which covered Germany‟s losses, but Müller 
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interpreted them as propaganda. Coming from North Africa in 1943, these 
men had not seen the destruction of Germany as had many other soldiers 
who fought in Europe. They had not personally experienced the German 
civilians‟ reaction to the Wehrmacht‟s defeat in Stalingrad. For some of the 
prisoners in the United States, the downtrodden outward appearance and 
horrific first-hand testimonies of soldiers arriving from battles in Europe in 
1944 and 1945 were evidence enough that Germany was about to lose the 
war, but Müller and the rest of the “troublemakers” believed in a chance for 
the alleged German “wonder weapon” that would lead to the German victory.  
When the war eventually ended in 1945, Müller and his group were 
deeply depressed, but he did not understand the full extent of Germany‟s 
defeat until he saw the destruction of Germany through the windows of the 
passenger train on the transport from Bremerhaven to Cologne in 1945. 
Müller also struggled with accepting the implications of the “news” about the 
Auschwitzler (the National Socialist term for prisoners in death camps, such 
as Auschwitz). Müller, like most subjects I interviewed, seemed especially 
resistant to the implication of collective guilt in the Holocaust. Müller 
mentioned the process of denazification and the Nuremberg trials. Unlike 
other prisoners who were in the United States or Europe, he read about the 
trials in newspapers at his home in Bavaria. He explained that he:  
had no influence on these [things.] We were under the 
impression that our, uh, me and my men thought that a lot of 
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things happened over there that were not, well. It was not right 
what was done to all those Auschwitzler, all those Jews, so 
forth, and all those things, and we did not know about any of 
that beforehand. We only found out about most of that after the 
war. Among us soldiers, nobody knew that something like that 
had happened in Germany or in Auschwitz. In our area, only 
Dachau was somewhat “known.” In our region [in Bavaria] they 
said, if you did this or that, then you‟d come to Dachau. But 
what really happened there, we did not know because we 
thought that was a little bit like a Straflager [penal camp]; but 
that something else was included in that, we did not know. 
Nobody was allowed to say a single word about it. 
Like many of my other subjects, Müller contradicted himself by stating that he 
knew nothing and that he was also not supposed to talk about “it.” Like all of 
my subjects, except one, Müller acknowledged that Germans murdered 
Jews, and he disproved of this genocide. In many cases, each interviewee‟s 
references to the Nazi genocide served only to distinguish him from outward 
Nazis and Holocaust deniers. Although many Germans denied the Nazi 
genocide of Jews in the 1950s and 1960s, knowledge of the Holocaust, as it 
came to be known in the 1960s, was required and expected. However, like 
Müller, most of my subjects deny having known about mass murder in the 
camps. Müller‟s story is exceptional insofar as it offers insight into the 
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motivations among prisoners whom the U.S. military categorized as 
troublemakers. Müller‟s narrative demonstrates that his need for cohesion 
revolved around conflicts stemming from his identification with National 
Socialist nationalism. 
4.4 Herr Schuhler and the “999ers” 
Herr Schuhler was born in 1923 in a small community in the southwest 
corner of the Rhineland Palatine. Schuhler volunteered to join the war in May 
1941 and was deployed on the eastern front until March 1942. He fought in 
Greece in 1942, left for Italy in October 1942 and was transported to Tunis, 
North Africa in November 1942. Schuhler was taken captive along with his 
whole unit following combat against U.S. and British forces in May 1943. 
They arrived in Boston three months later and were transported to Camp 
Trinidad, Colorado. Schuhler worked in the POW labor program and was 
moved very frequently: from to Fort Greely, Colorado, to Camp Douglass, 
Wyoming, and Fort Custer, Michigan, where he harvested asparagus. 
Schuhler was then moved to Camp Grant, Illinois, where he picked corn and 
worked in a fruit-packing factory; in Atterburg, Indiana he helped with the 
tomato harvest. After his release from U.S. captivity in 1946, Schuhler was 
moved to camp Mereworth in England where he helped with grain and hops 
129 
 
harvests. Schuhler was repatriated through the release camp in Bretzenheim 
in March 1947.32  
Schuhler‟s narrative about war captivity revolves around labor and the 
money he was able to save. He volunteered for all the labor opportunities he 
could get, mainly to earn money. Schuhler was very meticulous about 
validating dates and places to which his narrative referred and he provided 
detailed information about his deployment and the many camps he worked in 
as a prisoner of war. Schuhler mentioned no conflicts with U.S. camp 
personnel and no events where he needed or received crucial validation from 
a U.S. military authority that would later shape his sense of composure. 
Instead, his narrative revolves around conflicts with one specific group of 
prisoners he encountered in Fort Devens, Massachusetts in May 1945. Fort 
Devens was one of the three major so-called “anti-Nazi” camps in the United 
States. It housed 3,300 German prisoners categorized as anti-Nazis or 
“democrats.”  Schuhler claimed that he was moved to Fort Devens to 
“undergo reeducation.”  
Schuhler was offended by the presence of the prisoners who ran Fort 
Devens because they called themselves “anti-fascists.” In 1945, as well as in 
2003 when I interviewed him by telephone, Schuhler perceived them as 
“foreigners” because they identified themselves by their outspokenly non-
German national identities. It particularly irritated him that each nationality got 
                                               
32 The camp in Bretzenheim was the most notorious of the Rhinemeadow camps in which 
several thousand German POWs died of typhoid and dysentery.  
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its own camp leader, one German, one Austrian, one Polish, and one 
Czechoslovakian. They “used to be our Helfvölker [“support nations”], but 
now,” Schuhler said: “They wanted to be their own group. They no longer 
wanted to be Germans. They fought with us, but now they called themselves 
Poles and Austrians. They called themselves Czechoslovakian.” In addition, 
Schuhler perceived them as “deserters” because they had “abandoned the 
German Wehrmacht” when they were in the United States.  
Schuhler had apparently continued to identify as a German 
Wehrmacht soldier and felt very strongly about German nationalism. His 
narrative illustrates that his sense of military duty and national obligation 
were thoroughly intertwined. Moreover, Schuhler interpreted the role of the 
German “anti-Nazis” through the lens of National Socialist ideology. He 
described the men as “communists” and “criminals” because many of the 
German soldiers who were trained as reeducators had belonged to the 
“999ers,” which the National Socialists conceptualized as a 
Bewährungsbatallion (probation battalion), a Wehrmacht unit composed of 
former concentration camp inmates on probation. Schuhler referred to the 
“999ers” as a “Strafbattallion” (“punishment battalion”) and claimed that it 
was “composed of criminals, child molesters and deserters.”  Schuhler 
inadvertently explained his use of the term by suggesting that the 999ers had 
been “forced to fight at the front” as a form of punishment for crimes they had 
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committed. At the front, they could redeem themselves and rectify the 
damage they had done to the German people.  
Schuhler complained that these men in Camp Devens wanted to 
“cook their own soup,” a phrase many subjects used to refer to people and 
groups seeking to counteract or discredit the Wehrmacht or sever their ties 
from Germany or the Third Reich. Schuhler composed his memory by 
validating his antagonism towards the German anti-fascists with the 
friendliness between Afrika Korps soldiers and U.S. military personnel. In 
May 1945, Schuhler noticed that his U.S. captors were “a little bit more firm” 
and punished them “little, but not much.” Even then, Schuhler claimed, “we 
were war prisoners. We could do anything we wanted. We just could not get 
caught doing it.” Illustrating his claim, he began recalling several incidents 
during the time he worked for the U.S. labor program. They had to pick 
cotton and sometimes put a watermelon in their cotton sacks to pretend they 
had fulfilled their 160-pound ratio. Many times I heard from the former 
prisoners of war that they had done “things that we can laugh about—today,” 
as if these things had not been laughable back then. At the same time, they 
always add that “the Americans” laughed, too, such as in this story about the 
watermelon. Schuhler, like most other subjects, described his U.S. captivity 
as menschlich (humane).  
 Representing the U.S. soldiers as his friends suggests that Schuhler‟s 
captivity in the United States was an elating, lighthearted time in his life. 
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Schuhler recalled with great enthusiasm the time when he and his peers 
were transported by train and found that crowds of civilians were standing by 
the train tracks to see the German prisoners. Posters on the POW transport 
trains persuaded Americans to “Buy War Bonds” by displaying German 
POWs as evidence for the U.S. military‟s successes. Schuhler and many 
other POWs did not experience their captivity as defeat. On the contrary, 
Schuhler felt as though he was in a carnival parade.  
When the war ended, these amicable transnational relations persisted, 
but the relationships between Schuhler and the 999ers had changed. The 
“anti-fascists” had chosen to use the U.S. military as an agency and the anti-
Nazi camps as arenas to propagate their anti-Nazi sentiments. With the end 
of the war, these members of the former “support nations” regained social 
and national power and defined themselves. Schuhler described these men 
in Fort Devens as “traitors.” They had turned their backs on the German 
Wehrmacht. He described them as criminals because they had been in 
concentration camps; for him that made them “naturally” the strongest 
advocates of German collective guilt.  
Schuhler was a common soldier who was happy and eager to work for 
his own good, even when it served the U.S. economy. Schuhler was 
categorized as a possible candidate for the reeducation program for which 
German prisoners allegedly only qualified if they were anti-Nazi. However, 
Schuhler‟s representation of the main conflicts in U.S. captivity demonstrates 
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that he had assimilated prevalent Nazi beliefs about concentration camps, 
deserters, and National subjects and did not adjust his understanding. 
Schuhler‟s narrative portrays his relationship with the U.S. military as 
unproblematic. Even though he was labeled an “anti-Nazi,” perhaps because 
he so diligently participated in the labor program, Schuhler‟s main conflict 
revolved around the loss of comradely cohesion among the prisoner 
population. 
4.5 Conclusion 
Koch, Müller, and Schuhler‟s memories of U.S. captivity revolve 
around their emotional memories that stemmed from the loss of their sense 
of national cohesion in 1945. Their memories revolve around the tensions 
between their past emotional identifications as a national subjects and their 
desire to be respectable and ethical postwar German subjects. Müller sought 
to preserve and justify his nationalism by composing memories of receiving 
recognition from representatives of the U.S. military. Schuhler did the same, 
but his memory is less concerned with ethical questions than it is concerned 
with the loss of national comradeship among German soldiers. Schuhler‟s 
discomposure stemmed from disappointment about the consequences of the 
war that resulted, for him, in the loss of his sense of cultural cohesion. Koch, 
however, composed his memory around contrasts between his past self and 
his seemingly approved, present self. Koch sought to achieve composure by 
proving that he was a changed man, has learned from his past mistakes, and 
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felt the need to expose these mistakes. Only by confessing that he was, 
indeed, a “Nazi,” was Koch able to compose an ethically respectable identity 
that he could live with. Koch, Müller and Schuhler had preserved their 
nationalism in captivity, but had composed very different memories revolving 
around the tensions between their past nationalist selves and the selves they 
felt they had to become in the years and decades after the war. 
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5. “ON BEHALF OF MY COMRADES” 
5.1 Introduction 
Most of my interviewees (and most Germans) were evaluated 
according to the criteria of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067 (JCS 1067) 
(1945-1947) after they returned to Germany in 1945 or 1946. As part of the 
Allied postwar denazification process, JCS 1067 declared the disbandment 
of the Nazi party and all its organizations, the abolishment of all National 
Socialist laws, and the dismissal of Nazi party members in public office. 
Moreover, it demanded the automatic arrest of several National Socialist 
groups and organizations, such as the SS, and the automatic release of 
groups not defined as criminal.  
The majority of war prisoners were exonerated because they were 
members of the Wehrmacht, which was not declared a criminal organization 
in the Nuremberg Trials. However, men who had been in the Waffen SS, the 
armed part of the SS, were automatically categorized as “lesser offenders.”  
The Allied Control Council, responsible for implementing denazification in 
four zones of occupation, also issued directive no. 24, which demanded the 
removal of National Socialists and resisting persons, as well as directive no. 
38, which distinguished between five categories of war criminals: major 
offenders, offenders, lesser offenders, followers and persons exonerated. 
Angelika Königseder argues that sentences were decided based on 
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testimony given in screenings and denazification hearings, which sought to 
determine potential threats to postwar German society.  
This chapter discusses interviews with Herr Vogel, Herr Becker and 
Herr Bachmann. Herr Vogel was deemed a „danger to society‟ as a 
consequence of the statements he made during an interrogation. Herr 
Becker and Herr Bachmann had been members of the Waffen SS, a criminal 
organization, but convinced their captors they had become Waffen SS 
members against their better judgment and therefore posed no threat to 
postwar Germany or the Allied occupation forces. As punishment for being 
“lesser offenders” by virtue of their Waffen SS affiliation, Becker and 
Bachmann were interned in American Internierungslager (internment camps), 
facilities which had previously been used by the Nazis as concentration 
camps. Internment camps were special facilities for national and local Nazi 
officials, members of SS, SD, and the Gestapo, and suspected war criminals. 
Königseder estimates that 92,259 persons in the U.S. zone, 64,500 in the 
British zone, 18,963 in the French zone, and 67,179 persons in the Soviet 
zones were placed in internment camps (Benz 114-17). These persons were 
removed from the civilian population and from the general population of 
surrendered or defeated enemy personnel.  
Vogel, Becker and Bachmann were thus clearly set apart from 
“common soldiers” and therefore had to negotiate a position fundamentally 
different from most of the other soldiers I interviewed. Their separation from 
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the general German population, both military and civilian, put the two former 
Waffen SS soldiers in a unique relationship with the public memories of the 
war in western Germany. Their roles as outsiders become apparent in their 
private memories of captivity as punishment. They were legally punished for 
their affiliation with the Waffen SS or for being deemed a danger to postwar 
German society.  
5.2 Herr Vogel: “On Behalf of my Comrades” 
I spoke with Herrmann Vogel (1913-2004) in a telephone interview in 
2002. He had been erster Generalstabsoffizier (first officer of the General 
Staff) of a newly formed infantry division of 10,000 men, which fought in 
Mecklenburg against the Red Army in April and May 1945. Vogel was in the 
upper echelon of command, right under the Wehrmacht High Command 
(OKW) in the eastern front, which means that he not only engaged in the 
warfare in the East, but also relayed the combat orders. Vogel explains that 
as the “1A,” he had been educated in tactics at the war academy. He was the 
tactical advisor to the division‟s commander.  
Vogel eagerly participated in my project—he contacted me, in 
factand told me right away that he disagreed with the representations of 
the German Wehrmacht in the public media and politics, and the ways in 
which the “dear Germans” had commemorated the past. When we first spoke 
on the telephone, he stated that he had no worries about “speaking openly” 
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with me because he “was of the opinion that we should indeed give the war 
witnesses—those who are still alive—their right to speak, so that all that 
nonsense,... started and put out into the world by the Germans, that Herr 
Reemstma,… finally gets sorted out. It‟s not the Americans;” Vogel added, 
“it‟s the dear Germans [who are talking] nonsense about the war.”  Vogel 
spontaneously accused Jan Phillip Reemtsma, the sponsor of the Crimes of 
the German Wehrmacht exhibit, of “consciously distorting the truth” about the 
Wehrmacht generally, and about its actions at the eastern front specifically. 
Speaking from “a relatively high position,” Vogel said, he strongly 
disagreed with the slogan, “soldiers are murderers.” Vogel‟s repeated 
references to this Kurt Tucholksy phrase (first published in a German 
newspaper in 1931) strategically complicates the question of guilt by implying 
that pacifists who call soldiers murderers are guilty of denunciation. Pacifists 
in Germany have used this recognizable phrase over the past seven 
decades, inciting controversy about its legal and ethical ramifications. Around 
the same time that the Crimes of the German Wehrmacht exhibit was 
opened, a public debate began, in which the conservative parties CDU/CSU 
asked the court to make the public denunciation of soldiers illegal. The 
request was denied by popular demand.  
Vogel‟s repeated references thus resonate with the sectional 
memories promoted by German militarists and veterans organizations and 
with his narrative of American captivity. His captivity story, along with his 
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objections to pacifism and the claim that soldiers are murderers, composed 
Vogel‟s memory. Vogel complained, “With that Reemstma exhibition, the 
Wehrmacht exhibition [sic.] and all that, these interpretations [of soldiers as 
murderers] will survive. If we reduced those stories [about the crimes of the 
Wehrmacht] back into reality that would not even be possible.”  Attempting to 
discredit the exhibit, Vogel drew only from his own subjective interpretations. 
Vogel acknowledged that the crimes the exhibit showed did, in fact, occur, 
but he sought to blame a small minority of soldiers for committing crimes 
outside of the generally proper conduct of Wehrmacht soldiers. Vogel 
disagreed with the phrase “soldiers are murderers” and the exhibit‟s claim 
that the Wehrmacht was involved in a war of annihilation:  
The Wehrmacht was an army of millions, and among millions, 
you will always find criminals. Today, more than one percent of 
all people are criminal. One can‟t just pick them out and say, 
that‟s how the Germans are. You know? They picked those 
events that were not altogether right and projected those onto 
the majority. And that is something that deeply disturbs me—on 
behalf of my comrades—nearly all [of whom] fell in the war.  
Vogel claimed that he spoke “on behalf of his comrades,” that he wished to 
counteract public denunciations of the German military because his 
comrades had died. Vogel‟s narrative does not really serve his soldiers, 
however, but it does serve him on two levels: by claiming to defend his 
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soldiers, by describing war crimes as exceptions to the rule, he deflected 
from the fact that first officers like himself implemented the National Socialist 
foreign policy in combat. He also deflected from his position of a first officer 
who must have strategized so that German soldiers would fight until the very 
end of a war that had already been lost. He was among those Germans who 
sought to defend the Third Reich at all costs.  
Vogel seemed to be more interested in restoring the reputation of the 
German Wehrmacht and his authority as first officer. His claim, to speak on 
behalf of his comrades, is especially telling in the context of immediate 
postwar Germany when Vogel was in U.S. captivity. In Homecomings, Frank 
Biess explains that the civilian population in 1945 and 1946 publicly 
complained to the Allies that among the men they released early were a 
disproportionately large number of ardent Nazis, including Wehrmacht 
officers who had carelessly ordered common soldiers (some of them teenage 
boys) to fight deadly battles they could not win. While these complaints 
mainly sought to exonerate family members, Biess suggests, they also 
showed that many Germans were willing to find and persecute Nazis. In that 
context, the German POWs who were in U.S. captivity in late 1945 and 1946, 
even those in favorable conditions as compared to the civilian population, 
were also publicly regarded as victims of an unfair Allied administration that 
failed to separate the Nazis from the less guilty Wehrmacht soldiers. In light 
of that particular conflict in postwar Germany at a time when Vogel was still 
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in captivity, his story about speaking “on behalf of his comrades” loses much 
of its substance, while illuminating his strategy for composure.  
Vogel‟s main strategy was to praise the German Wehrmacht by 
discrediting the U.S. military. Vogel used anecdotes from U.S. war captivity 
to substantiate his defense of the Wehrmacht and his rigid self-identification 
with National Socialist militarism. Vogel began by elaborating on the 
processes of his division‟s retreat from the Red Army. He thus fulfilled the 
dual purpose of illustrating his knowledge and perspective of a first officer 
with above-average military skills, as well as the American and German 
military‟s seemingly shared opinion that the German Wehrmacht should 
surrender to the U.S. forces rather than to the Red Army. This narrative 
emphasizes that the American military chose to break international law to 
help the German soldiers evade Soviet captivity. Vogel presented his 
surrender and subsequent captivity in American hands as a result of implied 
anti-Bolshevism among the German and American militaries. His narrative 
suggests that the German Wehrmacht and the American military shared a 
common understanding of warfare outside of the questions of guilt and 
responsibility.  
Vogel came to U.S. captivity at the end of the war. He and his infantry 
division were in the process of “fighting the Russians [sic]” eastwards of the 
demarcation line. Vogel explained that the Allies had decided on the 
demarcation lines at the Yalta Conference. The conference determined that 
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Germans were to be taken prisoner by whichever military occupied the zone 
in which they were fighting, upon their own surrender or defeat. The Allies 
informed the German military about the places where they expected them to 
surrender. However, on May 2, 1945—six days before Germany‟s official 
surrender—they were given the order to “retreat westwards over the 
demarcation line to surrender to the U.S. forces and be taken into captivity,” 
Vogel suggested. That plan “was negotiated and agreed on with the 
Americans” and included his division, as well as all other divisions fighting in 
Mecklenburg against the Soviet forces, “specifically the Armee Wenck that 
was, as is commonly known, to liberate Berlin, which didn‟t work.”  Vogel 
explained that the U.S. military was helpful to them: “the Americans allowed 
us to use our radios to withdraw from the enemy. See, you can‟t just retreat 
and leave ground. You separate from the enemy under artillery fire. You 
retreat further and further to the point where the Russians could not advance 
because that was taboo.” Apparently in violation of the Yalta agreements, the 
U.S. military helped the division to surrender to them instead of to the feared 
Red Army in whose designated territory they were fighting at the time.  
However, in the three-and-a-half weeks his division was in U.S. 
captivity, the U.S. military tried to turn them back over to the Soviet forces, to 
whom they should have surrendered in the first place. Vogel‟s division 
apparently successfully resisted and managed to negotiate to be moved 
instead to Schleswig Holstein, an area temporarily dedicated to POW 
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detainment, and then turned over to the British forces. Even though the U.S. 
military was helpful in “protecting” them from Soviet captivity, Vogel felt 
insulted that they had tried to change their minds.  
Vogel‟s story resonates with a sense of entitlement: for being a 
general staff in the German Wehrmacht, for being a German. He felt entitled 
to be held in western captivity, where conditions were reputably good, and he 
found this entitlement seemingly justified by the very fact that the U.S. 
military at the time of active warfare chose to override international 
agreements with the Soviet Union. Vogel‟s sense of entitlement is also 
illustrated by his perceptions of the American soldiers who were in charge of 
them during those three-and-a-half weeks. Vogel claimed that he obtained a 
“distinctly poor impression of the Americans.” He believed they had 
surrendered on May 3, 1945 to the 3rd Battalion of the 28th U.S. Infantry 
Division from Texas, which he described as “reputedly unintelligent.” Vogel‟s 
experience of U.S. captivity “disappointed” him. He said that: 
with all that we experienced in captivity, we were depressed 
that—in spite of our expertise and all these things—that we 
were on the side of the losers. Well, and the battalion, as far as 
their combat ability was concerned—if they had had to fight the 
Russians [sic], they would have gone under as a result of their 
immobility. They would have been inept. Well, but that‟s just the 
way it was. As is commonly known, the Americans have always 
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won not by especially good tactics or skilled single combatants, 
but with an overabundance of materials. They are still doing 
that to this day. 
Vogel felt superior both as a militarist and as a German, as his descriptions 
of his captivity experience suggests. His assessment of the U.S. soldiers‟ 
alleged lack of qualification foregrounds his arrogance at being an educated, 
upper-ranking German militarist, a rank he was only able to obtain due to his 
age and his upper-class background.  
Vogel also seemed to defend the German military‟s rigid class 
structure. He claimed that the first encounter with the U.S. military 
organization shocked him. “The adjutant of the battalion carried the radio unit 
on his own back and had to make radio contact without the help of a Non-
Commissioned officer. I asked him why he did that by himself and he said, 
„We do not have well-trained people like you who can do that.‟ That was my 
first impression in captivity—that an adjutant has to do what was in our army 
an absolutely subordinate task.”  Nevertheless, Vogel felt that the “co-
operation” between the U.S. and German military officers was “very proper 
and respectable, and very good. And we among the upper ranks quickly got 
the impression that we were quite fortunate that things worked out the way 
they did, aside from the provisions.”   
Vogel described captivity in very practical and administrative terms, 
showing that he was able to judge the quality of the U.S. military‟s camp 
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administration from his professional military position. For instance, Vogel 
defended the material conditions in the U.S.-run camps immediately after the 
war. Because a large mass of Germans surrendered to the U.S. forces, “the 
Americans,” Vogel explained, “were overburdened, mainly when it came to 
food. That was a very, very big problem, but inevitable.” The U.S. military 
was only able to offer the POWs one daily ration for twenty persons. They 
still had some food and were able to cook with their field-kitchens but soon 
resorted to slaughtering and eating their horses. 
However, Vogel criticizes the U.S. soldiers from the “Texan” battalion. 
He stated that they “picked” the German‟s badges and wristwatches. Some 
of them, Vogel claimed, would have up to six watches on each arm. If they 
had horses, they would ride them “rambunctiously,” still wearing the steel 
helmets, “seemingly out of a feeling of exaltation,” even though the war was 
over, with their fingers on the trigger. That made Vogel very “uncomfortable” 
because:  
one never knew if one of them would pull the trigger. Nothing 
much happened, but they simply had slightly odd manners. For 
example, there were watch guards who would get an armchair 
out of one of the houses and a parasol and did their watch duty 
in that armchair. That would have been utterly impossible with 
our German terms and conditions. Needless to say they were 
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occasionally falling asleep and our Lieutenants were still 
burning for action and stole the rifle from one of these posts. 
Vogel described roll calls as “very frustrating,” because the guards, he 
claimed, had a hard time counting to one hundred and had to repeat the 
procedures several times. Eventually, Vogel argued, the POWs helped the 
American guards with the task.  
In Vogel‟s narrative, the American soldiers meant well but lacked high 
qualifications. Vogel used these stories to show that the U.S. military had 
severe administrative difficulties and needed the German soldiers to get their 
own jobs done. From Vogel‟s perspective, U.S. soldiers, primarily the 
common soldiers, were incompetent and irresponsible, seemingly untrained 
in proper military conduct. He thereby created a contrast between him and 
his higher ranking German Wehrmacht officers and generals and the lower 
ranking U.S. soldiers.  
His captivity narrative served Vogel to represent Germany as culturally 
and militarily superior and the U.S. military as mostly “proper” and “fair” but 
“dumb.” This was at a time when Germany‟s atrocities were revealed 
worldwide. As first officer in the Wehrmacht, he knew that many of his army‟s 
operations violated the Hague rules, but he still felt unquestionably entitled to 
protection under those same laws. This illustrates that in captivity Vogel 
actively chose to preserve—but also was given the opportunity to preserve—
his sense of superiority and impunity for the crimes they committed in the 
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name of the German “Volk” (“people”). Vogel represented the “proper” 
treatment they received from the U.S. forces as their right. The same rules 
and regulations the Wehrmacht broke now protected them from the 
consequences of their actions. 
His interview illustrates two things I wish to emphasize. First, it shows 
that Vogel was capable of preserving the sense of self that he had created in 
the ideological framework of National Socialist militarism. It also shows that 
he has sought to protect this sense of self from pacifist and humanist 
discourses generally and the claims of the Wehrmacht exhibition specifically. 
Second, his interview also allows insight into the relatively amicable 
relationships between the American and German militaries at the end of the 
war. More specifically, it serves as an example of the admiration many 
American military members had for the German Wehrmacht. The treatment 
he received in captivity appears to comprise a less visible layer of postwar 
German-American relations that began to emerge only more prominently in 
1948, with the onset of the Cold War, and was firmly established in 1955, 
with the remilitarization of West Germany as part of the Alliance with the 
United States. Like my interviews with most of the subjects, Vogel‟s interview 
suggests that the relationship between the German and the United States 
militaries remained friendly in spite of the hostilities and Germany‟s atrocities.  
Vogel‟s narrative attempts to defend and justify German militarism in 
the Third Reich with stories about the German Wehrmacht‟s strategic and 
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organizational competence. In his narrative, German soldiers are better 
qualified than U.S. soldiers, a focus on competence that seems to serve as a 
positive identification for him, only possible in the absence of empathy for 
those people who were killed by that same alleged competence and 
effectiveness. His belief in German military superiority was the result of 
National Socialist propaganda, as was the perceived “incompetence” of the 
U.S. military. Vogel‟s representation of U.S. soldiers in captivity corresponds 
precisely to Nazi propaganda. American captivity gave Vogel evidence to 
support his assumptions about America incompetence, which he seems to 
find more important to remember than the immorality of the war.  
Far more disturbing were Vogel‟s interpretations of the persecution of 
the Jews in Germany. Vogel described the history of anti-Semitism, 
persecution, and even the murder of Jews in Europe as “nothing new” in the 
world. They had always been wronged and mistreated, he claimed, and 
implied that what the Germans did to European Jews in the Third Reich was 
morally no more despicable than what had been done to them hundreds of 
years prior to Hitler. Even in reference to the Holocaust, Vogel described 
Germans as more competent than others. Vogel claims that the only 
difference between the past and the Third Reich was that the Germans were 
more effective at murdering Jews: “unfortunately, when the Germans do 
something, they do it thoroughly, as is commonly known.”  Vogel, whose 
remarks are so blatantly flippant, as if he were not talking about human 
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beings, simultaneously claimed that he had not approved of the treatment of 
the Jews in the Third Reich.  
Vogel did not explicitly distance himself from Hitler‟s ideology, and he 
did not even try very hard to hide his apparent distrust of Jews. Even though 
Vogel claimed that Jews had done nothing to deserve being singled out by 
the regime, he still distrusted his Jewish interrogators. Vogel was 
disappointed over having lost the war to what he perceived to be an under-
qualified and poorly trained American military that would not have been able 
to withstand the Soviet Army or to win as many battles as the German 
Wehrmacht had. 
Because his division was in the Soviet zone of occupation, they were 
supposed to be in Soviet captivity. Within his three-and-a-half weeks of U.S. 
captivity, the U.S. military tried to turn the division over to the Soviet forces, 
but Vogel and his superiors managed to negotiate with them to be moved to 
a British camp in East Holstein, which was north of Schleswig Holstein in the 
British occupation zone. Because the Allies, including the British, released 
their prisoners in the order in which they were needed to rebuild Europe, 
farmers went first, and officers of the General Staff and Generals were last. 
Waiting to be processed for release, in 1946 they were moved to the 
Münsterlager, where they were put in front of a review board and were 
“practically denazified.” Vogel claims that all men who were in the Marines 
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were interrogated by the British Marine people, “all others were interrogated 
by emigrated Jews. Well, and they had a pretty rough tone.”  
Unfair treatment, according to him, did not really come from the U.S. 
military but from Jews in the intelligence service.33  Again, Vogel‟s anti-
Semitism makes itself heard in spite of his story about having opposed the 
persecution of the Jews. Vogel claimed that he was interrogated by a Jewish 
intelligence officer from Saxony. When Vogel told him that he was a 
professional soldier, the interrogator allegedly responded in German, “„So, 
you have made murder your profession.‟ In response to which I said, „Sure, 
just like Montgomery and Eisenhower.” Again, Vogel sought to represent the 
German military and the American military in terms of moral equivalence, 
excluding from his interpretation the fact that Germany had started the war, 
not the United States or Great Britain, and that Germany fought an illegal war 
that was from the start planned and carried out as a war of extermination. 
Vogel claimed the interrogator called in two more interrogators and 
stated that he, as the first operations officer in this division, must be “an 
ardent Nazi” because, “as is commonly known, only ardent Nazis served in 
this division.”  Vogel claimed that he responded:  
„Aside from the fact that that‟s not true, I am sure your 
prognosis would also apply to the commander of the division … 
whom you have released four weeks ago.‟ They did not like 
                                               
33 Marcuse explains that the documents of the intelligence service have not been made 
accessible to researchers.  
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hearing that, either, and the outcome of the interrogation was 
that I was declared to be a danger to the democratic Aufbau 
[construction] of Germany and had to be put in detention to 
protect the general German public, and would therefore be 
interned. 
His status was changed from prisoner of war to criminal internee. Vogel 
resisted the interrogators, even though feigned compliance might have 
motivated his interrogators to repatriate him with lesser punishment. Vogel‟s 
narrative presents him as a firm, consistent, and frank military man with the 
conviction that the German Wehrmacht had not done anything the western 
Allies had not done to win the war.  
After the interrogation, Vogel was transported to a civil internment 
camp, CIC Adelheide.34  In Adelheide, intelligence service from Erfurth 
arrived and captors told Vogel and his peers that their “time of white collars 
were over. You now have the opportunity to learn a decent profession. You 
can become a mason, a tailor, or a mechanic so that you can finally become 
a proper member of society.” Vogel confessed that he thought, “oh well, if 
that‟s how it is, then I will become a mason. After all, Hitler always said that „I 
will rebuild Germany, more beautifully than ever before.‟ So, I learned to 
become a mason.”  Vogel appeared unashamed to reference and imitate 
Hitler‟s worldview. More importantly, he presented his acceptance of what 
                                               
34 Also, see Harold Marcuse on several CICs, including Dachau‟s postwar utilization as a 
CIC. CIC Adelheide is also referred to as a special camp no.11.  
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turned out to be a temporary punishment for his defiance during the 
interrogation as another way to insert his Nazi beliefs in spite of the U.S. 
military‟s attempt to change him. 
  Vogel claimed that a British delegation visited the camp in 1948 while 
representatives of the intelligence service “were having their Shabbos.” The 
delegation allegedly overrode the decisions of the Jewish intelligence service 
officers during their Sabbath, and decided that the inmates were not a 
danger to the German postwar society and released them. According to 
Vogel, he was never questioned again. Later, he learned he had been 
“documented as category five,” the least incriminated, “and all that without 
any noticeable brainwashing.”35 He pointed out that not he, but rather the 
interrogators, had changed their politics. Vogel sought to illustrate his own 
consistency and the outsider‟s inconsistency. Vogel‟s consistently National 
Socialist consciousness was meant to represent him as more authentic and 
honest than either the U.S. military or the interrogators.  
Vogel‟s memories of the confrontations between the victors and the 
Germans served to illustrate his mentality at the end of the war. He distanced 
himself from the accusation that all German Wehrmacht members had 
participated in exceptionally violent crimes against eastern European 
civilians. Thus, Vogel resisted the claim that Germany had fought a war that 
was fundamentally different from all other wars before or after. Instead, he 
                                               
35 This remark was clearly meant to be sarcastic.  
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presented the German Wehrmacht as more qualified and prestigious, role 
models for effective warfare whom the United States even today would do 
well to imitate. Vogel‟s sense of composure derived from his continued sense 
of superiority and continuity.  
Vogel‟s memory represents the Wehrmacht, even Nazis, as superior 
to their victors. He described his American captors as “dumb” but “fair” and 
the Wehrmacht as capable and even helpful so that the American soldiers 
could hold them captive. Like a reversal of the characters in Hogan‟s Heroes, 
a popular U.S. TV series from the 1960s about U.S. soldiers in German 
captivity, the German military characters in Vogel‟s narrative could have left 
the camp whenever they pleased. They could have stolen the U.S. soldiers‟ 
weapons because the latter were allegedly so neglectful as to go to sleep 
while on watch duty. Vogel used all of these incidents to present the 
Wehrmacht as the qualitative winners of the war. They were more capable 
than “the Americans,” if not cooler, calmer and more collected in their 
willingness to accept their position as captives of allegedly unqualified 
soldiers. Vogel thereby composed his memory by presenting the German 
soldiers as rational thinking people who fulfilled military chores in a detached 
and thoughtful manner—an image that would contrast starkly with the images 
shown by the Crimes of the German Wehrmacht exhibit.  
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5.3 Herr Becker: “The Same Porcelain Insulators”  
Herr Becker was born in a small town in southwestern Germany in 
December 1926. At the age of seventeen, Becker joined the motorized 
Waffen SS, the armored SS Division Das Reich, Regiment Der Führer. He 
participated in campaigns in the eastern and western war theaters and fell 
into the hands of the U.S. military when the war in Europe ended. Becker 
was held briefly as a POW before being declared a “lesser offender” for his 
Waffen SS membership and placed in Flossenbürg, a liberated concentration 
camp in which the American military held members of the SS and Waffen 
SS. 
Becker‟s interview did not address debates about the Wehrmacht 
crimes. While the Nuremberg Trials ostensibly proved to the German 
population that the Wehrmacht was “clean,” the Waffen SS came to 
represent the most ferocious, criminal acts of warfare. Distinctions between 
the Wehrmacht and the Waffen SS have contributed to the exoneration of the 
Wehrmacht from its participation in atrocities and war crimes. Becker did not 
discuss these debates—about the Crimes of the German Wehrmacht 
exhibit—even though he could have addressed the exhibit to show that his 
guilt was no greater than the guilt of millions of his fellow Germans.  
Becker did not use the debate to diminish his guilt. His lack of reaction 
to the exhibit leads me to conclude that the new debates did not affect 
Becker‟s composure. The truth about the criminality of the Waffen SS had 
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been decided more than fifty years before our interviews. In the transnational 
context of American captivity and the sentence they received based on JCS 
1067, Becker was not able to construct stories of exoneration based on their 
military affiliation, unlike members of the Wehrmacht.  
However, Becker‟s narrative remains linked to the alleged distinctions 
between the National Socialist regime and the German military. Becker relies 
on the falsehood that German military activities during the Second World War 
had nothing do to with National Socialist ideologies or convictions. The core 
of Becker‟s argument is that he did what he was told to do and was a proper, 
professional, and levelheaded soldier whose actions were based on following 
orders. In this regard, Becker joined the thousands of German soldiers who 
contrasted their patriotic behavior with that of “Nazis,” who enjoyed killing. 
Similar to many other German Second World War veterans, Becker 
shaped his memories according to his denazification testimony. In 
interrogations and denazification testimonies, these men articulated stories of 
their actions for an audience not composed of their peers (anticipatory 
memory). To make his memories conform to a story that qualified him for 
exoneration by his U.S. captors, Becker explained during his interrogation 
that he was in the Waffen SS “against his will.” Becker used his 
denazification story in his interview with me, indicating the enduring value of 
the memory he composed at the end of the Second World War. At the time, 
Becker and his peers faced not only punishment, but also the loss of their 
156 
 
possessions and future careers. During my interviews (2001-2004), these 
former German POWs were retired and had successfully raised their children 
to adulthood. They no longer feared losing their jobs and livelihood. Late in 
their lives, Becker and his peers were in safer positions to correct their earlier 
rationalizations and strategies for excusing their crimes, yet Becker did not 
do so.  
 Instead, Becker emphasized that he had just turned seventeen when, 
on 7 January 1943, he was conscripted into the Reichsarbeitsdienst (RAD) 
(Reich Labor Service), a six-month labor program mandatory for German 
men and women between seventeen and twenty-five to receive National 
Socialist ideological, practical and pre-military training (Bartsch). Most 
German men were drafted into the Wehrmacht after their six-month RAD, but 
Becker claims that SS representatives visited only eight days after he began 
his RAD to lecture on the elite status of the SS and its devotion to National 
Socialism and the Führer, then “picked” and “commanded” him into the ranks 
of the Waffen SS. After physical examinations, Becker was again “picked” for 
the infantry and became a member of the motorized Waffen SS Division Das 
Reich. 
Becker‟s emphasis on being picked and ordered into the SS was the 
first part in a chronological series of events in his denazification story that 
convinced authorities that Becker had not become a Waffen SS member 
based on his ideological convictions. The sound-byte that Becker repeated 
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frequently during the interview was that he was “forced” into the Waffen SS; 
this comprised his plea for exoneration. However, the friend who had referred 
me to Becker told me directly that Becker had volunteered eagerly for the 
Waffen SS. The friend, who had experienced similar recruitment procedures, 
argued that men were rarely forced and that most were free to decide. This 
interviewee was among the men who would not step forward and therefore 
remained in the Wehrmacht. Becker chose to stand by his denazification 
testimony when he spoke with me, even though he seemed to have revealed 
a different story to his friend. 
Whether Becker had volunteered for the Waffen SS or had been 
forced was an ethical question, but at the end of the war it was mainly a legal 
question because it decided the severity of his punishment and the course of 
his future career. Had Becker become a member of the Waffen SS prior to 
1942, he would probably not have been able to claim that he was “forced” 
into the Waffen SS because membership until then was voluntary. 
Nevertheless, Becker sufficiently persuaded the authorities that he would not 
be a threat to a democratic postwar Germany and was therefore deemed 
only minimally incriminated.  
With the verdict he received in the 1940s in hand, Becker appeared 
comfortable telling the story of his deployment, presenting himself as 
emotionally uninvolved (and therefore a non-Nazi soldier), but Becker‟s 
sense of community within Waffen SS seems to contradict his denazification 
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story. Becker emphasized the “immense comradeship” and “harmony” he felt 
among Waffen SS members, which was lost when men in captivity 
denounced one another or Nazi Germany.  
Becker never mentioned feeling out of place, disliking his job, or being 
associated with a stigmatized organization. On the contrary, he appeared to 
feel like an accepted, proper member of the Waffen SS, saying “I was the 
kind of person, I have always, uh, done what was asked of me; I never 
dropped out. And I was…I was athletically pretty fit. I took part in everything. 
And, uh. I had basically nothing to fear.”  He admitted that Waffen-SS 
soldiers were better dressed and equipped than Wehrmacht soldiers. His 
brother had been in the Wehrmacht and was sometimes inadequately 
dressed, so he gave him his uniform while on leave, which Becker could 
apparently afford because he ordered and received a new uniform for himself 
before redeployment. Becker‟s sense of security in the Waffen SS thus 
suggests his feelings of physical and material superiority over Wehrmacht 
units, an attitude stemming from his division‟s modern heavy armament and 
greater privileges and advantages than other men in combat enjoyed.  
Becker presented himself as a well-adjusted, cooperative soldier 
whose service at the front was unobjectionable. He befriended a captain of 
his unit, a man twice his age who was a Lieutenant from Baden 
Württemberg. “I got along with him very well; and I always did what I was 
told; and I was dedicated, he remembered.” Becker emphasized that his 
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captain often complimented him for his driving skills. Proud to be good driver 
and to fit in and get along, Becker explained how he: 
drove the trucks for the [German] troops in Russia and in 
Normandy and in the Ardennes. I had a special vehicle, namely 
an all-wheel drive ... with grenade launchers, 12.5. And then I 
was in the unit. That was in the Ardennes. And in Hungary, 
when we were in Hungary and in Russia, I always drove the 
trucks. I drove down to the front and back again. At night, I 
brought them food and brought the wounded back with me. 
That was my job.  
Although Becker emphasized his driving skills, he also described his job as if 
it were a standard occupation for a man his age. He spoke about killings of 
Soviet prisoners with a casual tone. Becker claimed, “we made prisoners in 
the Ardennes,” but “we didn‟t take prisoners in Russia.”  Killing Soviet 
soldiers and executing Soviet civilians after they were taken prisoner were 
common practices, and not only among Waffen SS members. These actions 
were later considered war crimes, but not by the standards of German 
warfare in the Third Reich. According to Hergard Robel, about three million 
out of a total of five million Soviet POWs died or were killed by the Germans 
during the war.  
Becker clothed his memories of killing Soviet soldiers and civilians 
with descriptions of his driving duties. He drove men from the front lines to 
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the rear areas, where they were transferred even further back. Becker 
claimed not to have known what happened to enemy soldiers near the front 
lines and denied knowing the fates of the captured soldiers after transporting 
them to the rear. When I requested more details, Becker claimed he could 
remember no incidents involving “Russians.”  This sounded more like a 
rejection of my questions than a lapse of memory, because Becker did not 
ask about the events to which I referred. His denial of taking prisoners in the 
Soviet Union was the most he would let himself to say or allow me to hear.  
Becker spoke of his past as if it had been a series of ordinary 
movements from one location to another or a list of stations, each one as 
mundane as the next. Within this sequence of seemingly ordinary events, 
there are casual references to brief vacations at home, military actions, 
lengthy drives, and “Partisaneneinsatz” (“partisan actions”), as if 
discriminating among these incidents were mere formality. All events became 
part of the same chronological story Becker offered with no inflection or 
emotion. For instance, in March 1945, he and his division were in Dresden 
and then moved to Czechoslovakia, where they learned that Adolf Hitler had 
died:   
We were a motorized unit—well equipped—and then we drove 
to Prague and, well, restored the calm there—we had a high 
profile there—and then it got calmer. We were a regiment. 
That‟s more than 1,000 heavily armed men and lots of armored 
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vehicles, armored personnel carriers. That was a good 
regiment, that is, well equipped. 
Becker explained his regiment‟s action in Prague:  
There was an uprising. There were many Wehrmacht members 
there in Prague and we had to go to Prague. We freed those 
who were isolated in there; they were closed-in on in there. We 
got them out. That was almost half a division that we got out of 
there, but then we went back to the west where we went into 
captivity. 
Becker‟s narrative neither responds to nor even acknowledges the 
Wehrmacht exhibition nor the public debates about genocidal warfare that 
included some criminal actions of his division. He seemed content with the 
story of himself as a “lesser offender” among a group of war criminals, but he 
also perceived the Waffen SS as an elite organization of agents who were 
physically and militarily superior to the Wehrmacht.  
From Prague, Becker and the rest of his division moved west to “meet 
and surrender to the American troops” in Klatovy in Czecheslovakia, where 
the American military had a Sammellager, a camp where the Germans 
soldiers were to gather. These camps usually consisted only of grasslands 
and farmlands, some of which were enclosed by fences. Becker and his 
group were told to park their vehicles, put down their weapons, walk into the 
camp and “sit in tank furrows” until further notice. Becker claimed, “the 
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guards had nothing to worry about. We had no interest in leaving—we felt 
comfortable being with the Americans and not the Russians.”  With his 
assertion of comfort in American captivity, Becker immediately established 
an impression of German-American amicability. The implication is that he 
and his peers would have been motivated to fight had they been in a Soviet 
camp. 
Becker claimed that he and the rest of the captives stayed in the 
temporary enclosure for six to eight weeks before being transferred to the 
barracks in Klatovy and from there “loaned” to Czechoslovakian farmers as 
field hands during August and September 1945. Again, Becker related the 
events in the matter-of-fact tone of voice and monotonous chronology that 
characterized his narrative style throughout the interview. After their work for 
the Czech farmers, he and the other Waffen SS men were transported by the 
American military to Flossenbürg, which Becker described as a “prisoner of 
war camp that was previously a concentration camp” where “all the SS men 
stayed until April or May 1946.”  
Flossenbürg was in northern Bavaria, close to the Czechoslovakian 
border and in the vicinity of several large granite quarries where, as early as 
1938, the SS had used slave laborers as workers. Barbara Distel argues that 
the Nazis had “no consideration for the health and life” of these laborers 
(462-64). Distel also notes that by 1944, there were more than one hundred 
branch camps around Flossenbürg that held about 45,000 prisoners, 
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including 16,000 women. Starting in 1944, Flossenbürg was also an 
execution camp, where 1,500 people were put to death, including Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer and others who were involved in the July 20, 1944. assassination 
attempt on Hitler. Distel estimates that 30,000 of the total 100,000 inmates of 
Flossenbürg died in the camps or on death marches when the SS evacuated 
the camps as late as the end of April 1945.  
However, Becker‟s recollection did not seem to match either the 
historical descriptions of the camp or the historical descriptions of the Waffen 
SS’ acts in the Second World War. Becker claimed that he and his peers had 
been in the Flossenbürg camp for three to four weeks before they realized 
that people had been killed there. He found out through a conversation with 
his peers; they were in the showers and one man said that people “had been 
gassed” in those showers, which is highly improbable since there were no 
gas chambers in Flossenbürg. More important, however, is his claim that he 
“hadn‟t known that people were killed.”  He stated, “I knew there were 
concentration camps where people were interned and had to accustom 
themselves to a daily routine,” yet he claimed ignorance about the killings in 
the camps. Becker‟s story thus accomplishes two things at once. It 
represents his ignorance about the Holocaust and inserts his and his peers‟ 
bodies into the image of the gas chambers; victims who had actually lived or 
were killed by the SS in Flossenbürg were absent from Becker‟s image of the 
camp. Moreover, Becker‟s narrative persistently refers to the internment 
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camp as a concentration camp, which was its purpose until Germany lost the 
war but not when the American military used it as an internment camp.  
The American military had significantly improved the conditions in 
these barracks before the SS men arrived, but, according to Becker, there 
was still uncomfortably little space for the 280 interned Waffen SS men in 
each barrack; by contrast, the Nazis had forced about 500 persons to live in 
these same barracks before Germany‟s defeat. The prisoners slept in three-
level wooden bunk beds. Becker complained that there was room only for 
three people in the corridors, and that the place was overcrowded and did 
not allow for good personal hygiene. He mentioned having had lice and 
mange. Yet, the U.S. military not only heated the barracks, it also gave the 
men more personal space than the SS had allowed its prisoners.  
Becker‟s use of the term “concentration camp” illuminates that he 
failed to differentiate between his fate in the hands of the American military 
and the fate of the victims of the SS. Becker actively emphasized that he was 
interned in a former concentration camp, apparent when he went to great 
lengths to describe a distinctive three-part fence: “The middle part of fence 
was electric; it still had the porcelain insulators the Nazis had installed.” He 
added, “That fence ran right by the latrines, which meant that one had to 
walk carefully not to get too close to the fence” on the way to the bathroom. 
With his story about the camp, Becker sought to illustrate his and his 
comrades‟ vulnerability in the camp. One time, Becker claimed, an American 
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guard shot into his barracks at night, wounding a man who was taken away 
and “did not return.” Becker‟s story about the fence and the shooting imply 
that the American military made the Waffen SS men vulnerable. By 
continually describing the camp as a “KZ,” the German abbreviation for 
concentration camp, and by focusing on the insulators and the same bunk 
beds, Becker‟s narrative illustrates that he was uncomfortable in Flossenbürg 
for both material and symbolic reasons.  
Becker spoke about learning from another inmate about German war 
crimes that were committed inside concentration camps, but he did not speak 
about how the victims who had been in the camps before him might have 
suffered. He felt as little sympathy for the people who suffered in the camps 
as he did for the partisans his division killed. Becker‟s narrative shows that 
although he learned about the Nazis‟ use of the camp, he did not empathize 
with any other human beings who had been at the mercy of “his” people. 
Where Becker‟s narrative could include human beings who suffered in Nazi 
camps, there is an absence, a void. The victims did not take human shape in 
his memory, though his peers did. Becker contemplated that people had lived 
and died in the camp before him, but not in an empathic way. On the 
contrary, he compared himself to them and felt superior and inconvenienced 
by the lack of comfort and safety in the camp.  
Becker‟s description of the American camp experience illuminates his 
mentality at the time. During our interview in 2002, Becker mentioned the 
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murders the Nazis had committed in concentration camps in order to distract 
from other war crimes he and his division had committed. He spoke directly 
about the war crimes in the concentration camps perhaps because he was 
not directly involved in them. However, Becker either ignored or downplayed 
the crimes in which he was directly involved. Like many other subjects, 
Becker distracted himself from his own crimes or acts of aggression by 
speaking plainly about the war crimes others had committed.  
Becker„s narrative overshadows and distracts from memories of 
killings that occurred in the streets in Germany, in the ghettos, and at the 
front. Becker stated that he took part in anti-partisan actions, which implies 
that he partook in killings of civilians, the majority of whom were Jewish. With 
the focus on the memory of the concentration camps, men like Becker can 
construct memories in which they have not seen or known of any atrocities, 
even though millions of them occurred not only in the areas in which he was 
deployed, but also in the actions of his division. Becker used his U.S. 
captivity story to deflect from the active aggressiveness he had embraced as 
a Waffen SS member and to construct a passive persona. He did not know 
about the genocide of the Jews, but he “had to be told.” He was not a 
hardened criminal but an ordinary guy rendered defenseless by the American 
military.  
Becker seemed eager to explain actions that the American military 
recognized as crimes at the time of his internment. Becker described 
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emotionally significant activities as normal or heroic, especially when he 
could assume that I would not recognize these activities as criminal. He 
mentioned not taking prisoners in the Soviet Union and took the statement 
back when I indicated that I knew what this might have entailed. He 
mentioned having established “order” in Prague—a Nazi euphemism for 
ferocious warfare—seemingly under the impression that a member of my 
generation would not understand the significance of his statement. Using 
National Socialist jargon with his peers also served Becker to preserve his 
identification with an outlawed regime and ideology. Becker did not question 
his activities in the war. He did not interrogate his understanding of National 
Socialism or the Third Reich. His constructed passivity and ignorance 
distracted from the active choices he made in the war. He distracted from his 
individual acts by associating himself with a whole paramilitary organization, 
the Waffen SS. Becker had ostensibly atoned for his crimes by serving his 
sentence in the American internment camp; nothing more was necessary. 
5.4 Herr Bachmann: “They didn’t like us much, the Americans” 
Herr Bachmann was born in 1925. He was a “cable-fox” in the Signal 
Troops of the 12. Waffen SS Panzer Division Hitler Jugend between 1943 
and 1945. The 12. SS-Panzer division was deployed in Chechnya, Italy, 
Holland, Belgium, Brussels, France, Hungary and Austria. Like Becker, 
Bachmann‟s narrative was chronological. He narrated the stations of his 
military involvement in battles against the Americans in the winter of 1944. 
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His division was sent to Budapest, Hungary, to “support” the German 
occupational forces, as he put it. On May 8, 1945, they had returned to 
Austria, where they surrendered to the American military.  
Bachmann was first incarcerated in a Sammellager in Altheim, Austria, 
for two months. There, he was among about 100,000 German prisoners who, 
according to his memories, got little water and even less food. Bachmann, 
who is about six‟ one”, claims he weighed only forty kilos (eighty-eight 
pounds) when he left. By the end of these two months, Bachmann says, 
everybody who had not been in the SS was released. Being one of the men 
who were interned when most German soldiers had been released, he was 
afraid the American military would treat him the way the German military 
treated its prisoners. The Americans, Bachmann says:  
drove us through the woods and then I saw in front of me a 
quarry in the front of the line. Then I thought, “Oh, my! What will 
happen this time? Everything that happened under the sign of 
the SS—now they are going to do the same things to us. 
Quarry. Machine guns. Uh. Those are totally logical thoughts 
one has in that situation. My legs got heavier and heavier and 
suddenly I see the line in front of me make a turn away from the 
quarry. Man, could I walk well all of a sudden. 
Instead of bringing the SS men to the quarry, the American military escorted 
them to the camp Ebensee, in Austria. During the war, Ebensee had been a 
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concentration camp similar to Flossenbürg. Bachmann did not speak about 
the details of the camp but mentioned that Ebensee was a satellite camp of 
the Concentration Camp Mathausen. During the war, it was referred to the 
SS Arbeitslager Zement. 
“They didn‟t like us much, the Americans,” Bachmann said. “When we 
came to Ebensee, there was still the sign Arbeit macht Frei and the porcelain 
insulators on the electrical fences were still there.” It was in this former 
concentration camp that Bachman learned about the “mountains of corpses” 
from the American press. He explained that he had “not known” about the 
“gas chambers” and the mass killings. When he arrived in Ebensee, he was 
confronted with those things he did not want to perceive or think about during 
the war, and he admitted that. When he was there, the concentration camps 
no longer looked like labor camps but like death facilities in which men and 
women had been worked to death. At Ebensee, Bachmann came into closer 
contact with former concentration camp inmates:  
A world collapsed for me. All that had happened? Madness … 
And now [the Americans] put me in the same dirty, bug-ridden, 
lice-infested barracks, in those plank beds—you know those 
from pictures, how they are lying there, sticking their heads out 
like chicken, and that‟s where they put us. The same plank 
beds. And, of course, all the lice. As a soldier, I knew lice. We 
had lice. Sometimes they crawled out of my sleeves. Lack of 
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hygiene. We could not wash for six weeks. No water. The same 
clothes on, day and night—in the snow and that‟s where you 
get lice. And the Kzl’er, [the concentration camp prisoners] who 
could not go home because they were from Russia or from 
Poland and did not want to go home or could not go home and 
were housed somewhere near, near the vacated concentration 
camp—uhm, they, naturally, happily threw stones at us or beat 
us up with clubs. We put our backpacks over our heads and 
walked in, into the concentration camp.  
Bachmann‟s narrative made him sound degraded or dishonored by being 
held captive in the same site where unspeakable horror had occurred. 
Bachmann was shocked to find himself in a place for people he thought were 
criminals; he interpreted photographs and his presence in the camp from a 
perspective of superiority to the camp‟s previous inmates. Today‟s audiences 
know these same photographs as evidence for the abuse of prisoners. In 
Bachmann‟s case, the photographs did not depict victims; instead, he saw 
unclean people beneath his social standing. He did not maintain this position 
during his interview, but Bachmann‟s emotional memory of the American 
military‟s confrontation with the camp remained unchanged.  
Bachmann married a Hungarian Jewish woman in the 1970s and has 
become very sympathetic to what she and her family endured during the war. 
However, when confronted with evidence of extermination camps and seeing 
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photographs of inmates, when recalling his captivity in a former concentration 
camp, Bachmann seems to return to the personal outrage he felt at the time. 
He would never be like the men who had been in the camp. 
Distel estimates almost 100,000 people were murdered at Mathausen 
and its branch camps. Mathausen was liberated by a U.S. tank division three 
days before Germany‟s defeat. In our interview, Bachmann seemed to know 
more about the camp than Becker had known or admitted knowing about 
Flossenbürg. Yet, Bachmann mentioned no details about the camp‟s 
previous function besides its beds and the security systems and the apparent 
distaste Americans expressed for their German prisoners.  
In Ebensee, Bachmann was interrogated by the American intelligence 
service, which was still searching for various high-ranking SS disguised as 
lower-ranking soldiers and using false German military identification. 
Bachmann‟s first three interrogations were “not pleasant,” as he put it. He 
said he was beaten, clubbed, and maimed. After the third interrogation, he 
claimed to be “fearful of the punches by the MPs. They were not particularly 
tender. Uh. The German police weren‟t tender, either, during prisoner 
interrogations. It‟s just like that, everywhere in the military.” His comparison 
of transgressions by the U.S. and German militaries implies that Bachmann 
did not feel victimized or treated unfairly, considering what he knew of 
military police methods. However, Bachmann‟s statement does make the 
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actions of the German military relative, complicating assumptions that the 
U.S. military was incapable of abuse. 
A young German-speaking lieutenant who identified himself as a 
German Jewish émigré from Frankfurt finally interrogated Bachmann. This 
new interrogator, Bachmann suggested, used a different method by offering 
him a cigarette and coffee and telling him directly why he was being 
questioned. Bachmann, whose narrative style is characterized by a lot of 
direct speech, imitates his interrogator‟s Hessian dialect: “Got beat up? 
Those are idiots. They aren‟t any better than your military police. But—uh, 
wanna cigarette? Coffee? OK, now. OK, now. You were 
Obersturmbannführer of the Waffen SS.” This would be equivalent to the 
rank of Lieutenant-Colonel in the American and British Armies (Ripley 338). 
At twenty years old, Bachmann could not have been an 
Obersturmbannführer, so Bachmann told this new interrogator: “Me? I am not 
even 21. I am only 20 years old. I can‟t BE an Obersturmbannführer at 20.” 
The interrogator allegedly responded, “OK, enough. You can go. Take a 
cigarette and get lost.” Bachmann was not interrogated again. 
Bachmann experienced these interrogations as the outcome of a 
moment when high-ranking Nazis managed to escape and lower-ranking 
soldiers were caught up in a convoluted screening process. He did not seem 
to feel bitter about the American interrogators and made sure to mention that 
they were no more aggressive than the German military police, though he 
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appeared to fear punishment for some unknown crime. Sometime later, he 
found out why he had been interrogated for so long. He claimed that he read 
a newspaper article years after the war that mentioned an escaped 
Obersturmbannführer with his same last name.36  Only then did he 
understand that the American military was in fact eager to find and 
apprehend this man. The problem was that they did not fully understand that 
a man Bachmann‟s age at the end of the war could not have possibly been 
able to reach the rank of Obersturmbannführer. The man they had searched 
for was more than thirty years older than Bachmann.  
Bachmann‟s narrative does not suggest he felt unfairly treated by the 
U.S. military, but he did feel the American interrogators were not very well 
informed about the German military and ranks. It took a German who also 
happened to be Jewish to correct a major misunderstanding caused by a 
higher ranking Waffen SS Obersturmbannführer, which was another example 
of how  lower ranking Germans “suffered” from rank and class hierarchy in 
the military and the Nazi state. The person who exonerated Bachmann from 
false accusations was a German Jew, and in this regard, his story is different 
from the stories other subjects shared. Most other subjects claimed they had 
been interrogated and victimized by revengeful Jewish interrogators. 
Bachmann, however, felt that the only person who managed to think clearly, 
                                               
36 I confirmed this story. The SS Obersturmbannführer was never apprehended. 
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and not vengefully, who was capable, and not ignorant, was this Jewish 
interrogator.  
 Even in the internment camp, Bachmann claimed he had received “so 
much food” all of a sudden, that they “got sick from it and sent home 
packages with sugar, butter and tobacco.” He and his “comrades” helped 
renovate the camp and deloused the barracks. Because the barracks could 
not be heated, they were moved out of Ebsensee in October or November 
1946 to another former concentration camp near Augsburg where Bachman 
worked in a motor pool, a kitchen, and a sick-station primarily for African-
American soldiers. Among various other things he perceived as absurd, he 
was ordered in Augsburg to paint several Mickey Mouse cartoons on the 
walls as a way to show the prisoners who was now in power.37 
Bachmann described his denazification as a farce because the 
screenings the American military undertook when he was interned were 
driven by a goal to punish criminals, not collectively exonerate Germans with 
symbolic fines. Standing in the middle of his living room, he read out his 
denazification papers: “The accused has joined the SS due to his very 
National Socialistically-inclined parents. We classified him as less 
incriminated. As atonement, he has to pay 250 marks.” He laughed and 
added:  “And that‟s how I was „atoned‟.” Both he and his wife rolled their eyes 
as he recited what was apparently his standard commentary on his 
                                               
37 Marcuse explains similar occasions where U.S. military personnel made German POWs 
do something seemingly American.  
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denazification: “Sobald das Geld im Kasten klingt / Die Seele in den Himmel 
springt,” (“As soon as the money drops in the box / The Soul jumps into 
heaven.”38 
Bachmann‟s interview reveals that confronting his memories about the 
concentration camp caused him to have strong emotions of hubris and 
outrage about having to be in the same place as people he did not consider 
his human equals. Herr Bachmann was not aware of the significance of his 
feelings when he described having to sleep in the “same bunk beds” where 
the concentration camp victims had “stuck their heads out like chicken.” His 
sense of unfair treatment after the war was not a form of convenient denial 
that focused him only on the cognitive aspects of memory, as some scholars 
might conclude. The concepts of denial or strategic forgetting often applied to 
German war memories do not manage to explain that so many Germans, 
such as Bachmann, truly lacked the ethical capacity necessary to understand 
the suffering of Jews in the Third Reich. For instance, denial or strategic 
forgetting do not manage to describe what he and his future wife experienced 
when they had their first conversation in a café in the 1970s. She told him 
that she was Jewish, and he responded with enthusiasm and reaffirmation 
that he felt very “close” to her and rolled up his sleeve to show his SS blood-
type tattoo for evidence. He explained that he knew what she had been 
                                               
38 This phrase refers to indulgences.  
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through because he, too, had undergone maltreatment in a former 
concentration camp after the war. He added to his explanation that he had 
once seen “slave laborers from concentration camps in their striped 
pajamas,” and only much later recognized his indifference and initial 
assumptions: “and I thought, oh well, there are some concentration camp 
guys. They must be criminals—and I moved on!”  In 1945, Bachmann felt 
outraged about being put in a camp “dirtied” by camp inmates and this 
emotion stayed in his memory as if it happened yesterday.  
By contrast, in the 1970s when met his future wife, Bachmann was 
better capable of appreciating what she had lived through during the Third 
Reich—even though he was not able to revise the emotional memory of 
feeling degraded in the former concentration camp.  
After their marriage, Bachmann and his wife traveled to Israel many 
times. He visited synagogue with her. Their armoire was decorated with flags 
of Israel and little tokens from both other families‟ and their own travels. Over 
their bathroom door hung a large poster photograph of the first postwar 
Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, who had established the ties with the western 
Allies, primarily the United States, and with Israel. In their living room, Herr 
and Frau Bachmann had collected symbols of national significance that 
correlated with their personal pasts. He showed me a little piece of wood he 
had made briefly after the war in which he had carved the names and dates 
of the prison camps where he was held. He kept his denazification papers 
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right beside it, along with his family photo album, and typed-up letters his 
father had distributed in the community, all signed “Heil Hitler.” 
5.5 Conclusion 
The interviews with Herr Vogel, Herr Becker and Herr Bachmann 
demonstrate how they composed their private memories of transnational 
relations in the context of their internment as incriminated subjects. Vogel, 
Becker and Bachmann remembered internment emotionally as forms of 
social degradation. Seeking to bring these emotional memories in alignment 
with their cognitive understanding of their previous roles in the Third Reich, 
they composed different memories and significantly different identities. 
Becker composed his memory by passively assuming the role of a man who 
simply followed orders—both in the war and in captivity. Becker appears as a 
member of the collective Waffen SS in stories about military successes. His 
memory also shows that Becker continued to evaluate these successes by 
National Socialist standards when he refers to “helping” Werhmacht troops 
“establish order.” However, Bachmann actively composed his memory by 
assuming the role of a man who emerged from his youthful deception. He 
admitted to being having volunteered for the Waffen SS, and explained that 
he had learned about his mistakes because of his internment in a former 
concentration camp. By contrast, Vogel composed his memory by assuming 
the role of a military authority, aggressively discrediting opposing viewpoints. 
Vogel, too, continued to evaluate and explain his actions during the war 
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through the lens of National Socialism, and he did so to defy social and 
cultural change after the German defeat.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
Most subjects who were captured in North Africa and were interned in 
the United States did not represent their capture and internment as a form of 
victimization. Most of them composed memories of war captivity as scenarios 
in which they could imagine themselves collectively and automatically 
exonerated by their sheer absence from the worst acts of violence. Some of 
them represented the U.S. military‟s acceptance of the prisoners‟ Nazi 
behavior as a reliable diagnosis of alleged non-Nazism. Others represented 
the U.S. military‟s positive treatment not only to show appreciation for what 
they perceived as a transnational comradeship, but also to defy socialist or 
anti-fascist discourses and preserve a sense of national cohesion after 1945.  
In each case, the interview subjects sought to compose an imagined, 
cohesive identity by composing memories of who they were and what they 
had experienced in U.S. captivity. Some sought to decontaminate their 
former selves from the stigma of Nazism, and others sought to protect their 
former selves from the sense of loss caused by the social changes in 1945.  
Most of the POWs in the United States composed very positive 
memories about captivity in which the U.S. military welcomed the German 
soldiers as comrades. This comradeship, as most of the interview subjects 
described it, revolved around personal interest, socialization, and, primarily, 
the fact that the U.S. military gave the POWs such generous access to their 
material wealth. They had plenty to eat, lived comfortably, were able to earn 
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money by participating in the labor programs and maintained a relatively 
luxurious life. German prisoners were also given access to privileges from 
which non-white Americans were excluded at the time. Material wealth, in 
addition to promises of repatriation and employment opportunities at home, 
helped to persuade German POWs to embrace the United States as a future 
ally more than the intellectual diversion the SPD had offered the prisoners 
between 1944 and 1945.  
Most of my interview subjects who were captured in Europe and 
interned in U.S. camps after the war did not represent their capture and 
internment as a form of victimization, but as a form of (temporary) 
degradation. They represented their internment as both physical punishment 
and symbolic humiliation. Vogel, Becker, and Bachmann had previously 
belonged to a military and National Socialist elite, and they still identified 
themselves as elite soldiers after 1945 when they were interned. Their 
memories revolved around their need to bring into cohesion their sense of 
privilege as members of a National Socialist and military elite and the loss of 
these privileges when they were interned.  
However, even Vogel, who aggressively defended his past degraded 
self from the “incompetent” U.S. soldiers, drew on memories of transnational 
military comradeship. Memories of “fair” relations between German and U.S. 
soldiers counteract German discourses that are critical of the German past. 
They do so because they resonate both with their emotional memories and 
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the transnational hegemonic memories of military relations between the 
United States and Germany after the war. It is in these private memories of 
this German-American (war and postwar) transnational comradeship where 
the United States—real and imagined—provides composure.  
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